Abstract
This paper has a threefold purpose. First, it presents a detailed analysis and interpretation of John Harsanyi’s recently proposed solution concept for non-cooperative games — the so-called ‘tracing procedure’. Secondly, it presents a detailed critique of Harsanyi’s proposal and argues that the failure of that solution concept arises from its dependence on the ‘normal form of representation’ from traditional game theory. Thirdly, a structure based on the exchange theories of social psychology is offered as an alternative to that normal form.
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Bjerring, A.K. (1978). The ‘Tracing Procedure’ and a Theory of Rational Interaction. In: Hooker, C.A., Leach, J.J., >McClennen, E.F. (eds) Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 13a. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9789-9_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9789-9_1
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