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i. e. in the sense of helping make psychology a systematized science. The practical significance of psychometrics is obvious.
W. James, Principles of Psychology, I. p. 546. Although many critics do not agree with James, this mere disagreement shows the presence of a problem. No one in his senses would say the proper outcome of thermometrics for instanceis just nothing. James was certainly in his senses.
E. L. Thorndike, The Measurement of Intelligence, New York, 1927-Thorndike's judgment although five years old could well be repeated today.
The writer is indebted to many sources for the ideas set forth in the following section. Rather than overburden the text with notes he wishes to admit this indebtedness here. The reader familiar with the writings of C. D. Broad, A. D. Ritchie, J. H. Woodger, L. v. Bertalanffy, H. Reichenbach, K. Lewin and W. Koehler will be more than faintly reminded of them in the following sections. The writer believes, however, that he is the first to apply the newer methodological ideas to an analysis of psychometrics and that he has some new ideas concerning the relationship between laws and instruments. Since completing this manuscript I have read Nagel, “Measurement”, Erkenntnis 2, 313–335, 1931. Although Nagel uses quite a different nomenclature and pursues the logical side of the question further than I shall do here, I find our general positions regarding laws, instruments and measurements very similar.
To a certain extent the writer agrees with this dictum. Measurement is necessary. This quarrel, however, as we shall see is concerning its relationship to law. It will be the writer's contention that this relationship has been completely misunderstood by the psychometricians.
When analysing psychological concepts and methods in terms of “vergleichende Wissenschaftslehre” one must not forget that physics has had a comparatively long history and psychology has had virtually no history at all, despite the fact that psychologists flatter themselves by turning out long volumes on their science's history. Contemporary biological science is according to L. v. Bertalanffy “pre-Copernician”; to K. Lewin, “Aristotelian”.
Cf. E. Mach, Prinzipien der Wärmelehre, Leipzig, 1922.
Cf. E. Warburg, Experimentelle Physik, Tübingen, 1922
E. Mach, Die Mechanik, Leipzig, 1921.
For instance, A. D. Ritchie, Scientific Method, New York and London, 1923.
Whether or not this is epistemologically necessary (Reichenbach, for instance, in his “Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre” considers that it is not), in actual practice our time measurements are “read off” visually.
Discorsi, III Day.
Cf. J. F.Brown, Psychol. Forsch, 14, 199–268, 1931, particularly the paper, “On time perception in visual movement fields”.
Cf. P. W. Bridgman, “The Logic of Modern Physics”, New York, 1927.
Actually as we shall see in the next paragraphs, this is not quite true. Law and measurement cannot really be chronologically separated. In case of the velocity equation it is common experience that ifv 1>v 2, thens 1>s 2 ort 1<t 2. Since this is so, one supposesv=s/t and later proves it.
“Hunch” is an American colloquialism signifying about what “glücklicher Einfall” signifies to the German.
For a more thorough discussion of the relationship between laws and theories Cf. K. Lewin, Gesetz und Experiment in der Psychologie, Berlin-Schlachtenfee, 1927, and H. Dingler, Der Zusammenbruch der Wissenschaft, etc., München, 1926.
Die Mechanik, Leipzig, 1921.
That the measurement process is not independent of the thing measured is shown in the following quotation from M. Planck: “Nur auf diese Weise scheint die Behauptung der neuen Physik verständlich zu werden, daß das Meß-instrument sich nicht prinzipiell trennen läßt von dem gemessenen Objekt, insofern beide dem nämlichen physikalischen Gebilde angehören.” Forsch. und Fortschr., 6, 1929.
We are concerned here only with the reliability of the instrument. Other sources of unreliability such as errors of observation and errors of sampling although interesting, offer the same problems for psychology and physics.
In connection with the problem of the constancy of the I. Q.
H. E. Garett in a book entitled “Great Experiments in Psychology”, New York, 1930, gives the first place to Binet.
The practical significance of psychometrics isnot to be denied. Psychometrics, however, have not helped psychology as a systematized science a bit. Thermometrics in the XIX century helped make modern physics and the two Thermodynamic laws became the cornerstones of the new energetics. Undoubtedly Fechner and Binet looked for something similar.
J. F.Brown and R. H.Mize, On the effect of field structure on differential sensitivity, Psychol. Forsch. 16, 355–372, 1932. Following a slightly different argument Percy W. Cobb (“Weber's Law and the Fechnerian Muddle”, Psychol. Rev., 39, 1932) illustrates the same point concerning the validity of Weber's law.
Brown and Mize, op. cit.
Cf. L. v. Bertalanffy, Theoretische Biologie, Berlin, 1932, and J. H. Woodger, Biological Principles, New York and London, 1929.
Cf. M. Planck, Op. cit.
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Brown, J.F. A methodological consideration of the problem of psychometrics. Erkenntnis 4, 46–61 (1934). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01793476
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01793476