Abstract
The view that moral cognition is subserved by a two-tieredarchitecture is defended: Moral reasoning is the result both ofspecialized, informationally encapsulated modules which automaticallyand effortlessly generate intuitions; and of general-purpose,cognitively penetrable mechanisms which enable moral judgment in thelight of the agent's general fund of knowledge. This view is contrastedwith rival architectures of social/moral cognition, such as Cosmidesand Tooby's view that the mind is wholly modular, and it is argued thata two-tiered architecture is more plausible.
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Bolender, J. A Two-Tiered Cognitive Architecture For Moral Reasoning. Biology & Philosophy 16, 339–356 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010663018267
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010663018267