Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Le Raisonnement Juridique: Une Pratique Spécifique?

  • Published:
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Selon une thèse largement partagée, le droit et une pratique sociale et les contributions des participants sont complémentaires les unes des autres. Dans ces conditions, le raisonnement juridique consiste d’abord en une interprétation de ces pratiques et présuppose un point de vue interne de la part de celui qui souhaite en rendre compte. Le raisonnement juridique est ainsi conçu comme une argumentation pratique, subordonnée aux exigences de la rationalité car ceux qui participent à la pratique juridique sont contraints de donner des raisons à leur action et ces raisons tissent un réseau de contraintes. Très séduisante, cette thèse qui doit beaucoup à la critique des réalistes par Hart, n’en demeure pas moins justiciable de quelque critique.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Alchourrón, Carlos, and Eugenio Bulygin. 1971. Normative systems. Wien-New York: Springer (édition argentine antérieure).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  2. Alexander, Larry, and Emily Sherwin. 2008. Demystifying legal reasoning. Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy and Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  3. Atienza, Manuel. 2005. Las Razones del Derecho. Teorias de La Argumentacion Juridica. Mexico: UNAM.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Bobbio, Norberto. 1954. Sul ragionamento dei giuristi. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 27–28: 67–84.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Bulygin, Eugenio. 1982. Norms, normative propositions, and legal statements. In Contemporary philosophy. A new survey, ed. G. Floistad, 127–152. The Hague-Boston-London: Martinus Nijhoff.

  6. Bulygin, Eugenio. 1995. Norme, Validità et sistemi normativi. Trad. ital Paolo Comanducci, and Riccardo Guastini. Torino: Giappichelli, not. 105–106.

  7. Centre national de recherches de logique. 1970. Le Raisonnement juridique et la logique déontique, Actes du colloque de Bruxelles, 22–23 décembre 1969. Louvain, Paris: Editions Nauwelaerts.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Cohen, Felix.S. 1935. Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach. Columbia Law Review 35(6): 809–849.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Cohen, Mathilde. 2008. Giving reasons in court practice: decision-makers at the crossroads. Columbia Journal of European Law 14(2): 257–276.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Cohen, Mathilde. 2011. Giving reasons: Why and how public institutions justify their decisions. Cambridge: ProQuest, UMI Dissertation Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Coke, Sir Edward. 1628. The first part of the institutes of the Law of England, (Coke upon Littleton), reprinted in II The selected writings of Sir Edward Coke (1639). Ed. 2003. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

  12. Congrès Mondial de Philosophie du Droit et de Philosophie Sociale. 1971. Le Raisonnement juridique. Legal reasoning. Die juridische Argumentation, Actes du congrès de Bruxelles, 30 août-3 septembre 1971. Louvain, Paris Editions Nauwelaerts.

  13. Dworkin, Ronald. 1985. La Théorie du droit comme interprétation. Droit et Société 1:100–114 (trad. F. Michaut).

  14. Dworkin, Ronald. 1986. Law’s empire. Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Fisher III, W., Morton.J. Horwitz, and T.A. Reed. 1993. American legal realism. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Frank, Jerome. 1930. Law & the modern mind. New York: Brentano’s.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Frank J. 1932. What courts do in fact. Illinois Law Review 26:645–666, 761–784.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Gray, John Chipman. 1909. The nature and sources of Law. New and revised ed., 1921. New York: Macmillan Co.

  19. Guastini, Riccardo. 2006. Le “point de vue” de la science juridique. Analisi e Diritto:137–149.

  20. Guibourg, Ricardo. 1986. Derecho, sistema y realidad. Buenos Aires: Astrea.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Hart, H.L.A. 1962. The judicial decision by Richard A. Wasserstrom. Stanford Law Review 14: 919–926.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. Hart, H.L.A. 1983. Essays in jurisprudence and philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  23. Hobbes, Thomas.1990. Thomas Hobbes, a dialogue between a philosopher and a student of the common Laws of England. 1681. http://oll.libertyfund.org/EBooks/Hobbes_0298.pdf. V. en français: Hobbes, Thomas. Dialogue entre un philosophe et un légiste des Common-Laws d’Angleterre. Trans. L. Carrive, and P. Carrive. Paris: Vrin. Le texte est accessible en ligne dans une traduction de Philippe Folliot à cette adresse: http://classiques.uqac.ca/.

  24. Hutcheson, Joseph C. 1929. The judgment intuitive: The function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision. Cornell Law Quarterly 14:274 réimprimé in 1998. The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of The “Hunch” in Judicial Decision. South Texas Law Review 39:889.

  25. Kripke, Saul. 1982. Wittgenstein on rules and private language. An elementary exposition. Cambridge: Harvard UP; trad. fr. de Th. Marchaisse: Kripke, Saul. 1995. Règles et langage privé. Introduction au paradoxe de Wittgenstein. Paris: Seuil.

  26. La Torre, Massimo. 2012. Sullo spirito mite delle leggi. Ragione, razionalità, ragionevolezza. Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica.

  27. Leiter, Brian. 2004. American legal realism. In The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of Law and legal theory, ed. Martin.P. Golding, and William.A. Edmundson, 50–66. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Levi, Edward.H. 1962. An introduction to legal reasoning (1941–1948). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  29. Levi, Edward.H. 1964. The nature of judicial reasoning. In Law and philosophy, ed. Sidney Hook, 263–381. New York: New York University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Llewellyn, K.N. 1960. The Common Law tradition-deciding appeals. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

    Google Scholar 

  31. MacCormick, Neil, and Ota Weinberger. 1986. An institutional theory of Law. New approaches to legal positivism. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  32. MacCormick, Neil. 1978. Legal reasoning and legal theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  33. MacCormick, Neil. 1983. On legal decisions and their consequences: From Dewey to Dworkin. New York University Law Review 58: 239–258.

