Abstract
I develop a variant of the constraint interpretation of the emergence of purely physical (non-biological) entities, focusing on the principle of the non-derivability of actual physical states from possible physical states (physical laws) alone. While this is a necessary condition for any account of emergence, it is not sufficient, for it becomes trivial if not extended to types of constraint that specifically constitute physical entities, namely, those that individuate and differentiate them. Because physical organizations with these features are in fact interdependent sets of such constraints, and because such constraints on physical laws cannot themselves be derived from physical laws, physical organization is emergent. These two complementary types of constraint are components of a complete non-reductive physicalism, comprising a non-reductive materialism and a non-reductive formalism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I provide an account of metaphysical reductionism and its formalist assumptions both in an ancient context (Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle) and a modern context (Hume, Kant, Hegel) in Essential Difference (2012). I also explore there the issues treated in this essay more completely and consider what emergence might entail in biological and mental phenomena.
Weiss (1969, 21, fn.5) also adopted it fairly early on, noting that Polanyi’s view was “crucial” to his own. We also find it more recently in Salthe (1985, 1993), Küppers (1992), Stephan (1997), Van Gulick (1993), Emmeche et al. (1997), Christiansen (2000) and Moreno and Umerez (2000). Wilson’s (2010) focus on “degrees of freedom” adopts a very similar strategy (without relying on any of this earlier work); her treatment provides a valuable perspective on the idea.
I am grateful to a reviewer of this paper for raising a question that led to the preceding clarification of this issue.
See the discussion following Proposition 5 of his section on “Dynamics” in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant (1970) [1786].
The idealist reductionism described here is the same, in principle, as that which Aristotle associated with Plato and Parmenides. A differentia, which Aristotle took to be the substantive principle of form itself, is not a contingent or accidental variation of the possibilities contained within the genus it differentiates (derivable from that genus), but is an actualization of those possibilities that yields an emergent substance. I explain all this more completely in Essential Difference (2012).
I do examine this question more completely in Essential Difference (2012).
References
Baylis, C. A. (1929). The philosophic functions of emergence. Philosophical Review, 38, 372–384.
Blachowicz, J. (2012). Essential difference: Toward a metaphysics of emergence. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Blitz, D. (1992). Emergent evolution: Qualitative novelty and the levels of reality. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Chalmers, D. J. (2006). Strong and weak emergence. In P. Clayton & P. Davies (Eds.), The re-emergence of emergence (pp. 244–256). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Christiansen, P. V. (2000). Macro and micro-levels in physics. In Andersen et al. (Eds.), Downward causation: Minds, bodies and matter (pp. 51–62). Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
Emmeche, C., Køppe, S., & Stjernfelt, F. (1997). Explaining emergence: Towards an ontology of levels. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 28, 83–119.
Giere, R. N. (1968). Structure of an organism. Science, 162, 410.
Humphreys, P. (1997). Emergence, not supervenience. Philosophy of Science, 64, S337–S345. Proceedings.
Kant, I. (1970) [1786]. The metaphysical foundations of natural science (translated and introduction by Ellington, J.) Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Klee, R. (1984). Micro-determinism and concepts of emergence. Philosophy of Science, 51, 44–63.
Küppers, B.-O. (1992). Understanding complexity. In A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, J. Kim (Eds.), Emergence or reduction? Essays on the prospects of nonreductive physicalism (pp. 241–256). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
McGivern, P., & Rueger, A. (2010). Emergence in physics. In A. Corradini & T. O’Connor (Eds.), Emergence in science and philosophy (pp. 213–232). London: Routledge.
Moreno, A., & Umerez, J. (2000). Downward causation at the core of living organization. In Andersen et al. (Eds.), Downward causation: Minds, bodies and matter (pp. 99–117). Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
Morgan, C. L. (1923). Emergent evolution. London: Williams and Norgate.
Muir, A. (1982). Holism and reductionism are compatible. In S. Rose (Ed.), Against biological determinism (pp. 122–135). New York: Allison and Busby.
Pattee, H. H. (1970). The problem of biological hierarchy. In C. H. Waddington (Ed.), Towards a theoretical biology: 3: Drafts (pp. 117–136). Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.
Pattee, H. H. (1972). Laws and constraints, symbols and languages. In C. H. Waddington (Ed.), Towards a theoretical biology: 4: Essays (pp. 248–250). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Polanyi, M. (1958/1964). Personal knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy, revised edition (1962) published by University of Chicago Press. Harper Torchbook edition (1964). New York: Harper & Row.
Polanyi, M. (1968). Life’s irreducible structure. Science, 160, 1308–1312.
Popper, K. (1953). The principle of individuation. In Aristotelian society proceedings: Berkeley and modern problems (Vol. 27, pp. 97–120).
Salthe, S. N. (1985). Evolving hierarchical systems: Their structure and representation. New York: Columbia University Press.
Salthe, S. N. (1993). Development and evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sperry, R. W. (1984). Emergence. In P. Weintraub (Ed.), The Omni interviews (pp. 187–207). New York: Ticknor & Fields.
Stephan, A. (1997). Armchair arguments against emergentism. Erkenntnis, 46, 305–314.
Van Gulick, R. (1993). Who’s in charge here? And who’s doing all the work? In J. Heil & A. Mele (Eds.), Mental causation (pp. 233–256). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
van Inwagen, P. (1990). Material beings. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Weinberg, S. (2002). Is the universe a computer? In The New York review of books (Vol. 49, pp. 43–48).
Weiss, P. A. (1969). The living system: determinism stratified. In A. Koestler & J. R. Smythies (Eds.), Beyond reductionism: New perspectives in the life sciences (pp. 3–55). Boston: Beacon Press.
Wigner, E. P. (1964). Events, laws of nature, and invariance principles. Science, 145, 995–999.
Wilson, J. (2010). Non-reductive physicalism and degrees of freedom. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61, 279–311.
Wimsatt, W. (1997). Aggregativity: Reductive heuristics for finding emergence. Philosophy of Science, 64, S372–S384. Proceedings.
Wolfram, S. (2002). A new kind of science. Champaign, IL: Wolfram Media, Inc.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers of this paper for their detailed comments. The result is a significantly improved version of the original.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Blachowicz, J. The Constraint Interpretation of Physical Emergence. J Gen Philos Sci 44, 21–40 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-013-9207-7
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-013-9207-7