Abstract
Contemporary neo-Aristotelians disagree about whether Aristotle’s work can contribute to rather than compete with or replace modern political theories, particularly theories that take individual rights seriously. In his Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics, Fred Miller says “yes.” In After Virtue, drawing on Aristotle to provide an alternative to what he sees as the moral bankruptcy on which modern political theories rest, Alasdair MacIntyre says “no.” However, I maintain—as does Miller (though on somewhat different grounds)—that MacIntyre is mistaken to think that Aristotelianism and modern political theories are entirely at odds with one another. They are mostly reconcilable, a position I call the ‘compatibility thesis.’ An implication of this is that Aristotle’s thought, especially concerning the common advantage, can clarify and strengthen modern political theories that regard individuals (not the state or society) as morally primary and that advocate protecting them equally via rights under the rule of law.
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Notes
- 1.
Miller (1995).
- 2.
Throughout this work, Alasdair MacIntyre indicts ‘modernity’ (and modern liberal political theory) as such, arguing that it is marked by moral pluralism, atomistic individualism, and acquisitiveness that transforms the state into an amoral bureaucracy that settles conflicts between rights-claims (see MacIntyre (1984), e.g., pp. 152, 156–57, 204, 227, 244–55). However, since he critiques what are in fact a wide variety of modern political theories that differ in significant ways (e.g., those of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Robert Nozick), I use the phrase ‘modern political theories’.
- 3.
In the course of arguing for the compatibility thesis, I will challenge some of MacIntyre’s premises. However, doing so is not the main purpose of this essay. Fred Miller (rightly) challenges some of MacIntyre’s other key premises; see Miller (1995), pp. 111–12. For additional, extensive critiques of MacIntyre’s views on this topic, see Irfan Khawaja (unpublished-a) and Khawaja (unpublished-b).
- 4.
At least some versions of liberal political thought, especially modern classical liberalism; see Sect. 5 below. In this regard, an implication of my project here is similar to a position that Roderick Long defends (though for different reasons), namely, that “Miller does not go far enough” in defending a compatibility thesis and that “the liberal, individualist strand in Aristotle is still more robust than even Miller is prepared to maintain”; see Long (1996), pp. 776–77. Although the details of their account differ (in some cases substantially) from mine, the spirit of Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl’s approach to integrating Aristotelianism with modern classical liberalism also aligns with my general approach. See Rasmussen and Den Uyl (1991), Chap. 4, and Rasmussen and Den Uyl (2005).
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
Miller (1995), p. 196.
- 8.
Popper (1966).
- 9.
- 10.
Miller (1995), p. 197.
- 11.
Miller (1995), p. 198.
- 12.
MacIntyre (1984), pp. 150, 156, 172.
- 13.
- 14.
MacIntyre (1984), p. 229.
- 15.
- 16.
Miller (1995), p. 199.
- 17.
Miller (1995), pp. 199, 351, 349–57.
- 18.
- 19.
Miller (1995), p. 200.
- 20.
Miller (1995), pp. 203–4.
- 21.
Miller (1995), pp. 200–205, 352–53.
- 22.
Miller (1995), p. 211.
- 23.
I am grateful to Irfan Khawaja for urging me to reconsider Miller’s taxonomy, engaging in extensive discussions on this topic, and providing substantial feedback on an earlier version of this essay (especially on what is now Sect. 3).
- 24.
MacIntyre (1984), p. 151.
- 25.
MacIntyre (1984), pp. 190–91; see also 155–58, 216–22, 228–29.
- 26.
MacIntyre (1984), pp. 189–90.
- 27.
See MacIntyre (1984), pp. 62–66, 70–71, for his rejection of utilitarianism, and pp. 150, 198–99, for his discussion of how Aristotle’s moral theory is not consequentialist.
- 28.
Miller (1995), pp. 203–4.
- 29.
MacIntyre (1984), pp. 220–21.
- 30.