    Google Scholar 

  34. MacCormick, Neil. 1989. The ethics of Legalism. Ratio Juris 2(2): 184–193.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  35. MacCormick, Neil. 1994. Legal reasoning and the institutional theory. Rechtstheorie Beiheft 14: 117–139.

    Google Scholar 

  36. MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1981. After Virtue. A study in moral theory. 3rd ed. 2007 Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame.

  37. Mackie, John. 1977. The third theory of Law. Philosophy & Public Affairs 7: 3–16.

    Google Scholar 

  38. Modak-Truran, Mark.C. 2001. A pragmatic justification of the judicial hunch. University of Richmond Law Review 35: 55–89.

    Google Scholar 

  39. Moor, Pierre. 2010. Dynamique du système juridique. Une théorie générale du droit. Bruxelles, Paris, Lausanne: Bruylant, LGDJ, Schultess Editions romandes.

  40. Müller, Friedrich. 1994. Strukturierende Rechtslehre, 2e ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  41. Nino, Carlos Santiago. 1985. La validez del derecho. Buenos Aires: Astrea.

    Google Scholar 

  42. Nino, Carlos Santiago. 1999. Il diritto come morale applicata. trad. ital. a cura di M. La Torre. Milano:Giuffrè, 48–49.

  43. Postema, Gerald.J. 2002. The philosophy of Common Law. In The Oxford handbook of jurisprudence and philosophy of Law, ed. Jules Coleman, and Scott.J. Shapiro, 588–622. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  44. Postema, Gerald.J. 2003. Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part 2). Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 3: 1–28.

    Google Scholar 

  45. Radin, Max. 1930. Statutory interpretation. Harvard Law Review 43(6): 863–885.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  46. Raz, Joseph. 1975. Practical reason and norms. 2nd ed. 1999. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  47. Raz, Joseph. 1994. Ethics in the Public Domain. Essays in the morality of Law and Politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  48. Redondo, Maria.Cristina. 1996. La nócion de razón para la acción en el análisis juridíco. Madrid: CEC.

    Google Scholar 

  49. Renoux-Zagamé, Marie.-France. 2004. La figure du juge chez Domat. Droits 39: 35–52.

    Google Scholar 

  50. Renoux-Zagamé, Marie-France. 2007. Domat, Jean. In Dictionnaire historique des juristes français XIIe–XXe, eds. P. Arabeyre, and J.-L. Halpérin, and J. Krynen, 254–257. Paris: PUF.

  51. Rumble Jr, Wilfrid.E. 1965. The Paradox of American Legal Realism. Ethics 75: 166–178.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  52. Rumble Jr, Wilfrid.E. 1966. Rule-Skepticism and the Role of the Judge: A study of American Legal Realism. Journal of Public Law Emory Law School 15: 251–285.

    Google Scholar 

  53. Samuel, Geoffrey. 2009. Can Legal Reasoning Be Demystified? Legal Studies 29: 181–210.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  54. Scharffs, Brett.G. 2001. Law as craft. Vanderbilt Law Review 54: 2245–2347.

    Google Scholar 

  55. Scharffs, Brett.G. 2004. The character of legal reasoning. Washington and Lee University School of Law 61: 733–786.

    Google Scholar 

  56. Schauer, Frederick. 1995. Giving reasons. Stanford Law Review 47: 633–659.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  57. Schauer, Frederick. 2003. Neutrality and Judicial Review. Law and Philosophy 22: 217–240.

    Google Scholar 

  58. Schauer, Frederick. 2009. Thinking like a lawyer. A new introduction to legal reasoning. Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  59. Segal, Jeffrey A., and Albert Cover. 1989. Ideological values and the votes of supreme court justices. American Political Science Review 83:557–565.

    Google Scholar 

  60. Smith, Matthew Noah. 2006. The Law as a social practice. Are shared activities at the foundations of Law? Legal Theory 12(3):265–292.

    Google Scholar 

  61. Songer, Donald R., and Stefanie A. Lindquist. 1996. Not the whole story: The impact of justices’ values on Supreme Court decision making. American Journal of Political Science 40: 1049–1063.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  62. Stone, Julius. 1968. Reasons and Reasoning in Judicial and Juristic Argument. In Legal systems and Lawyer’s reasoning, 301–337. Stanford: Stanford UP.

  63. Sunstein, Cass. 2012. Elections. New York Review of Books (Nov. 8):10–12.

  64. Trujillo, Isabel. 2010. Pensare e ragionare da giuristi: interpretazione e ragionamento giuridico. Ragion Pratica 34: 59–72.

    Google Scholar 

  65. Viola, Franceso. 1990. Il diritto come pratica sociale. Milano: Ed. Univ. Jaca.

    Google Scholar 

  66. Viola, Franceso. 2007. Pratiche sociali: istituzioni e procedure nel costituzionalismo. Rivista di Studi Utopici 2: 97–106.

    Google Scholar 

  67. Wasserstrom, Richard A. 1961. The judicial decision. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  68. Weinreb, Lloyd L. 2005. Legal reason. The use of analogy in Legal Argument, 123–146. New York: Cambridge University Press.

  69. Zelermyer, William. 1963. The process of Legal Reasoning. New York: Prentice-Hall Inc.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. UMR CNRS 7074 Centre de Théorie et Analyse du Droit, Institut Universitaire de France, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre, Nanterre, France

    Pierre Brunet

Authors
  1. Pierre Brunet
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Pierre Brunet.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Brunet, P. Le Raisonnement Juridique: Une Pratique Spécifique?. Int J Semiot Law 26, 767–782 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-013-9310-4

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-013-9310-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation