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The Importance of Eudaimonia for Action-guiding Virtue Ethics

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Notes

  1. See G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” in R. Crisp, & M. Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 31-35.

  2. See Daniel Russell, The Practical Intelligence and the Virtues, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009).

  3. Robert Louden, “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics” in R. Crisp, & M. Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 205-206.

  4. Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 25.

  5. David Solomon, “Internal Objection to Virtue Ethics”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XIII, (1988), p. 432.

  6. William Frankena, Ethics, (Prentice-Hall, Inc: Englewood Cliffs, 1973), p. 65.

  7. For action-guidance objection see also Jerome Schneewind, "The Misfortunes of Virtue," in R. Crisp, & M. Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 178-201; Robert Johnson, “Virtue and Right,” Ethics, vol. 113, no.4 (The University of Chicago Press, 2003): pp. 810-834; and Ramon Das, “Virtue Ethics and Right Action” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81: 3, (2003): pp. 324-339.

  8. Edmund Pincoff, “Quandary Ethics”, Mind, New Series, 80: 320, (Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 552.

  9. Ibid, 553.

  10. Solomon, “Internal Objection to Virtue Ethics”, p. 432.

  11. Ibid.

  12. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Roger Crisp (tr.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), IV, 1120a27-31.

  13. Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp.32-35

  14. John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason,” in R. Crisp and M. Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 154-56.

  15. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I. 3, 1094b13-24.

  16. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, 33-34.

  17. Famous criticism of the solution-oriented focus of modern moral theories can be exemplified by Pincoff, “Quandary Ethics”, Mind, New Series, 80: 320, (Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 552-571., Bernard Williams, “Morality, the Peculiar Institution” in R. Crisp, & M. Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 45-66. For the lack of morally important aspects see Michael Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories”, in R. Crisp, & M. Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 66-79, and Annette Baier, “What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory” in R. Crisp, & M. Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 263-278.

  18. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 69.

  19. Ibid, 23.

  20. Ramon Das, “Virtue Ethics and Right Action” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81: 3, (2003), p. 325.

  21. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 41.

  22. John McDowell, “Virtue and Reason”, p. 141.

  23. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 167.

  24. Solomon, “Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics”, p. 437.

  25. Ibid.

  26. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 1103a5-12.

  27. Annas, Intelligent Virtue, p.8.

  28. Ibid.

  29. Ibid, p. 12.

  30. Ibid, p.25.

  31. Ibid, p.27.

  32. Ibid, p.37.

  33. Ibid, p.22.

  34. See Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978); Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics; Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Daniel Russell, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).

  35. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 8, 1099a35-1099b.

  36. For the account of the Stoics see Annas, The Morality of Happiness, pp. 427-431. For Plato’s account see Plato, The Republic, 352d-354a.

  37. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 172-174.

  38. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, 3, 1105b5-11.

  39. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 28.

  40. Annas, The Morality of Happiness, p. 111.

  41. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 23.

  42. Ibid, p. 28.

  43. Pp.5-9.

  44. Solomon, “Internal Objection to Virtue Ethics”, p. 434.

  45. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 22.

  46. Ibid.

  47. Ibid.

  48. Ibid, p. 22-23.

  49. Ibid, p. 28.

  50. Ibid, p. 29.

  51. Ibid, p. 28.

  52. Ibid.

  53. Ibid, pp. 81-82.

  54. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II,4, 1105a32-36.

  55. Ibid, I, 4.

  56. Frans Svensson, “Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics and Right Action: A Reassessment” The Journal of Ethics, 15:4, (2011), p. 335.; Yuval Eylon, “The Virtuous Person and Normativity” in Stan van Hooft (ed.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics, (Durham: Acumen Publishing Ltd., 2014), pp. 141-142.

  57. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 59.

  58. Ibid, p.60.

  59. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II,1, 1103a31-1103b3.

  60. Annas, Intelligent Virtue.

  61. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 5, 1140a24-29.

  62. Thomas Sherman, S.J., “Wisdom and Action Guidance in the Agent-Based Virtue Ethics of Aristotle”, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 80:4, (2006), p. 486.

  63. Russell, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 27.

  64. Ibid.

  65. Sarah Broadie, Aristotle and Beyond, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 123-126.

  66. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 5, 1140b18-19.

  67. John McDowell, “Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle’s Ethics” in R. Heinaman (ed.) Aristotle and Moral Realism, (Boulder: Westview Press,1995), p. 214.

  68. Thomas, C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, “Socrates and the Unity of the Virtues”, The Journal of Ethics, 1: 4, (1997), p. 313.

  69. Ibid, p. 319. See also Plato, “Protagoras”, in W.M.R. Lamb (tr.), Plato with an English Translation: Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 329d4-10.

  70. Brickhouse and Smith, “Socrates and the Unity of the Virtues”, p. 319.

  71. Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 57.

  72. Annas, The Morality of Happiness, p. 75.

  73. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 12, 1144a4-10.

  74. Ibid, VI, 13, 1145a9-14.

  75. Ibid, 1140b23-24.

  76. Annas, The Morality of Happiness, p. 9.

  77. Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, p. 58.

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Correspondence to Ikbal Bozkaya.

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This article is in part based on my PhD Dissertation entitled Action-Guiding Virtue Ethics: The Indispensability of Practical Wisdom and Eudaimonia. See Ikbal Bozkaya, Action-Guiding Virtue Ethics: The Indispensability of Practical Wisdom and Eudaimonia, (PhD Dissertation, Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey, 2021).

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Bozkaya, I. The Importance of Eudaimonia for Action-guiding Virtue Ethics. J Value Inquiry 55, 289–304 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-021-09816-y

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