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Hybrid-Logical Reasoning in the Smarties and Sally-Anne Tasks

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Abstract

The main aim of the present paper is to use a proof system for hybrid modal logic to formalize what are called false-belief tasks in cognitive psychology, thereby investigating the interplay between cognition and logical reasoning about belief. We consider two different versions of the Smarties task, involving respectively a shift of perspective to another person and to another time. Our formalizations disclose that despite this difference, the two versions of the Smarties task have exactly the same underlying logical structure. We also consider the Sally-Anne task, having a more complicated logical structure, presupposing a “principle of inertia” saying that a belief is preserved over time, unless there is belief to the contrary.

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Notes

  1. Autism is a psychiatric disorder with the following three diagnostic criteria: 1. Impairment in social interaction. 2. Impairment in communication. 3. Restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests, and activities. For details, see Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (DSM-IV), published by the American Psychiatric Association.

  2. Strictly speaking, the modality \(B\) in Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008) is not formalized in terms of modal logic, but in terms of what is called event calculus, where \(B\) is a predicate that can take formulas as arguments.

  3. The observation that Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008) applies axiom \(\mathsf{K}\) and (implicitly) the necessitation rule, raises the following question: How could the logical analyses of the Smarties and Sally-Anne tasks in Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008) be turned into full formalizations, that is, fully formal proofs in some well-defined proof-system? The book Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008) puts much emphasis on applying the closed world reasoning mechanism of logic programming, that is, the standard procedural evaluation mechanism of Horn clauses, extended with the metalinguistic predicate negation as failure (classical negation is not expressible using Horn clauses), and this would in a principled way have to be combined with machinery like axiom \(\mathsf{K}\) and the necessitation rule, stemming from Hilbert-style axiom systems, which is a very different type of reasoning.

  4. We here have in mind natural deduction, Gentzen, and tableau systems for hybrid logic, not Hilbert-style axiom systems. Proof systems of the first three types are suitable for actual reasoning, carried out by a human, a computer, or in some other medium. Axiom systems are usually not meant for actual reasoning, but are of a more foundational interest.

  5. One may ask why the premise “if alcohol is forbidden then Sake is forbidden” is formalized as \(p \rightarrow q\) using classical implication, rather than a form of non-monotonic implication. Like in many cases when classical logic is used to formalize natural language statements, there is an idealization in our choice of classical implication. We think this idealization is justified since our main goal is to formalize the perspective shift involved in the example argument. We note in passing that classical implication is also used in Seligman (1997) where this example stems from, or to be precise, machinery equivalent to classical implication. See also Footnote 7.

  6. The author thanks Michiel van Lambalgen for mentioning the Smarties task in an email exchange in 2011 where the author suggested that the shift of perspective in the hybrid-logical rule (Term) could be of relevance in connection with the theory of mind view of autism.

  7. Analogous to the question in Footnote 5, it can be asked why we use classical implication in \(D \phi \rightarrow B \phi \), rather than a form of non-monotonic implication. Again, the answer is that this is an idealization. In this connection we remark that principle (9.4) in Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008) also uses classical implication (the non-monotonicity in the logical analysis of the Smarties task of Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008) does not concern principle (9.4), but other principles).

  8. Formally, there are no quantifiers in the object language used by Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008) to formalize the Sally-Anne task, but quantification relies on the fact that uninstantiated variables in logic programs are automatically quantified, as described in Footnote 9.

