Abstract
Ammonius′ final speech in the De E apud Delphos is usually regarded as one of the most important testimonies of Plutarch′s platonism. Indeed, the contrast between divine perfection and human weakness occurs elsewhere in the Moralia and clearly reflects Plutarch′s theological interpretation of Plato. Yet some ambiguity remains, for the dialogue does not explicitly claim that the Delphian riddle has been definitely settled. On the contrary, both Ammonius and Plutarch insist on the value of searching as opposed to possessing the truth. Some Platonic references to the Theaetetus and the Protagoras show that Ammonius′ speech, and Plutarch′s overall dialogue, have to be taken not so much as the attempt at solving the Delphian riddle as a tribute to God′s superiority. By raising riddles, Apollo stimulates our search and our desire for knowledge (our philosophia), whereas our attempts at solving the riddles make us aware of his superiority. According to Plutarch, truth does not consist in a correspondence model, but in a subjective, reverential attitude.
© by Akademie Verlag, Berlin, Germany
