Abstract
Susan Hurley has argued against a well known argument for freedom of speech, the argument from autonomy, on the basis of two hypotheses about violence in the media and aggressive behaviour. The first hypothesis says that exposure to media violence causes aggressive behaviour; the second, that humans have an innate tendency to copy behaviour in ways that bypass conscious deliberation. I argue, first, that Hurley is not successful in setting aside the argument from autonomy. Second, I show that the empirical data are irrelevant to statutory regulation of media violence. They do not yield a sufficiently strong correlation between exposure to media violence and non-autonomously copied criminal violence, and they do not yield a way ex ante to individuate the viewers who will be affected by media violence.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
This paper is mainly inspired by Hurley’s work (2004, 2005, 2006), but similar views are propounded by social psychologists such as Anderson et al. (2003). Hurley does not explicitly advocate particular regulations on media violence, and she cautions against a paternalistic interpretation of her research. She presents her work as “trying to open up a set of issues and to excavate connections that need considerable further thought, both at the levels of theory and of legal policy” (Hurley 2004, p. 166).
For critique of the findings from social psychologists on aggression research see, e.g., Freedman (2002), partly reprinted in Nier (2007), which also contains work by the main protagonists of the literature Hurley uses. See also Savage (2004). Not explicitly critical, but offering a decidedly different view of media violence are Kirsh (2006) and Trend (2007). Critique of the neuroscience and cognitive science of imitation was raised, e.g., by Gallese and Goldman (1998), especially Appendix A, and Jones (2005).
Note that correlation does not allow for straightforward probabilistic conclusions. It would be incorrect, for instance, to interpret a correlation coefficient of r = 0.10 as corresponding to a figure of 10% of the viewer population. Hurley seems to miss this point when she writes: “Suppose, for example, that only 10% of the viewers who see a given program are influenced to be more aggressive; this may seem a small effect size, but 10% of 10 million viewers is still a million people” (Hurley 2004, p. 178). She appends a footnote referring to a paper by Smith and Donnerstein (1998). But Smith and Donnerstein (1998, p. 178) write about an indication that “approximately 10% of the variability in later criminal behavior can be attributed to television violence” rather than saying that exposure to television violence will lead in 10% of the cases to criminal violence later on. In the same footnote Hurley mentions a particular interpretation of correlation: “the overall effect size… was 0.31, which is equivalent to aggressive behavior being exhibited by 65.5% of those above the median in exposure, but only by 34.4% [sic; this has to be 34.5%] of those below the median,” referring to Bushman and Huesmann (2001, p. 234, they do get the percentages right). In fact, Bushman and Huesmann (2001) interpret correlation in terms of the binomial effect size display (BESD) developed by Rosenthal and Rubin (1982). But BESDs only correctly represent percentages under the assumption that, in statistical jargon, the overall binomial success rate is 50% and that exposure group and control group are equal. This entails, roughly, that if the group exposed to media violence shows aggression in 65.5% of the cases, and not in 34.5%, then the control group shows violence in 34.5% and not in 65.5% of the cases. This would mean that of those people who do not view media violence, 34.5% engage in aggressive acts. Thompson and Schumacker (1997) point out that the assumptions underlying BESD fail to hold in many cases.
Freedman (2002) and Savage (2004) express reservations about the issue of causality.
See Freedman (2002) for the view that ex ante individuation is possible.
See, however, Anderson et al. (2003, pp. 94–95) for a similar view with similar references to the neuroscientific literature to which Hurley refers.
See Brison (1998) for references.
Hurley sets aside the argument from speaker autonomy by noting that it is unpromising because media violence is “predominantly commercial, and aims at economic profit” (Hurley 2004, p. 194). I shall not address the problems of this view, except to observe that various low-budget, “artistic” films contain a great deal of violence.
To be precise, this is my reconstruction of Hurley’s interpretation of Scanlon’s (1979) conception of autonomy. In fact Scanlon (1972, p. 215) defined autonomy as being sovereign in our decisions about what to believe and how to act, and to use, in these decisions, our own “canons of rationality.” While in the later paper he describes this use of the term as “vague, somewhat grandiloquent and perhaps misleading” (1979, p. 533), he uses the 1972 definition in his 1979 argument for freedom of speech based on hearer autonomy that Hurley also adopts. A specific problem with Hurley’s approach that I do not discuss further is that under this definition of autonomy a display of violence in a news report on television may at the same time be justified (and restricting such a report should be condemned) on the grounds that autonomous agents use the information to form beliefs and desires, and rejected (and its restriction defended) because, if Hurley is right, it compromises autonomy by leading to non-autonomous violence. Cf. Hurley (2004, pp. 196–197). I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this Journal for pointing this out to me.
See references in note 2.
This is independent of the fact that it is impossible, if CEH is true, ex ante to determine those individuals who will be influenced by MV and those who will not. It is important to note that the research underlying CEH implies that the group of unaffected individuals is rather large.
Cohen’s (1969/1988) influential classification considers r = 0.10 “small,” r = 0.30 “medium” and r = 0.50 “large” in the behavioural sciences.
Prettyman and Hook (1987) consider forms of damage to one’s own person resulting from, for instance, copying the behaviour of a stunt man in a television show. These cases do not seem to involve non-autonomous imitation and violence, though.
See note 13.
Schenk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1991), p. 52.
See also Scanlon (1972, p. 210). Take, for instance, a person voicing her political opinions through a megaphone causing a nearby listener’s eardrums to break.
