Abstract
The life sciences are increasingly being called on to produce “socially robust” knowledge that honors the social contract between science and society. This has resulted in the emergence of a number of “broad social issues” that reflect the ethical tensions in these social contracts. These issues are framed in a variety of ways around the world, evidenced by differences in regulations addressing them. It is important to question whether these variations are simply regulatory variations or in fact reflect a contextual approach to ethics that brings into question the existence of a system of “global scientific ethics”. Nonetheless, within ethics education for scientists these broad social issues are often presented using this scheme of global ethics due to legacies of science ethics pedagogy. This paper suggests this may present barriers to fostering international discourse between communities of scientists, and may cause difficulties in harmonizing (and transporting) national regulations for the governance of these issues. Reinterpreting these variations according to how the content of ethical principles is attributed by communities is proposed as crucial for developing a robust international discourse. To illustrate this, the paper offers some empirical fieldwork data that considers how the concept of dual-use (as a broad social issue) was discussed within African and UK laboratories. Demonstrating that African scientists reshaped the concept of dual-use according to their own research environmental pressures and ascribed alternative content to the principles that underpin it, suggests that the limitations of a “global scientific ethics” system for these issues cannot be ignored.
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Notes
Such as, for instance, the “FFP” misconducts of falsification, fabrication and plagiarism.
These norms are also often listed in codes of conduct or codes of practice.
Ie. The principle of beneficence in its broadest sense is understood by different communities of scientists to play an important role in the interpretation of a broad social issue such as stem cell research.
In offering this alternative Engelhardt emphasizes his perception that in the absence of a “higher deciding power”, such as God, it is impossible to construct an international system of ethics.
The treatment of human subjects in life science research, for example, has been the topic of a number of international agreements such as the Nuremberg Code (1947) and the Declaration of Helsinki (1975) that have been widely endorsed internationally. The recent codification of the ethical principles underpinning international discussions in this area were identified in the UNESCO publication Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005).
I make the distinction between the internal responsibilities that scientists hold to their research and their colleagues to ensure that high quality data is produced with integrity, and the broad social responsibilities that reflect the social contract that scientists hold with society and their commitment to produce scientific research that will enhance and promote humanity in a manner that takes into consideration social priorities and norms.
For example, in the last decade scientific and biotechnological advances such as “Dolly the sheep” the human genome project, human embryonic stem cells, gene transfer, transgenic animals, and the chimera hu-mouse have all raised serious concerns about the knowledge generated by the life sciences, while also offering significant opportunities for advancement (Jones 2007). These emerging technologies are not only challenging human imagination, but the speed of modern scientific research has also made it difficult for ethics to catch up. Increasingly, questions are being asked about the limits of scientific research—whether there is, in fact, some knowledge better left untouched. Science, together with associated fields such as computing, is increasingly being called upon to defend and redefine their social contract with society. In addressing this, the integrity and responsibility of scientists necessarily extends beyond simply conducting credible research within an established social institution, but should also include critical reflection on what is the right thing to do for (and with) society (Mitcham 2003).
Issues such as the regulation of stem cell research, for example, have had markedly disparate treatment in countries around the world. While some countries have developed considerably permissive laws regarding the generation and use of stem cells, others have banned the practice outright. These variations, it is important to note, are usually suggested to have arisen as a result of religion, political positions and other social factors (UNESCO 2001; DRZE 2011). Despite the international policy community having long recognized these variations, and the ethics community commenting widely on these variations, this has not (to my knowledge) however led to as much criticism of global system of ethics for the life sciences as might have been expected.
It must be noted that the inclusion of these broad social issues in ethics education as "add ons" is at least in part due to broad social issues being newer for ethics education and thus often incorporated in pre-existing structures—both of educational structures as well as the methods of teaching them.
These observations were possible due to the author’s previous background in life science research.
This, of course, contrasts to biosecurity issues that are predominantly concerned with the misuse of physical samples, equipment or reagents (Clevestig 2009).
Harm arising from the misuse of data may have many interpretations including the generation of weapons, adverse environmental impact, creation of social unrest, creation of situations in which individuals or communities may be stigmatized or penalized and many other possibilities.
Although this is changing, these studies are still in a considerable minority in comparison to those focusing on Western countries.
For example, the majority of discussions on dual-use education automatically make the connection between the principle of harm and bioterrorist activity, as can be observed in the recent review book on dual-use education Challenges and Opportunities for Education about Dual-Use Issues in the Life Sciences (NRC 2011). Although it is recognized that there may be differences between the educational requirements of scientists in developed and developing countries, this book (for example) limits discussion on contextuality to the need to develop more “context appropriate” case studies. Nothing is said about the possibility that the principle of harm (and associated principles such as beneficence) may be interpreted differently by scientists not working in a Western context.
These include online courses such as those developed by the University of Bradford (www.brad.ac.uk/bioethics/), summaries of course contents (NRC 2011) and codes of conduct (such as NSABB 2012).
While the motivations for these sub-state aggressors are understood to vary and are religious, political or, ideological; the results of their actions are similar: to deliberately target or disregard the safety of non- combatant civilians, and bioterrorism is thus usually viewed as a unified term.
This is, of course, in contrast to official claims of developing countries governments that see a technical divide by the West on life sciences and technologies. It is possible that this may be a fruitful area for further study.
Designated Kenya (KY1), Uganda (UG1), first South Africa (SA1), second South Africa (SA2).
Even with the recent prioritization of scientific research by the African Union (AU), few African governments invest even 1 % of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) into scientific research (COHRED 2010).
I had suspected that South Africa’s earlier biological and nuclear weapons programmes (Venter 2012) would have contributed towards a greater acceptance of the threat of biological warfare or the possibility of bioterrorism amongst the scientific population. However this did not appear to play a major role in how South African scientists accessed the dual-use concept, and indeed there were very few references to the Apartheid government’s weaponry programmes during the fieldwork.
This also raises questions about the possible difference that such an approach has compared to the traditional dual use discussion: that of intent. Is intent a necessary component of misuse (in bioterror-related dual use or other outcomes), as in the case of fear mongering it could be rather ascribed to irresponsibility (ignorant, blind, not necessarily intentionally malicious)? This might be an area for further investigation.
In contrast to more homogenous interpretations of the “global scientific community” as often promoted by global systems of ethics for the life sciences.
Manuscripts in preparation.
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Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Prof Brian Rappert at the University of Exeter for his comments on this manuscript. The fieldwork presented at this paper was sponsored by the Welcome Trust.
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Bezuidenhout, L. Moving Life Science Ethics Debates Beyond National Borders: Some Empirical Observations. Sci Eng Ethics 20, 445–467 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-013-9468-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-013-9468-x