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Notes
See Thom Brooks, ‘Kant’s Theory of Punishment’, Utilitas 15 (2003): 206–224.
It should be noted that this is the same Feuerbach whom G W F Hegel critiques, saying (Feuerbach’s theory of) deterrence is akin to merely raising a stick at a dog. It should be further noted that it was common in German legal thinking at that time to understand the judiciary as part of the executive branch, which fits with Altman’s remark that the legislature’s threat ‘is carried out by judges’ as they had an applied role unlike that found with the separation of powers (see Altman 2021: 7).
See T H Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986): 89–106 (sects.113–136).
In my latest work, I have developed a hierarchy of penal purposes under the umbrella of rights protection that shows how a unified theory is possible. See Thom Brooks, Punishment: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2021), chapter 7.
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Brooks, T. Matthew C. Altman: A Theory of Legal Punishment: Deterrence, Retribution and the Aims of the State, Routledge, London, 2021. Criminal Law, Philosophy 17, 507–511 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09655-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09655-x