Abstract
In this paper, I seek to caution the increasing number of contemporary sociologists who are engaging with continental phenomenological sociology without looking at the Anglo-American tradition. I look at a particular debate that took place during the formative period in the Anglo-American tradition. My focus is on the way participants sought to negotiate the disciplinary division between philosophy and sociology. I outline various ways that these disciplinary exigencies, especially the institutional struggles with the sociological establishment, shaped how participants defined phenomenological sociology. I argue that despite the supposed theoretical, methodological, and substantial differences between these waves of phenomenological sociology, the contemporary wave could benefit from some of the lessons that were learned by their predecessors.
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Notes
For hermeneutical purposes only I will make a distinction between the Anglo-American “wave” and the recent Continental “wave” in phenomenological sociology, however, I am really using it in a parenthesized sense because I seek to challenge such a polarizing distinction.
Armstrong (1976, 1979a, 1979b); Berger (1966); Berger and Luckmann (1966); Garfinkel (1967) and Hinkle et al. (1977); Heap (1974), and Hinkle et al. (1977); Heap & Roth (1973); Holzner (1974); Lengermann et al. (1978); Natanson (1973); O’Neill (1972, 1980, 1985), and Hinkle et al. (1977); Psathas (1973), and Hinkle et al. (1977); Rose in Hinkle et al. (1977); Srubar (1984); Tiryakian (1965, 1966), and Hinkle et al. (1977); Wieder in Hinkle et al. (1977); Wagner (1969, 1973, 1975, 1976); Hinkle et al. (1977); Wolff (1978). I have subdivided Hinkle et al. (1977) into eight texts, given that it is a transcription of a panel discussion.
Coser’s presidency was highly contentious because he sought to bring functionalism to the forefront in the association by excluding many other schools. This was received as a serious blow by the phenomenological sociologists, especially those who generally applied the assimilative approach. Wagner (1976), notes that prior to this setback there had been steady rise in the presence of phenomenological sociology at these meeting (16). For our purposes, this event also brought out the exigency of belonging more explicitly than we find in any of the other texts. The stakes considering the relationship between the sociological establishment and phenomenological sociology became even more serious.
It should be noted that The Social Construction of Reality is a stretch to my scope. First, it comes before the wave of texts considering “phenomenological sociology.” Second, other than a brief statement about the phenomenological method, and a chapter that is based on an interpretation of Schutz’s theory of the everyday, this text does not self-identify as “phenomenological sociology” (1966, pp. 20; 19–46). I have added it because it has often been referred to as a key text in phenomenological sociology. I have the same apprehension with including O’Neill (1972) and Garfinkel (1967) because these texts are more applied than directly programmatic in a manner of the majority of the texts in this scope, however, as is the case with Berger and Luckmann (1966), these texts were referred to extensively in these debates.
For the most explicit account of Psathas’ own experiences with disciplinary exigencies they faced during this period, one should consult his editorial article called “The Path to Human Studies” (2002).
For these reasons I have placed the adaptive approach before the second strategic approach, which can only be understood after this discussion.
It seems that O’Neill is using “whore” in a third person manner. “Whore” characterizes the natural or disciplinarian attitude that other phenomenological sociologists are reproducing in their texts. In this sense, the use of “whore” is an apt representation for the way in which something becomes thoroughly objectified, even abjected. The image of the “whore” in our culture, as opposed to a “sex trade worker,” is of an object that has been penetrated by so many others that she/he has lost all sense of a self-identity. That is, one’s identity has been ascribed to them from others and it is reproduced in the “natural attitude.” This, I presume, represents the way in which many phenomenological sociologists have take up the problem by either defending sociology from being treated this way, or at the least catering to this fear (i.e. first two approaches), and those who merely say “let’s keep doing it” (i.e. last two approaches). So “whore” is being used in a critical sense: sociology is being treated like certain abased gendered trades.
This is a rare instance where a text that is not advocating for the fourth strategic approach has not concluded that such an approach is actually un-sociological, i.e. abdicative.
Other proponents of this approach are less careful, such as Wagner, who at one point claims to be working on a “metasociology” (in Hinkle et al. 1977, p. 21).
This approach was also hard to distinguish from the other approaches because several figures employed it in some texts (Tiryakian and Wagner in Hinkle et al. 1977; Armstrong 1979b; Berger and Luckmann 1966), while in other texts they employ either the assimilative approach (Tiryakian 1965, 1966; Wagner 1969, 1973, 1975, 1976) or the integrative approach (Armstrong 1976, 1979a; Berger 1966). This is another example where the intersection of the strategy and the way caused a great amount of confusion in this debate as the interlocutors shifted positions from text to text.
There are only three texts that explicitly advocate for the fourth strategic approach: Heap (1974); Heap in Hinkle et al. (1977); and Heap and Roth (1973). The five other texts that are included in this section only peripherally add to this interpretation. Srubar (1984) is a retrospective take on this debate. Berger (1966) and Armstrong (1976) are both short commentaries on other texts. Armstrong (1979a) is only indirectly related to the other texts because it was written as a response to the critics of phenomenological sociology. Finally, Natanson (1973), for reasons which will be outlined further below, falls outside of this approach.
As an interesting aside, every text that I have considered in this paper reaffirms the disciplinarian boundaries when they speak of “phenomenology.” I have not found a single instance where phenomenology, as a noun, is referred to in a cross-disciplinary sense. As a noun, phenomenology refers to a branch of philosophy. The implication is that phenomenology is only sociological when it becomes an adjective, i.e. “phenomenological sociology.”
This is an appropriate moment to recall that Natanson is the only “professional” philosopher that I have included in this survey, which could partially account for such a statement.
We have to question such hard distinctions, within our discipline and in our inter-disciplinary interactions, since the outcome would be that philosophers are the designers and we merely apply their products. Within all the texts I read, including those that have not been cited in this bibliography, it was obvious that the phenomenological sociologists reciprocally faced opposition from the professional philosophers who were equally defensive against intrusions into their terrain. This is still a formidable obstacle in today’s context, which reinforces the disciplinarian attitude. Unfortunately, we cannot deal with it in a substantial fashion in this paper.
Many thanks are due in this paper. First, I would like to thank the editorial team at Human Studies—the anonymous referees and Lenore Langsdorf. Second, I am thankful for the time that Colleen Bell, Kevin Hegge, Sarah Hornstein and the Social Theory Reading Group in the Department of Sociology at York have spent editing previous drafts of this paper. Finally, thank you to Brian Singer, John O’Neill, and Philip Walsh, each of whom has faced what Brian, in an informal conversation, has called the “problem of translation” that sociologists face when they have an interest in philosophy.
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Bird, G. What is Phenomenological Sociology Again?. Hum Stud 32, 419–439 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-009-9131-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-009-9131-3