Abstract
Braun (Linguistics & Philosophy 35, 461–489, 2012) argued for a non- relativist, invariantist theory of ‘might’. Yanovich (Linguistics & Philosophy, 2013) argues that Braun’s theory is inconsistent with certain facts concerning diachronic meaning changes in ‘might’, ‘can’, and ‘may’. This paper replies to Yanovich’s objection.
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Yanovich, I. (2013). Invariantist ‘might’ and modal meaning change. Linguistics and Philosophy. doi:10.1007/s10988_013_9133_5
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Braun, D. Invariantism about ‘can’ and ‘may’ (as well as ‘might’). Linguist and Philos 36, 181–185 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-013-9135-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-013-9135-3