  9. Slightly reformulated, principle (9.11) of Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008) is the following

    $$\begin{aligned} B_a l(i,t) \wedge t<u \wedge \lnot B_a { clipped}(t,i,u) \rightarrow D_a l(i,u) \end{aligned}$$

    where \(a\) stands for an agent, and where \({ clipped}(t,i,u)\) means that the marble ceases to be at location \(i\) at some time between \(t\) and \(u\), that is, there exists a time \(r\) between \(t\) and \(u\) such thet the marble ceases to be at location \(i\) at the time \(r\). This principle is in Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008) interpreted as a clause in a logic program where the negation prefixing the second occurrence of the \(B_a\) operator is interpreted using negation as failure. The predicate \({ clipped}(t,i,u)\) stems from the event calculus where it is defined as

    $$\begin{aligned} \forall t \forall f \forall u ({ clipped}(t,f,u) \leftrightarrow \exists e \exists r ({ happens}(e,r) \wedge t<r<u \wedge { terminates}(e,f,r))) \end{aligned}$$

    and where \(f\) stands for fluents and \(e\) stands for events. Notice the existential quantifiers \(\exists e\) and \(\exists r\) ranging over events and times. The book Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008) defines \({ clipped}\) using the clauses (9.12) and (9.13) at page 253. These two clauses are similar, and slightly reformulated, clause (9.12) is the following

    $$\begin{aligned} l(i,t) \wedge m(r) \wedge t<r<u \rightarrow { clipped}(t,i,u) \end{aligned}$$

    Note that there is no quantification in the object language of this clause, rather, quantification is taken care of by the evaluation mechanism in logic programs, where uninstantiated variables are automatically quantified over, cf. also Footnote 8, in particular, an uninstantiated variable in the body of a clause, not occurring in its head, is automatically existentially quantified, which is exactly what is going on with the variable \(r\) above. So the book Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008) existentially quantifies over times like in the usual definition of \({ clipped}\), displayed above, but contrary to the usual definition, the book does not quantify over events, rather, the action of moving the marble is formalized as a predicate, namely the predicate \(m(r)\).

  10. Axiom \([A_5]\) of Arkoudas and Bringsjord (2008) is the following

    $$\begin{aligned} C\forall a \forall f \forall t \forall u (B_a { holds}(f,t) \wedge B_a (t < u) \wedge \lnot B_a{ clipped}(t,f,u) \rightarrow B_a { holds}(f,u)) \end{aligned}$$

    where \(C\) is the common knowledge operator. The paper Arkoudas and Bringsjord (2008) defines \({ clipped}\) as usual in the event calculus, that is, as displayed in Footnote 9, except that the definition is prefixed by the common knowledge operator. So Arkoudas and Bringsjord (2008) makes use of quantification over times and events as well as fluents.

  11. Thanks to one of the reviewers for a comment prompting the author to include this information in the formalization, thereby making it more cognitively faithful.

  12. In the interest of comparison, we here disregard that Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008) allows a couple of other ways to acquire belief than seeing something, but this this can also be incorporated in our formalization at the expence of making it slightly more complicated.

  13. The cut-rule says that the end of any branch in a tableau tree can extended with two branches with \(\phi \) on the one branch and \(\lnot \phi \) on the other (expressing the bivalence of classical logic).

  14. Other examples of dissimilar, but logically equivalent, reasoning tasks are the two-player games called Marble Drop and the Matrix Game, used to investigate higher-order social reasoning. They are equivalent in the sense of being game-theoretically equivalent. See the papers Meijering et al. (2010) and Szymanik et al. (2013).

  15. It is well-known that such differences can give rise to differences in performance, see for example the extensive literature on the Wason selection task, as surveyed in Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008) and Dutilh Novaes (2012). Another example is the above mentioned games Marble Drop and the Matrix Game. In Meijering et al. (2010) it is demonstrated that subjects perform better when a game is embedded in a concrete physical context (Marble Drop) than when it is given a more abstract formulation (the Matrix Game).

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Acknowledgments

This paper has benefited from discussions with a number of researchers, in particular Johan van Benthem during a visit to Amsterdam in December 2012. The author thanks Thomas Bolander for comments on an early version of this paper. Also thanks to Jerry Seligman for a discussion of the paper. The author moreover wants to thank one of the reviewers for many constructive comments and suggestions. The author acknowledges the financial support received from The Velux Foundation as funding for the project Hybrid-Logical Proofs at Work in Cognitive Psychology (VELUX 33305).

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Correspondence to Torben Braüner.

