Visuomotor noise and the non-factive analysis of knowledge
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Date
28/11/2018Author
Bricker, Adam Michael
Metadata
Abstract
It is all but universally accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive: S knows
that p only if p. The purpose of this thesis is to present an argument against the
factivity of knowledge and in doing so develop a non-factive approach to the
analysis of knowledge. The argument against factivity presented here rests largely
on empirical evidence, especially extant research into visuomotor noise, which
suggests that the beliefs that guide everyday motor action are not strictly true.
However, as we still want to attribute knowledge on the basis of successful motor
action, I argue that the best option is to replace factivity with a weaker constraint on
knowledge, one on which certain false beliefs might still be known. In defence of
this point, I develop the non-factive analysis of knowledge, which demonstrates that
a non-factive constraint might do the same theoretical work as factivity.