Abstract
It is commonly argued that cultural objects ought to be returned to their place of origin in order to remedy injustices committed in the past. In this paper, it is shown that significant challenges attach to this way of arguing. Although there is considerable intuitive appeal in the idea that if somebody wrongs another person then she ought to compensate for that injustice, the principle is difficult (albeit not impossible) to apply to wrongdoings committed many decades or centuries ago. It is not clear that historic injustices can meaningfully be corrected, or compensated for, and there are several arguments why, even in cases where there is a prima facie moral case for compensation, repatriation might not be a legitimate means of remedy. In order to bring analytical clarity to the issue, this paper discusses the various steps of the argument that must be addressed in order to ground a valid repatriation claim based on historic injustices.
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Notes
See, for example, http://www.parthenonuk.com, entry “The Case for the Return” (accessed 10 April 2014).
See Spinner-Halev (2012, pp. 58–63) for a related discussion of “intergenerational collective narratives”.
A potentially complicating factor is that those from whom an object was wrongfully taken may in turn have acquired the object illegitimately and so may not be considered to be the legitimate owners of the object. In those cases, it is not clear that the victims at the most recent end of the line could legitimately ask for the return of the object. The Koh-i-Noor Diamond is an example of a cultural object for which competing repatriation claims have been advanced, based on the diamond’s successive transfers over the years.
It is important to keep in mind that wrongful removals of cultural objects may be part of a more substantial injustice committed against the original owners of the objects. For example, looting might be performed as part of genocide or systematic persecution. In those cases, it is possible that the non-identity problem would be triggered. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer who pointed this out to me.
I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer, who pointed this out to me.
Below, I frame the issue in terms of posthumous interests. For a discussion of posthumous rights, see Vernon (2012).
See also Ross’ (1939) distinction between “want-satisfaction” and “want-fulfilment”.
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful for the comments of colleagues at KTH Royal Institute of Technology and those of the editors and reviewers of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. I would like to express special thanks to Prof. Luc Bovens, whose comments and suggestions have been most helpful in improving the manuscript. All remaining errors (if any) are my own.
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Björnberg, K.E. Historic Injustices and the Moral Case for Cultural Repatriation. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 18, 461–474 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9530-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9530-z