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Compromise Despite Conviction: Curbing Integrity’s Moral Dangers

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Notes

  1. David Luban, “Integrity: Its Causes and Cures,” Fordham Law Review 72, no. 2 (2003): 298.

  2. Martin Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics (Kansas: University of Kansas, 1990).

  3. Drawing on major strands of the integrity literature, Dudzinski includes these two features of identity formation (integral values) and principled coherence (integrated values) in her description of formalist integrity. D. M. Dudzinski, “Integrity: Principled Coherence, Virtue, or Both?” The Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (2004): 301–5.

  4. See Bernard Williams, “Utilitarianism and Integrity,” in Utilitarianism: For and Against, ed. Bernard Williams and J. J. Smart (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973).

  5. See Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy LXVIII (1971).

  6. See Sharon Dolovich, “Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of Integrity,” in Professional Ethics and Personal Integrity, ed. Tim Dare and W. Bradley Wendel (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 146–7; Jody L. Graham, “Does Integrity Require Moral Goodness?” Ratio XIV (2001): 242–44.

  7. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Elizabeth Rapaport (Cambridge: Hackett, 2003), 35.

  8. Benjamin, Splitting the Difference, 48–51.

  9. See Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze, and Michael Levine, “Should We Strive for Integrity?” The Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (1999).

  10. See Colin James, “Seeing Things as We Are: Emotional Intelligence and Clinical Legal Education,” International Journal Clinical Legal Education 8 (2005): 133; James R. Rest, “A Psychologist Looks at the Teaching of Ethics,” The Hastings Center Report 12, no. 1 (1982): 34.

  11. See Cheshire Calhoun, “Standing for Something,” Philosophy 92, no. 5 (1995); Luban, “Causes and Cures.”; Greg Scherkoske, “Integrity and Moral Danger” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40, no. 3 (2010); Andrew Edgar and Stephen Pattison, “Integrity and the Moral Complexity of Professional Practice,” Nursing Philosophy 12 (2011).

  12. Greg Scherkoske, “Could Integrity Be an Epistemic Virtue?” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20, no. 2 (2012): 185.

  13. Graham, “Does Integrity Require Moral Goodness?” 246.

  14. Ibid.

  15. See Tim Dare, “Distance, Detachment, and Integrity,” in Professional Ethics and Personal Integrity, ed. Tim Dare and W. Bradley Wendel (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 117–18.

  16. Cox, La Caze, and Levine, “Should We Strive for Integrity?” 520.

  17. Dudzinski, “Principled Coherence,” 309; Morten Magelssen, “When Should Conscientious Objection Be Accepted?” Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (2012): 19–20.

  18. See Dudzinski, “Principled Coherence,” 305–09.

  19. See Benjamin, Splitting the Difference.

  20. Ibid., 36–43.

  21. Ibid., 37.

  22. See Edgar and Pattison, “Moral Complexity,” 96; Dolovich, “Ethical Lawyering.”

  23. See Michael Davis, “Professionalism Means Putting Your Profession First,” Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 2, no. 34 (1988).

  24. See Magelssen, “Conscientious Objection.”

  25. Scherkoske, “Epistemic Virtue?” 196–201; Calhoun, “Standing for Something,” 253–60; Edgar and Pattison, “Moral Complexity,” 102–3.

  26. Calhoun, “Standing for Something,” 258; Scherkoske, “Moral Danger,” 354.

  27. Calhoun, “Standing for Something,” 253–58.

  28. Edgar and Pattison, “Moral Complexity,” 103.

  29. Scherkoske, “Epistemic Virtue?” 201.

  30. Robert Noggle, “Integrity, the Self, and Desire-Based Accounts of the Good,” Philosophical Studies 96, no. 3 (1999): 310.

  31. For example, Scherkoske, “Epistemic Virtue?” 201–5.

  32. See Williams, “Utilitarianism and Integrity.”; Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze, and Michael Levine, Integrity and the Fragile Self (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), 73–100.

  33. Dare, “Distance, Detachment, and Integrity,” 118.

  34. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1969).

  35. Mill, On Liberty.

  36. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Joe Sachs (Newbury, MA: Focus Publishing/R. Pullins, 2002), 1097a–98a; Christopher V. Mirus, “Excellence as Completion in Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics,” The Review of Metaphysics 66, no. 4 (2013).

  37. This paper benefited from helpfully penetrating comments offered by seminar participants at the University of Queensland and the University of Tasmania, and from an anonymous reviewer for The Journal of Value Inquiry.

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  1. Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law, Griffith University, Macrossan (N16) 2.78, Nathan Campus, Nathan, QLD, Australia

    Hugh Breakey

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Breakey, H. Compromise Despite Conviction: Curbing Integrity’s Moral Dangers. J Value Inquiry 50, 613–629 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-016-9541-1

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