It could be in the best interest of individuals who likely engage in aggression after watching MV to limit exposure to MV. The present argument shows that this is impossible if the CEH research is right. I owe this point to an anonymous referee of this journal.
Of course, the first step is adequately to measure the correlation between exposure to MV and subsequent non-autonomously copied criminal violence. The current state of research does not seem to allow any clear determination here.
See references in note 2.
See Prettyman and Hook (1987) for a detailed analysis in a U.S. context.
References
Anderson CA, Bushman BJ (2001) Effects of violent video games on aggressive behaviour, aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, physiological arousal, and prosocial behaviour: a meta-analytic review of the scientific literature. Psychol Sci 12:353–359, doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00366
Anderson CA et al (2003) The influence of media violence on youth. Psychol Sci Public Interest 4:81–110, doi:10.1111/j.1529-1006.2003.pspi_1433.x
Berkowitz L (1993) Aggression: its causes, consequences, and control. McGraw-Hill, New York
Bushman B, Huesmann L (2001) Effects of televised violence on aggression. In: Singer D, Singer J (eds) Handbook of children and the media. Sage, Thousand Oaks, pp 223–254
Brison S (1998) The autonomy defense of free speech. Ethics 108:312–339, doi:10.1086/233807
Chartrand TL, Bargh JA (1999) The chameleon-effect: the perception-behavior link and social interaction. J Pers Soc Psychol 76:893–910, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.6.893
Cohen J (1969) Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. Academic, San Diego, (2nd edn 1988)
Cohen-Eliya M, Hammer Y (2004) Advertisements, stereotypes, and freedom of expression. J Soc Philos 35:165–187, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.2004.00223.x
Freedman J (2002) Media violence and its effect on aggression: assessing the scientific evidence. University of Toronto Press, Toronto
Gallese V, Goldman A (1998) Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading. Trends Cogn Sci 2:493–501, doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(98)01262-5
Hurley S (2004) Imitation, media violence, and freedom of speech. Philos Stud 117:165–218, doi:10.1023/B:PHIL.0000014533.94297.6b
Hurley S (2005) Applying the science of imitation to the imitation of violence. In: Hurley S, Chater N (eds) Perspectives on imitation: from neuroscience to social science. Vol. 2: Imitation, human development, and culture. The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 380–385
Hurley S (2006) Bypassing conscious control: Media violence, unconscious imitation, and freedom of speech. In: Pockett S, Banks W, Gallagher S (eds) Does consciousness cause behavior? An investigation of the nature of volition. The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 301–337
Johnson G et al (2002) Television viewing and aggressive behaviour during adolescence and adulthood. Science 295:2468–2471, doi:10.1126/science.1062929
Jones S (2005) The role of mirror neurons in imitation. In: Hurley S, Chater N (eds) Perspectives on imitation: from neuroscience to social science. Vol. 1: Mechanisms of imitation and imitation in animals. The MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 205–210
Kirsh S (2006) Children, adolescents, and media violence: a critical look at the research. Sage, Thousand Oaks
Machina K (1984) Freedom of expression in commerce. Law Philos 3:375–406, doi:10.1007/BF00654834
Nier J (2007) Taking sides: clashing sides in social psychology. McGraw-Hill, New York
Paik H, Comstock G (1994) The effects of television violence on antisocial behaviour: a meta-analysis. Commun Res 21:516–546, doi:10.1177/009365094021004004
Peonidis F (1998) Freedom of expression, autonomy, and defamation. Law Philos 17:1–17
Prettyman E Jr, Hook L (1987) The control of media-related imitative violence. Fed Commun Law J 38:317–382
Prinz W (2004) An ideomotor approach to imitation. In: Hurley S, Chater N (eds) Perspectives on imitation: from neuroscience to social sciences, vol. 1. The MIT Press, Cambridge
Rizzolatti G, Craighero L (2004) The mirror-neuron system. Annu Rev Neurosci 27:169–192, doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.144230
Rosenthal R, Rubin D (1982) A simple, general purpose display of magnitude of experimental effect. J Educ Psychol 74(2):166–169, doi:10.1037/0022-0663.74.2.166
Savage J (2004) Does viewing violent media really cause criminal violence? A methodological review. Aggress Violent Behav 10:99–128, doi:10.1016/j.avb.2003.10.001
Scanlon T (1972) A theory of freedom of expression. Philos Public Aff 1:204–226
Scanlon T (1979) Freedom of expression and categories of expression. Univ Pittsbg Law Rev 40:519–550
Smith S, Donnerstein E (1998) Harmful effects of exposure to media violence: learning of aggression, emotional desensitization, and fear. In: Geen R, Donnerstein E (eds) Human aggression: theories, research, and implications for social policy. Academic, New York, pp 167–202
Thompson K, Schumacker R (1997) An evaluation of Rosenthal and Rubin’s binomial effect size display. J Educ Behav Stat 22:109–117
Trend D (2007) The myth of media violence: a critical introduction. Blackwell, Malden
Acknowledgements
This paper has benefited from discussions with Martin van Hees, Susan Hurley, Bert Musschenga, and audiences in Amsterdam and Groningen, for which I extend my thanks. I am especially grateful to Frank Hindriks and two anonymous referees of this Journal for detailed written comments on an earlier draft.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
de Bruin, B. Media Violence and Freedom of Speech: How to Use Empirical Data. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 11, 493–505 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9125-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9125-7