‘Nonegoistic’ is not equivalent to anti-egoistic; individuals might sometimes or even always have their own good served by the common advantage. In such cases, the common advantage and the individual advantage harmonize, but only because there is either no self prior to (and/or separate from) the content given to it by the social (as on MacIntyre’s account) or the social utility calculus fortunately happens to fall on one’s side (as it might with utilitarianism).
- 31.
There could be additional salient features, depending on how nuanced one gets with value theory, such as distinctions between supernatural and natural, objective and subjective, and agent-neutral and agent-relative. However, the two features identified in the text above are sufficient for the purposes of this essay, for they disentangle forms of extreme individualism from forms of moderate holism and keep distinct moderate holism and moderate individualism.
- 32.
I have chosen to exclude the concept of intrinsic value from this taxonomy (and instead to work with instrumental and constitutive value) for four reasons. First, intrinsic value—in the sense that many people mean it, as something transcendently ‘valuable-in-itself apart from any valuers’ (i.e., agent-neutral value)—is notoriously vague and difficult (if not impossible) to justify. This view is defended, e.g., by G. E. Moore (1903). Second, while some regard intrinsic value as synonymous with ‘valued for its own sake’, I find this confusing, for doing so conflates agent-relative and agent-neutral value. Third, I argue in Sect. 4 below that Aristotle relies on constitutive value in his moral and political theory (for what is relevant in this essay). Fourth, one of the most important claims to establish in this debate is how (particularly Aristotle’s) egoism can recognize the value of others for oneself without that value reducing to mere instrumentalism, which minimally requires the clearer and more defensible notion of constitutive value.
- 33.
This kind of value is what I distinguish (and set aside) in the previous note as intrinsic value. As the set of examples in the text illustrates, using ‘intrinsic value’ to refer to something as ‘valued for its own sake’ would blur the important distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral value.
- 34.
Toner (2006).
- 35.
This is the sense of rationality in ethical reasoning as merely ‘means-end reasoning’ used by, e.g., Thomas Hobbes (1994), David Hume (1978), and many others in the social-contract tradition of political liberalism. The role of reason is only to calculate how to maximize getting whatever one desires, since—per Hume—“reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (1978), II.3.3, p. 415. Those who reject egoism see the challenge of ethics as how to ‘overcome’ egoism in a social setting by ‘constraining’ rationality or setting ‘deontic restraints’ on pursuing one’s self-interest.
- 36.
Notable exceptions to this strategy include Paula Gottlieb (1996) and—to a lesser extent—Kelly Rogers (1993). Gottlieb focuses on why Aristotle’s ethical theory does not succumb to criticisms that it is “objectionably egoistic,” whereas Rogers focuses on why it (specifically, Aristotle’s account of to kalon [noble, fine, beautiful]) is not altruistic. Although Gottlieb’s argument is generally compatible with my approach in holding Aristotle to defend ethical egoism, it is unclear whether she accepts or rejects the egoism-altruism distinction: “The objector here assumes that altruism and objectionable egoism are mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives which they are not; the fact that I do not do something because it is helping others (even though others may benefit as a result) does not necessarily mean that I am doing it solely to benefit myself” (1996), p. 15.
- 37.
In this essay, I am making only the interpretative case for Aristotle’s egoism. Defending the normative position that Aristotelian egoism is good (with which I agree) is beyond the scope of this project.
- 38.
Popper (1966), p. 100. Taking Plato as his target, Popper argues that he couples individualism with egoism and on that basis rejects individualism in favor of holism.
- 39.
Miller (1995), p. 200.
- 40.
MacIntyre (1984), pp. 156–58, 213–21.
- 41.
MacIntyre (1984), pp. 158–59, 161–62.
- 42.
Madigan (1991), p. 89.
- 43.
Madigan (1991), p. 87.
- 44.
Salmieri (2016), pp. 132–33.
- 45.
