Abstract
The phenomenological goal of grounding the content of conceptual thought in the background understanding of everyday, skillful coping was approached using evolutionary autonomous agent (EAA) methodology. The behavior of an EAA evolved to perform a specified motor task was identified with skillful coping. Changes in the dynamics of the EAA controller occurred when the EAA encountered an unexpected obstacle with loss of longer time scale components in its hierarchical temporal organization. These temporal changes are consistent with the phenomenological changes which we experience with breakdown during equipment use with our adoption of a more immediate, determinate stance. Since this latter experience is the basis of conceptual thought, the EAA paradigm goes some way in providing a naturalized explanation for the grounding of the content of conceptual thought in everyday, skillful coping in a manner that is physiologically plausible and phenomenologically accurate.
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This study was funded by a research grant from the Toronto East General Research Foundation.
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Borrett, D.S., Khan, S., Lam, C. et al. Evolutionary autonomous agents and the naturalization of phenomenology. Phenom Cogn Sci 5, 351–363 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-006-9025-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-006-9025-z