Abstract
The “verbal–nonverbal” distinction is mostly used in everyday language and its “‘naïve-natural’ attitude” (Husserl). It confirms the idea that a word/verb, as a component of human expressivity, is the basic unit of language. Theories of Peirce, Saumjan, and Searle highlight how a different, predominantly “‘non-naïve’-natural attitude” is required to understand the distinction and its position in the semiotic toolkit. To support this conclusion, Husserl unfolds a methodological approach of varying attitudes and attitude-changes, including important diversifications of ontology. A consequence is the need for an interregional ontological approach, which in this article leads to a consideration of social psychology (Lewin) and quantum theory (Bohm) because both underline that words and meanings are forces in fields, and by no means isolated single units. Word and meaning are to be understood as forces, and meaning-making as well as interpretation a matter of force field considerations. Semiotics should thus cherish dynamic features, whereby the “verbal–nonverbal” distinction teaches us at a “non-naïve” attitude level, that a word/verb is always a non-word/verb as well. The greatness of semiotics is in the understanding of such dynamic and continuously creative inversions.
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