I should note that while I regard egoism and altruism to be mutually exclusive, they are not jointly exhaustive of the logical space involved in the more fundamental egoism-nonegoism distinction. This is because impartialism (not to be confused with the impartiality involved in applying a principle equally to all those subject to it) is another type of nonegoistic theory. An impartial good does not necessarily have to benefit anyone—oneself or other persons—depending on the ultimate goal aimed at. This is what I refer to above as intrinsic or agent-neutral value. Examples might include aiming to do one’s duty though the heavens fall or preserving art for art’s sake even if no one values it. I don’t take Aristotle to be defending impartialism any more than altruism. This can be seen in how, e.g., Aristotle rejects in NE I.6 Plato’s univocal, transcendent Form of the Good as useless in favor of species-specific forms of the good that are good for members of the species.
- 46.
Salmieri (2016), p. 139.
- 47.
Salmieri (2016), p. 137.
- 48.
Miller (1995), p. 200.
- 49.
I qualify this because some others might be relatively neutral in terms of offering value for an agent and still others might provide disvalue for an agent by threatening his eudaimonia. Whereas it is the case that some actions (e.g., buying bread at the market) involve others in a primarily instrumentally valuable way, it is also true that Aristotelian justice requires not treating those others as a mere means; see Miller (1995), Chaps. 3 and 4.
- 50.
Other possible objections include that “the polis is prior to the individual” and “man is by nature political.” However, in making the case that both of these claims are consistent with what Miller calls “moderate individualism” and showing how the common advantage is also advantageous “for each and all,” I regard him as having successfully precluded these objections; see Miller (1995), Chap. 2, esp. pp. 30–56. My one caveat is that I would extend his arguments to reflect that these claims are also consistent with and reflect ethical egoism, not just individualism.
- 51.
In general, I follow Irwin’s 1986 translation, but will depart from it in a couple of significant instances in the text below.
- 52.
Contrary to many in the history of moral philosophy and modern political theory who embrace this dichotomy and see ‘the moral problem’ as being about how to reconcile ‘the right’ (i.e., moral, other-regarding) with ‘the good’ (i.e., rational/practical, self-regarding). See those cited in note 35 above and, e.g., Smith (1994) and Gauthier (1984). It is on account of accepting a dichotomy between morality and self-interest that Dennis McKerlie argues that Aristotle’s theory should be interpreted “as a kind of altruistic eudaimonism.” See McKerlie (1998), p. 532.
- 53.
Madigan (1991), p. 87.
- 54.
- 55.
See Miller (1995), p. 200.
- 56.
See, e.g., how C. D. C. Reeve (2014) translates the first part of this same passage above: “It is true of an excellent person too that he does many actions for the sake of his friends and his fatherland, even dying for them if need be. For he will give up wealth, honors, and fought-about goods generally, in keeping for himself what is noble.”
- 57.
Salmieri (2016), p. 137.
- 58.
Rogers (1993), p. 366.
- 59.
Bible, Proverbs 31:10.
- 60.
Rogers (1993), pp. 359–60.
- 61.
I develop a more extensive version of this argument in Biondi (2012), pp. 65–76.
- 62.
What I have in mind are especially those versions, such as modern classical (rather than welfare) liberalism, that are committed to individualism and protecting individual rights. I am not arguing that Aristotle can be interpreted as a robust modern liberal, that is, as someone who carves out a protected sphere around all persons that fully protects their individual rights. Despite a significant portion of his theory’s being hospitable to liberal political theory, Aristotle’s support for natural slavery, regulation of marriage and childbearing, and exclusion of women from politics are in tension with and preclude his theory from being robustly liberal. See also Miller (1995), pp. 239–51, and Long (1996), p. 777, for similar qualifications.
- 63.
I am grateful to Fred Miller for his inspiring mentorship and generous feedback on an earlier version of this essay, to David Keyt for his many thoughtful suggestions to improve the clarity and precision of my argument, to Christopher Shields for his support and attention to detail, and to Pamela Phillips for her excellent copyediting on the penultimate version of this essay.
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Biondi, CA. (2024). Aristotle, Egoism, and the Common Advantage. In: Keyt, D., Shields, C. (eds) Principles and Praxis in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 155. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51146-2_15
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