Abstract
The main claim I defend in this paper is that Robert Kilwardby, a thirteenth-century Dominican philosopher, construed bodily pain as a fully-fledged intentional state of the sensory soul. To prove this, I first examine Kilwarby’s account of how pain comes to be and how the sensory soul experiences it. I then show that pain cannot be reduced to a feeling the sensory soul experiences for the simple reason that pain has representational content, and is thus also directed at something.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
See, for example, Tye (1995, pp. 111–116).
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
For Kilwardby’s theory of the soul, see especially Silva (2012, part one).
- 7.
See Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum, q. 94, §§31–38, p. 256; De spiritu fantastico, §§120–121, pp. 81–82, henceforth DSF. I use A. Broadie’s 1993 English translation of DSF throughout this paper.
- 8.
“Anima enim aliquando occurrit passionibus corporis facili actione propter conuenientiam, aliquando diffícili propter inconuenientiam. Et hec difficultas percepta siue apprehensa uocatur ‘labor’ et ‘dolor’. […] Et hec potes faciliter intelligere sic: Instrumentum uel corpus sensitiuum ab excellentia uehementi sensibilis inproporcionalis leditur. Lesum autem, minus aptum est ad motum anime suscipiendum et minus est ab ea. regibile, et ideo difficiliori actione mouet illud anima, et ex hac difficultate molestatur.”
- 9.
Augustine, one of Kilwardby’s go-to sources, understands pain in similar terms. See, for example, Augustine, De libero arbitrio 3.23; De civitate dei 19.12; De natura boni 20.
- 10.
“Duo enim sunt in sentiendo, scilicet attencior operacio spiritus in corpore passo et huius actionis percepcio. Dum ergo attendit corpori passo ut illud moueat secundum exigenciam sue passionis, assimilat se passo secundum quod passum est. Assimilacio autem talis non est aliud quam formacio ymaginis rei sensibilis qua inuenit affectum suum organum in seipso, quia ipsa affectio organi ab obiecto sensibili est passio de qua loquimur. Et hec non est nisi impressio similitudinis obiecti in ipso organo facta. Quia uero spiritus aciem conuertit ad se sic ymagine informatum, ideo non latet eum attentior actio per quam formatus est. Et hoc est sentire in se ymaginem quam in se formavit attencius in corpus operando. […] Et sic sentit sensibile forinsecum per ymaginem quam in se formauit.”
- 11.
“[…] nota quod spiritus sensitiuus, eo quod forma est, continue operatur et agit influendo in corpus quod est ei materia, et hoc continendo, uniendo, saluando et ordinando illud secundum posse sibi ad hoc datum. Et quia est forma que est uita sensitiua, agit influentiam uitalis inspiracionis, uegetacionis et sensificacionis et conseruacionis et salutis et naturalis ordinacionis quan tum sibi datur. Et sicut continue operatur sic innuendo corpori, sic diuersimode operatur secundum diuersas affectiones uel passiones corporis. Sicut enim saluti et conseruacioni et ordinacioni corporis necessaria est actio anime et influencia eius, sic continuitati salutis, continuitas actionis, et diuersis passionibus et affeccionibus corporis, diuersus modus in actione anime.”
- 12.
“Totum autem hoc prouenit ex appetitu et attencione naturali ipsius spiritus quibus curat de salute et incolumitate et conseruacione corporis. Et hic appetitus saluandi corpus et attencio siue sollicitudo circa hoc spiritui inditi sunt, pro eo quod corpus coruptibile est et lesibile, et pro eo quod est delectabile et utile instrumentum ipsius spiritus ad multorum noticiam optinendam et ad comodum placitum de multis consequendum. Ex hoc enim quasi quadam naturali prouidentia siue prudentia iugiter sollicitus est spiritus de corpore, vt qualibuscumque uel quantiscumque passionibus siue affeccionibus corporis ab extra uel ab intra prouenientibus | occurrat, displicentes, si potest, remouens uel saltem mitigans, placentes acceptans.”
- 13.
Kilwardby, DSF §99. See footnote 11 above.
- 14.
For a more detailed description of the various types of intentionality in Kilwardby’s theory of sense perception, see Băltuță (2019).
- 15.
See Kilwardby, DSF §168: “Ad secundum [§§151–157] bene concedendum quod species rerum sensibilium perueniunt ad sensum communem per sensus particulares, et ad organum illius per organa eorum, et post sensum communem sequitur ymaginacio. Set ad exponendum modum perueniendi a sensu particulari ad communem primo oportet aliquid dicere de ipsis instrumentis sensuum. Notandum igitur quod secundum auctores qui de illis loquuntur, animal sentit per quosdam neruos continentes spiritum quemdam corporalem subtilem ualde, qui est immediatum instrumentum anime. Et iste spiritus corporalis suscipit species sensibilium inmediate citra animam sensitiuam, et inde eas haurit anima. ‘Instrumentum’ ergo sentiendi quandoque dicitur totum coniunctum ex nemo et dicto spiritu corporali, aliquando uero solus ipse spiritus. Totum enim coniunctum etsi sit per se instrumentum sentiendi, non tamen primum. Spiritus autem ipse est per se et primum.”
- 16.
See Kilwardby, DSF §118: “Ad quintum [§74], quod adducitur de libro De Trinitate, dicendum quod illud uerbum, anima conbibit speciem per sensum corporis, metaphorice dictum est. Sicut enim per ciphum bibitur liquor, sic per organum corporale attrahitur species; tamen in hoc dissimilitudo, quod ibi idem liquor numero qui erat in cipho intus trahitur, set hic similitudo de similitudine que erat in organo non eadem omnino. Et ideo dicit per sensum corporis bibi speciem, idest per organum corporale, quia illud est adminiculum et quasi uas vnde aliquo modo hauritur species. Illud autem uerbum quo dicit quod sensus ex corpore sensibili formatur, debet intelligi ita quod sensus accipiatur pro corporeo organo et non pro spiritu sensitiuo. Unde Augustinus, De Trinitate, libro 11, capitulo 4: Sensus autem oculorum non ob aliud sensus corporis dicitur nisi quia et ipsi oculi menbra sunt corporis. Et quamuis non sentiat corpus exanime, anima tamen commixta corpori per instrumentum sensus uocatur, qui eciam passione corporis cum quisque excecatur extinguitur.”
- 17.
“[…] spiritus sensitiuus formans in se ymaginem rei sensibilis, etsi hoc fecerit non sentiens neque apprehendens adhuc ipsam, non facit hoc casualiter set naturaliter, et prout a superioribus causis cognicionem et artem regitiuam habentibus directus, instinctu naturali ducitur.”
- 18.
See Băltuță (2020).
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Acknowledgments
I would like to convey my deepest thanks to the three anonymous reviewers who took the time to read the manuscript of this paper and who offered me numerous valuable suggestions. Joseph Stenberg and Sergiu Sava were kind enough to help me along the way with ideas, discussions, and language corrections. A first draft of this paper was presented in Berlin at the Medieval Gatherings coordinated by Nicola Polloni. I would like to thank the audience for the stimulating discussions.
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Băltuță, E. (2021). Does Bodily Pain Have an Intentional Character? Robert Kilwardby’s Answer. In: Chouinard, I., McConaughey, Z., Medeiros Ramos, A., Noël, R. (eds) Women's Perspectives on Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 24. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73190-8_17
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