Abstract
I respond to Tim Smartt’s (2023) skepticism about epistemic blame. Smartt’s skepticism is based on the claims that (i) mere negative epistemic evaluation can better explain everything proponents of epistemic blame say we need epistemic blame to explain; and (ii) no existing account of epistemic blame provides a plausible account of the putative force that any response deserving the label “blame” ought to have. He focuses primarily on the prominent “relationship-based” account of epistemic blame to defend these claims, arguing that the account is explanatorily idle, and cannot distinguish between epistemically excused and epistemically blameworthy agents. I argue that Smartt mischaracterizes the account’s role for judgments of epistemic relationship impairment, leading to mistaken claims about the account’s predictions. I also argue that the very feature of the account that Smartt mischaracterizes is key to understanding what epistemic blame does for our epistemic responsibility practices that mere negative epistemic evaluation cannot.
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Notes
In Boult (forthcoming, Ch. 1), I consider Dogramaci-style views about the function of epistemic evaluation as a potential source of concern about epistemic blame. For reasons similar to those offered here, I am not convinced they pose a problem for epistemic blame.
I will note that I find Smartt’s claims here implausible. Even if negative epistemic evaluation can play the roles Smartt and Dogramaci say it does, a further question is whether it can play that role equally effectively as epistemic blame. It may be the case that epistemic blame is better at playing the Deference and Compliance roles, in which case it may be an important notion to have in our theoretical toolbox. Thanks to Sebastian Schmidt for suggesting this point.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this issue.
The view also has strong affinities with Kauppinen (2018), and is inspired by Scanlon’s work on moral blame.
I have argued that epistemic agents also stand in epistemic relationships with themselves (Boult, 2021a). I set this complication aside for present purposes.
See Boult (forthcoming, Ch.3) for detailed discussion of how to understand the relationship between judgment of impairment and actual modifications in the relationship-based account. Chislenko (2020) has developed a challenge for Scanlon’s original view about moral blame regarding the idea of modifications “reflecting” or being “made fitting by” judgments of blameworthiness. In Boult (forthcoming, Ch. 3), I take up this worry in the epistemic context and respond.
Or reaffirming a previously formed intention to trust the person less in the relevant domain or on certain matters.
The literature on culpable ignorance and moral responsibility is one place where support for this idea can be found. See Moody-Adams (1994, 291), Rosen (2003, 79), and FitzPatrick (2008, 603, 612). The literature on normative defeaters to knowledge and justified belief is another very different place where support can be found. See Meeker (2004, 162–163), Senor (2007, 207), Record (2013, 3, 8), and Miller and Record (2013,122, 124).
An anonymous referee points out that an alternative response to Smartt here is to simply reject the assumption that reducing epistemic trust in excused epistemic agents is ever appropriate. Perhaps it is appropriate or fitting to merely treat them as less reliable, where this falls short of reducing epistemic trust (cf. Schmidt, 2021, Sect. 4.2). One way of motivating this idea would be to argue that genuine trust reductions are interpersonal in a way that the actions or attitudes of excused agents, as such, are not. Of course, this raises complex questions about the difference between trust and mere reliance.
Schmidt (2021, Sect. 4.2) for a related, but different way of framing this idea. According to Schmidt, the crucial difference between genuine blame, and responses that may outwardly resemble blame, is that blame is a response to the person’s character.
The role for judgment is emphasized in Boult (2021a). But to my knowledge, the distinction between meaning and permissibility has not been invoked in this context. Some authors may wish to avoid taking on this commitment. If so, they will need to find another way of explaining the difference between epistemic blamers and those acting out of prudence who nevertheless engage in the same sorts of behaviours and attitude adjustments. As fn. 11 notes, Schmidt’s approach may be one option, and there may of course be others.
See Boult (forthcoming, Ch.4) for discussion of whether assigning judgment such a central role generates problems for the relationship-based account’s ability to make sense of irrational blame. How does all of this jibe with the claims made earlier about how judgments alone (about norm violations, or even blameworthy norm violations) seem incapable of capturing the engagement characteristic of blame? The basic idea is that neither such judgments, nor certain behavioural and attitudinal reactions, are capable of capturing the engagement characteristic of blame alone: only certain behavioral and attitudinal reactions manifesting the relevant judgment are capable of doing so.
Thanks to Sebastian Schmidt for discussion.
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Acknowledgement
Thanks to Sebastian Schmidt, Sebastian Köhler, and three anonymous referees for very helpful feedback on eariler drafts of this article. Funding for research on this project was generously provided by an SSHRC Insight Development Grant 430-2022-00523.
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Boult, C. Epistemic blame as relationship modification: reply to Smartt. Philos Stud 181, 387–396 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02088-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02088-1