Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies

 Discussion REPLY TO RAY PERKINS ON RUSSELL’S CONDITIONAL THREAT OF WAR D B Philosophy, and Peace Studies Program / Central Connecticut State U. N B,  ,  @.. ay Perkins brings up a number of important points in “Russell and PreRventive War: a Reply to David Blitz”, his measured response to my article “Did Russell Advocate Preventive Atomic War Against the ?” I would like to consider the following issues which Perkins brings up: (a) did Russell’s position amount to a “conditional advocacy of preventive war”? (b) was his estimation of the likelihood of Soviet compliance with Western demands a mitigating factor that “partially vindicates Russell from the charges of advocating an immoral policy”? and (c) was Russell’s later confusion about what he actuallydidsayintheperiodunderquestion—to—anattempttomaintain his “humanitarian credibility” relative to a position which was “morally problematic” to many otherwise sympathetic observers? (a). Preventive War or Conditional Threat The major issue is that of characterizing Russell’s thesis. I refer to it as “conditional threat of war” (), and distinguish that from “advocacy of preventive war” (), while Perkins refers to is as “conditional advocacy of preventive war” (which he designates as PWc). Here are the statements behind the acronyms, formulated in terms of the Soviet Union (Russia) in the late s: (i) : “If Russia does not acquiesce in the Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic energy, then the West should conditionally threaten war.” (ii) : “Because Russia did not acquiesce in the Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic energy, the West should wage preventive war.” (Ibid.) Ray Perkins prefers the following formulation, which he terms PWc: (i)′ PWc: “The /West ought to wage war against the Soviets unless they agree, under  Russell, n.s.  (): –. Discussion  threat of war, to international controls (of atomic energy/armament).” (“Reply”, p. ) Perkins then specifies an important variant of this thesis, to include the likelihood of Soviet compliance, as follows: (ii) PWc: “We ought to wage war against the Soviets unless they agree, under threat of war, to internationalize controls; and they will probably agree.” Perkins argues that what Russell defended is captured by PWc : “conditional advocacy of preventive war”, qualified by the probability of Soviet compliance . However, I maintain that Russell did not publicly advocate preventive war, either conditionally or unconditionally, and that consideration of Soviet compliance was secondary and non-decisive. At the outset, I want to deal with a point of criticism concerning my formulation of  which Perkins has made. Perkins notes that if all the consequence involves is the conditional threat of war, rather than the actual waging of war, the consequence is mild indeed. The problem is that repeating the term “conditionally threaten” within the statement of the conditional threat is either redundant or too weak, and I have no objection to reformulating the conditional threat of war thesis as follows: ′: “If Russia does not acquiesce to the Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic energy, then the West should threaten to wage war.” The conditional aspect of the proposition is given by its implicational structure, and does not need to be reiterated in the proposition itself. I suspect that Perkins would like to see a stronger consequence in the formulation , such as “immediately wage war” rather than the weaker “threaten to wage war”. But I think that the weaker formulation is preferable, both in terms of what Russell did say, and what current events have demonstrated. As critics of  policy towards Iraq indicated in the recent debate in the Security Council , the decision to go to war is so serious that a two-step process is required: the first to determine the violation of the condition, and the second to authorize the use of force. This latter is needed because it is possible that other conditions may have also changed when the “casus belli” has occurred, and the automatic application of the consequence may be ill advised. Indeed, this is precisely what happened once the Soviet Union had both rejected the Baruch Plan and fully developed its own nuclear force: Russell came to believe that the consequence should not be applied in these doubly changed circumstances and reformulated his strategy in the mid-s.  Perkins, “Russell and Preventive...