In my presentation I understand anger as an emotion that, in addition to its relationship to time, is also subject to cultural rules and is therefore related to probability and predictability. With the use of selected references from the theory of emotions (ranging from antiquity to the present day) I identify several consistent fundamental assumptions about this emotion and reconstruct a discourse of “just” anger. Viewed from the perspective of such extra-literary concepts of anger (particularly Thomas Aquinas' ‘De passionibus animae’) Willehalm's outbursts of anger at the French court can be seen not only as an “illegitimate”, universally condemned act, through which the margrave unnecessarily puts at risk his legitimate claim to the king's support; equally, the very forbearance and expressions of solidarity which he is successively shown after his intemperate behaviour in Munleun can also be reinterpreted in light of the Aristotelian-Thomistic model of anger.
© 2009 Akademie Verlag
