Abstract
Aim of this paper is to show how Middle Platonist philosophers adapted Stoic epistemology to their own Platonist metaphysics. More precisely the discussion focuses on the key notion of ennoia (conception).Middle Platonists argue against the hypothesis that conceptions have an empirical origin and claim that an ennoia is what remains of the pre-natal vision of the ideas. According to them, it is only through metaphysics that a theory of knowledge can adequately be grounded. The second part of the paper delves into the limits of such a claim. The possibility of getting a proper knowledge of the ideas raises a problem, for if the ennoiai are grounded on the ideas, but the ideas are not object of a proper knowledge, we run the risk of not having a proper criterion anymore. On these grounds, we would not be able to account for the process of knowledge.
© 2018 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