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The present paper is a revised and extended version of the conference paper Braüner (2013). Beside a number of minor revisions, the formalization of the Sally-Anne task has been significantly revised [Sect. 7 in both the present paper and in Braüner (2013)]. Moreover, the discussion of related work has been significantly extended.

Proof of Analyticity

Proof of Analyticity

Usually, when considering a natural deduction system, one wants to equip it with a normalizing set of reduction rules such that normal derivations satisfy the subformula property. Normalization says that any derivation by repeated applications of reduction rules can be rewritten to a derivation which is normal, that is, no reduction rules apply. From this it follows that the system under consideration is analytic.

Now, the works Braüner (2004) and Braüner (2011), subsection 4.3, by the present author devise a set of reduction rules for \(\mathbf{N'}_{\mathcal{H}}\) obtained by translation of a set of reduction rules for a more common natural deduction system for hybrid logic. This more common system, which we denote \(\mathbf{N}_{\mathcal{H}}\), can be found in Braüner (2004) and in Braüner (2011), subsection 2.2. All formulas in the system \(\mathbf{N}_{\mathcal{H}}\) are satisfaction statements. Despite other desirable features, it is not known whether the reduction rules for \(\mathbf{N'}_{\mathcal{H}}\) are normalizing, and normal derivations do not always satisfy the subformula property. In fact, Chapter 4 of the book Braüner (2011) ends somewhat pessimistically by exhibiting a normal derivation without the subformula property. It is remarked that a remedy would be to find a more complete set of reduction rules, but the counter-example does not give a clue how such a set of reduction rules should look.

In what follows we shall take another route. We prove a completeness result saying that any valid formula has a derivation in \(\mathbf{N'}_{\mathcal{H}}\) satisfying a version of the subformula property. This is a sharpened version of a completeness result for \(\mathbf{N'}_{\mathcal{H}}\) originally given in Braüner (2004) and in subsection 4.3 of Braüner (2011) (Theorem 4.1 in Braüner (2011)). Thus, we prove that \(\mathbf{N'}_{\mathcal{H}}\) is analytic without going via a normalization result. So the proof of the completeness result does not involve reduction rules. The result is mathematically weaker than normalization together with the subformula property for normal derivations, but it nevertheless demonstrates analyticity. Analyticity is a major success criteria in proof-theory, one reason being that analytic provability is a step towards automated theorem proving (which obviously is related to Leibniz’ aim mentioned in the intoduction of the present paper).

In the proof below we shall refer to \(\mathbf{N}_{\mathcal{H}}\) as well as a translation \(( \cdot )^{\circ }\) from \(\mathbf{N}_{\mathcal{H}}\) to \(\mathbf{N'}_{\mathcal{H}}\) given in Braüner (2004) and subsection 4.3 of Braüner (2011). This translates a derivation \(\pi \) in \(\mathbf{N}_{\mathcal{H}}\) to a derivation \(\pi ^{\circ } \) in \(\mathbf{N'}_{\mathcal{H}}\) having the same end-formula and parcels of undischarged assumptions. The reader wanting to follow the details of our proof is advised to obtain a copy of the paper Braüner (2004) or the book Braüner (2011).

The translation \(( \cdot )^{\circ }\) satisfies the following.

Lemma 1

Let \(\pi \) be a derivation in \(\mathbf{N}_{\mathcal{H}}\). Any formula \(\theta \) occuring in \(\pi ^{\circ }\) has at least one of the following properties.

  1. 1.

    \(\theta \) occurs in \(\pi \).

  2. 2.

    \(@_{ a}\theta \) occurs in \(\pi \) for some satisfaction operator \(@_{ a}\).

  3. 3.

    \(\theta \) is a nominal \(a\) such that some formula \(@_{ a}\psi \) occurs in \(\pi \).

Proof

Induction on the structure of the derivation of \(\pi \). Each case in the translation \(( \cdot )^{\circ }\) is checked.

