Abstract
Tversky and Koehler's support theory attempts to explain why probability judgments are affected by the manner in which formally similar events are described. Support theory suggests that as the explicitness of a description increases, an event will be judged to be more likely. In the present experiment, experienced decision-makers from large, international accounting firms were given case-specific information about an audit client and asked to provide a series of judgments regarding the perceived likelihood of events. Unpacking a hypothesis into four formally equivalent hypotheses more than doubled its perceived likelihood. These results are largely consistent with support theory, extending its generalizability to applied contexts involving business professionals. Further, the paper finds that task-specific factors, a previously untested area, can also affect support theory interpretations.
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Brody, R.G., Coulter, J.M. & Daneshfar, A. Auditor Probability Judgments: Discounting Unspecified Possibilities. Theory and Decision 54, 85–104 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026243725082
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026243725082