Abstract
This paper assesses employees’ moral agency within corporate capitalism from a politically liberal standpoint. While political liberalism has spelt out its key institutional implications at state level, it has neglected moral agency at work, assuming that a rights-based state that secures freedom of contract, free choice of occupation and a free labour market within a fair context would protect it sufficiently. Yet two features of corporate capitalism constrain employees’ moral agency: the relation of authority that forms part of the work contract and organisations’ fragmented decision-making processes. Both seem at odds with the liberal ideal of allowing people to live by their own conception of the good. Consequently, this paper examines whether political liberalism should recommend greater safeguards for protecting workers’ moral agency. It proposes a criterion for assessing corporate capitalism: the ‘moral space’ defined as the socially shaped opportunities for action that can be enacted or endorsed from a comprehensive perspective. It argues that liberals should favour arrangements that widen workers’ moral space and suggests institutional designs that may achieve this while remaining within liberal boundaries.
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Notes
Conscience related ethical concerns that used to be limited to the healthcare sector are increasingly raised in the larger workplace (Von Bergen 2009, p. 13).
In this paper I use the term ‘corporate capitalism’ as a broad category to single out one feature of capitalism that developed primarily in the US during the late nineteenth century: the corporation, characterised by a legal personality, the separation of asset owners from managers, shareholders’ limited liability, as well as an often large hierarchal and multi-divisional organisational structure (Chandler 1977; Chandler and Hikino 1990; Djelic 1998). This arguably spread to Europe (Djelic 1998) and subsequently the globe during the second half of the twentieth century, yet with local adaptations and resistance. Thus, while corporate capitalism originally referred to the business system of market-based capitalism, corporations have spread beyond. Yet notable differences remain between systems of production and between capitalist models at large grounded in local histories and contexts. The extensive literature on the different ‘varieties of capitalism’ sets out their distinctive features (Amable 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001; Whitley 1999).
Despite the fact that corporate capitalism originally recoups the market-based model of capitalism, which involves a rather limited welfare state, capitalist corporations might yet be compatible with more generous welfare states. This issue is examined in ‘Liberal Institutions for Expanding Workers' Moral Space’ section.
The extent of the restriction is a matter of debate and depends on facts about the worker as well as the type and the object of the obligation. However, for our purposes it suffices to note that some restrictions on workers’ ethical behaviour (i.e. stemming from their conception of the good) are at play in corporations.
Friedman’s position is inaccurate since in law it is the corporation as an artificial person that is the principal of the employment relationship. Furthermore, shareholders do not own the corporation’s assets but shares, that is, ‘a legal entitlement to a share of the corporation’s profits’ (Rodin 2005, pp. 175–176). For an in-depth critique, see Robé (2011, p. 3).
For a discussion of this issue and an institutional proposal for reviving shareholders’ ethical responsibility, see Rodin (2005).
For Pogge, a (practical) ‘moral code’ defined as ‘conduct-guiding structures of values and norms’ (Pogge 2002, p. 77) is consistent with an (abstract) morality if it produces effects congruent with the demands of that morality. By contrast, a moral code includes a ‘loophole’ if some of its incentives guide people into regrettable behaviours that defeat the overall morality of the code (Pogge 2002, p. 81).
For a comparative assessment of third sectors in several European countries, see Kendall (2009).
Our definition of social arrangements is close to Pogge’s: ‘social arrangements, by which I mean relationships, associations, or social systems, such as marriages, lawyer-client relationships, families, firms, churches and states. Social arrangements tie their members together through normative expectations that are based upon special ties, including moral ties, which define special rights and obligations, powers and responsibilities. Such special moral ties vary in formality, ranging from the justifiable and enforced explicit provision of a legal code to the vague understandings that give rise to moral expectations and disappointments among friends and compatriots’ (Pogge 2002, p. 82).
Leximin or lexicographic maximin entails that the share of the worst off be maximised (i.e. be no smaller that the share of the worst off under any other feasible arrangement), then the situation of the next person up the scale, etc. A useful definition can be found in Van Parijs (1992, p. 467).
For Pogge, the relevant questions for assessing a moral code are: ‘have we organised our moral commitments in a way that reflects, and helps effectively achieve, what by their own lights matters?’ or would the aim of the code ‘be better fulfilled if this code were replaced by a somewhat different code’? (Pogge 2002, p. 79).
This echoes Arneson’s concern: ‘why suppose that real freedom is only a function of the variables of income and leisure? Many other features of the social environment, for example the legal rules that individuals face, are relevant to determining the extent of their real freedom’ (Arneson 1992, p. 503).
Arguably, Germany has been successful in offering a diverse welfare services delivery landscape. This has been achieved through a network of associations connected with six shelter organisations grounded in distinct comprehensive values—Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, non-confessional social approach, etc. (Kendall 2009).
The article of incorporation for the flexible purpose corporation specifies that its ‘special purpose’ can be one or more of the following: ‘(A) One or more charitable or public purpose activities that a nonprofit public benefit corporation is authorized to carry out. (B) The purpose of promoting positive short-term or long-term effects of, or minimizing adverse short-term or long-term effects of, the flexible purpose corporation’s activities upon any of the following: (i) The flexible purpose corporation’s employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors. (ii) The community and society. (iii) The environment’, Corporate Flexibility Act of 2011, (SB 201). Possible new types of contract in the French context are explored in Segrestin and Hatchuel (2012).
The degree of homogeneity of multipurpose corporations may well depend on the anti-discrimination provisions in employment law. Non-discrimination in hiring on grounds of personal, moral, philosophical or religious beliefs would diversify the workforce just as is the case with for-profit corporations.
A right to request flexible working for family reasons and a duty for firms to consider their request was, for instance, introduced in the UK in 2003. Such a right could be extended to cover more grounds for request.
This is the case in Germany, where the constitutional provision for freedom of conscience ‘has been construed to permit all employees to decline to perform a task they deem incompatible with their conscience’ (Von Bergen 2009, p. 17). According to Von Bergen, conscientious objection has not led to any practical problem in Germany.
For a useful overview of the literature on the various moral grounds for defending participation rights, see McCall (2001). A model of a firm that would include workers’ participation rights is set out in Ferreras (2012). For reflections on the practicalities of workers’ participation, see Le Gall (2011). See Roger (2012) for further critical reflections on corporate capitalism and directions for change.
For a helpful analysis, see McCall (2001).
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Acknowledgments
This paper was presented at the Essec C2G2 Brownbag Seminar, the Essec workshop Business in Society, the Philosophy of Management Conference, the EGOS Colloquium and the EBEN Annual Conference 2011. For their comments on these occasions, I am grateful to Marie-Laure Djelic and audiences of these events, as well as to Bobby Banerjee for insightful criticisms. One anonymous reviewer for the Euram annual conference provided helpful written comments, for which I am grateful. I would like to pay particular thanks to two anonymous reviewers for their help in revising this paper. All remaining errors are my own. I am indebted to the Research Programme on Corporate Ownership and Responsibility (Collège des Bernardins) and the Essec Center for Capitalism, Globalization and Governance for having hosted part of this research.
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Blanc, S. Expanding Workers’ ‘Moral Space’: A Liberal Critique of Corporate Capitalism. J Bus Ethics 120, 473–488 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-2000-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-2000-z