Note that in item 1 of the lemma above, the formula \(\theta \) must be a satisfaction statement since only satisfaction statements occur in \(\pi \). In what follows \(@_{ d}\Gamma \) denotes the set of formulas \(\{ @_{ d} \xi \; | \; \xi \in \Gamma \}\).

Theorem 1

Let \(\pi \) be a normal derivation of \(@_{ d}\phi \) from \(@_{ d} \Gamma \) in \(\mathbf{N}_{\mathcal{H}}\). Any formula \(\theta \) occuring in \(\pi ^{\circ }\) has at least one of the following properties.

  1. 1.

    \(\theta \) is of the form \(@_{ a}\psi \) such that \(\psi \) is a subformula of \(\phi \), some formula in \(\Gamma \), or some formula of the form \(c\) or \(\lozenge c\).

  2. 2.

    \(\theta \) is a subformula of \(\phi \), some formula in \(\Gamma \), or some formula of the form \(c\) or \(\lozenge c\).

  3. 3.

    \(\theta \) is a nominal.

  4. 4.

    \(\theta \) is of the form \(@_{ a}(p \rightarrow \bot )\) or \(p \rightarrow \bot \) where \(p\) is a subformula of \(\phi \) or some formula in \(\Gamma \).

  5. 5.

    \(\theta \) is of the form \(@_{ a}\bot \) or \(\bot \).

Proof

Follows from Lemma 1 above together with Theorem 2.4 (called the quasi-subformula property) in subsection 2.2.5 of Braüner (2011).

We are now ready to give our main result, which is a sharpened version of the completeness result given in Theorem 4.1 in subsection 4.3 of Braüner (2011).

Theorem 2

Let \(\phi \) be a formula and \(\Gamma \) a set of formulas. The first statement below implies the second statement.

  1. 1.

    For any model \(\mathcal{M}\), any world \(w\), and any assignment \(g\), if, for any formula \(\xi \in \Gamma \), \(\mathcal{M},g,w \models \xi \), then \(\mathcal{M},g,w \models \phi \).

  2. 2.

    There exists of derivation of \(\phi \) from \(\Gamma \) in \(\mathbf{N'}_{\mathcal{H}}\) such that any formula \(\theta \) occuring in the derivation has at least one of the five properties listed in Theorem 1.

Proof

Let \(d\) be a new nominal. It follows that for any model \(\mathcal{M}\) and any assignment \(g\), if, for any formula \(@_{ d} \xi \in @_{ d} \Gamma \), \(\mathcal{M},g \models @_{ d}\xi \), then \(\mathcal{M},g \models @_{ d}\phi \). By completeness of the system \(\mathbf{N}_{\mathcal{H}}\), Theorem 2.2 in subsection 2.2.3 of the book Braüner (2011), there exists a derivation \(\pi \) of \(@_{ d}\phi \) from \(@_{ d} \Gamma \) in \(\mathbf{N}_{\mathcal{H}}\). By normalization, Theorem 2.3 in subsection 2.2.5 of the book, we can assume that \(\pi \) is normal. We now apply the rules \((@I)\), \((@E)\), and \(({ Name})\) to \(\pi ^{\circ }\) obtaining a derivation of \(\phi \) from \(\Gamma \) in \(\mathbf{N'}_{\mathcal{H}}\) satisfying at least one of the properties mentioned in Theorem 1.

Remark

If the formula occurrence \(\theta \) mentioned in the theorem above is not of one of the forms covered by item 4 in Theorem 1, and does not have one of a finite number of very simple forms not involving propositional symbols, then either \(\theta \) is a subformula of \(\phi \) or some formula in \(\Gamma \), or \(\theta \) is of the form \(@_{ a}\psi \) such that \(\psi \) is a subformula of \(\phi \) or some formula in \(\Gamma \). This is the version of the subformula property we intended to prove.

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Braüner, T. Hybrid-Logical Reasoning in the Smarties and Sally-Anne Tasks. J of Log Lang and Inf 23, 415–439 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-014-9206-z

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