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The Adverbial Theory of Properties

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Metaphysica

Abstract

The paper presents a novel version of universalism—the thesis according to which there are only universals, no individuals—which is cashed out in terms of an adverbial analysis of predication. According to the theory, every spatiotemporal occurrence of a universal U can be expressed by a sentence which asserts the existence of U adverbially modified by the spatiotemporal region at which it exists. After some preliminary remarks on the interpretation of natural language, a formal semantics for the theory is first provided, along with an intended interpretation of its key metaphysical imports. Follow some commentaries on the spatiotemporal manifold and determinable properties.

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Notes

  1. It strikes me as remarkable that the recent debates over the so-called bundle theory, the multiple localization of universals, and the one on enduring entities ever faced the evident paradoxes related to the existence of the entities at hand.

  2. See for example (Burgess 2005) and for some notable ancestors (Montague 1970; Prior, 1968; Quine 1960; Strawson 1954).

  3. Probably, the most relevant text among those is "Proper Names" in (Russell 1940: Ch. 6). See also (Russell 1912). Some remarks pointing in the direction of a universalist metaphysics are offered also in (Cover and Hawthorne 1998).

  4. (Russell 1940: 122). On this particular aspect of Russell's thought, see also (Bergmann 1947, 1967; Casullo 1981).

  5. On this point, see (Casullo 1982).

  6. For an introductory exposition of endurantism, see (Loux 2002: Ch. 6; Haslanger 2003).

  7. This view has been defended by (Mellor 1981: 111–114), who is the only one, to my knowledge, to have defended such view in print.

  8. This view has been defended, among others, by (Johnston 1987).

  9. This view has been defended, among others, by (Lowe 1987; Haslanger 1989; Gallois 1998).

  10. See (Gallois 1998). Most importantly, I will offer more "liberal" rules of inference for sentences containing spatiotemporal adverbs; this avoids the problems with Gallois's theory that were outlined in (Varzi 2001).

  11. A parallel reasoning would hold for (A) and (B).

  12. Adverbialist approaches have notoriously been employed to address other philosophical problems. See for example (Chisholm 1957; Sellars 1975; Jackson 1975; Tye 1989) for an adverbialist approach to visual experience, and (Lowe 1987; Johnston 1987; Haslanger 1989) for an adverbialist approach to the problem of persistence through time of an individual.

  13. Two précis. Perhaps it is possible to think of a universal in isolation from any other universal and from any space–time region. Yet, my view is that, if it is possible to think of a universal in isolation, this does not imply the ontological independence of the universal from other universals. Perhaps you can think of Being a wooden chair without thinking of Being a tree, but you cannot have Being a wooden chair without having Being a tree; you can think of Being a person without thinking of Being oxygen, but you cannot have Being a person without Being oxygen. Secondly, the present discussion concerns the natural, material world. Perhaps there are universals which cannot exist in space and time, such as Being a perfect square or Being third. If such sort of universals exist, they will not be part of the present discussion.

  14. Clearly the language may be enriched with quantifiers, modal operators, and such; but, again, I shall leave this part of the theory for another occasion.

  15. See (Quine 1985; Quine 1958). More on this point below.

  16. (Gallois 1998; Varzi 2001).

  17. For the suggestion of applying mereology to trope theory, see also (Paul 2002).

  18. Note that this entailment is not in contradiction with the rebuttal of the principle of distribution (F). Indeed, (F) forbids the distribution of a property over a spatial region and a temporal region. In (17), (18), and (19), instead, the distribution is over two distinct spatiotemporal regions. Put it in another way: you can distribute over entire spatiotemporal regions, but you cannot distribute over single spatial or temporal regions. If Being red is here-now-ly and there-before-ly, then it is also here-now-ly; but it needs not be here-before-ly.

  19. This is a point on which I shall come back below.

  20. (Gallois 1998).

  21. It is to recall, however, that Gallois's goal is to defend endurantism, so he moves within an approach based on individuals. For this reason, I here employ an example involving a proper name.

  22. See (Varzi 2001: 4–5).

  23. (Strawson 1959: 221).

  24. (Strawson 1959: 212).

  25. This supposing that there is only one scale—say, the one in grams—for weight. For expressing different scales one could use a quantifier other than "Σ".

  26. On determinables, see also (Armstrong 1989, 1978; Campbell 1990: 66).

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Acknowledgments

I am most grateful to Achille Varzi and John Collins for insightful discussion on the theory here delineated and for detailed comments on previous drafts of the paper. The theory was also presented during a seminar at the University of Padua in February 2007: I thank the participants for the profuse discussion.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, College of the Holy Cross, 1 College Street, Worcester, MA, 01610, USA

    Andrea Borghini

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Borghini, A. The Adverbial Theory of Properties. Int Ontology Metaphysics 13, 107–123 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-012-0097-7

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