Expressivism, normative content, and propositions
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Date
30/11/2020Author
Brown, James Lindsey David
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Abstract
The thesis of this thesis is that expressivists can and should develop a theory
of normative propositions that can play an explanatory role in their theory of
normative thought and discourse. It has been widely assumed that
expressivists cannot make explanatory appeal to normative propositions
because propositional content is representational in the following sense: a
proposition is or determines a way that reality must be when that proposition
is true. If a normative proposition is or determines a way reality must be when
that proposition is true, and believing a proposition involves taking that
proposition to be true, it follows that believing a normative proposition
involves taking reality to be some particular way. But expressivists deny that
normative thought represents reality in this way. Rather, normative thought is
best explained as having some distinctive nonrepresentational function, such
as motivating our actions and coordinating our attitudes. As such, almost all
expressivists have rejected the existence of normative propositions, except in a
deflationary and hence non-explanatory sense.
However, by rejecting the existence of normative propositions, expressivists
face a number of serious problems in relation to explaining normative thought
and discourse. By positing propositions as the objects of our attitudes and
speech acts, we can provide a straightforward and systematic characterisation
of our thought and talk in terms of the things we are related to in believing,
desiring, asserting, denying, and so on. For example, logically complex
attitudes can be explained in terms of the logical complexity of their
propositional content. Rational connections between attitudes, such as
inconsistency and entailment relations between beliefs, can be explained in
terms of the properties of their propositional objects. Different attitude types
with the same content can be explained in terms of a subject’s standing in
different relations to the same proposition. And quantification over attitude
contents can be explained in terms of a domain of propositional objects over
which such quantification occurs. By rejecting normative propositions,
expressivists must provide alternative explanations of these features of
normative thought and discourse.
Although a number of philosophers have attempted to provide such an
alternative, such attempts face a number of serious difficulties. Moreover, even
supposing some adequate alternative is forthcoming, there is a remaining
problem of explaining why it is that both normative and non-normative
thought possess many of the same features but for completely different
reasons. Problems such as these have more recently led some to suggest that
expressivists should embrace the existence of normative propositions within their theory of normative thought and discourse. This thesis takes up this idea
and examines a number of different frameworks in which expressivists might
develop a theory of normative propositions.
How could an expressivist ever fully embrace the existence of normative
propositions? My simple answer is that expressivists should reject the
assumption that normative propositions are representational. If a normative
proposition is not or does not determine a way reality must be when it is true,
then believing that proposition need not involve representing reality as being
some particular way or other. I explore several different views about
propositions and argue that they each admit of generalisation such that some
but not all propositions are representational. I argue that some of these views
are better than others for the purposes of expressivism. My discussion of
propositions is also meant to contribute to theorising in the philosophy of mind
and language about what propositions are. For if you think there might be
something right about the expressivist idea that normative thought is not
representational like descriptive thought, then you should think that some
views of propositions are better than others in light of my arguments about
why expressivists can and should embrace a nonrepresentational view about
normative propositions.