Abstract
It might seem counterintuitive to think transhumanists, who are typically characterized by extreme techno-optimism and hope for radical life-extension, would be interested in assisted dying. Because the technological enhancements they long for will probably not be available during their natural lifetimes, many transhumanists at least entertain the idea of having themselves cryonically preserved to buy some additional time for real-world technology to catch up to their dreams. However, since an ideal preservation would take place before serious cellular deterioration sets in, controlling the time and manner of death would be very attractive for transhumanist cryonicists. This chapter identifies some circumstances under which they might be justified in seeking assistance in dying (even though they would describe it as something more akin to hibernating). After providing a fundamental overview of both transhumanism and cryonics, and then making my case for what some scholars have called “cryothanasia” (i.e. assisted dying for the purpose of improved preservation quality), I proceed to consider some scenarios meant to test the limits of this justification. While things are admittedly murkier when considering the possibility of cryothanasia outside the context of imminent medical collapse, I can see no insurmountable criticisms of cryothanasia as a last resort in cases of (currently) terminal and irreparable neurodegeneration or other forms of progressive brain damage.
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Notes
- 1.
Although transhumanists encourage technological enhancement, nearly all of them also advocate for individual freedom and autonomy when it comes to biomedical choices and enhancements, which makes it highly unlikely they would oppose assisted dying (see e.g. Manzocco 2019: 34–5; Sandberg 2013; Swan 2019: 726–7). On their general openness to choosing suicide, see, among many others, Jenny Huberman (2018: 57) and Tena Thau (2020: 641).
- 2.
The most optimistic speculations (see e.g. Kurzweil 2005: 358, 486) even suggest advancing to the point of being able to “hop” to other universes in order to avoid the inevitable destruction of this one. Reaffirming my commitment to down-to-earth ideas, I will not pursue this notion any further here.
- 3.
In the meantime, most transhumanists happily recommend following the latest research on the benefits of exercise and a healthy diet, while some make more controversial lifestyle choices, such as adopting a regimen of “caloric restriction.” This practice finds limited support in laboratory experiments showing that the lives of mice can be radically extended (roughly doubled) by drastically cutting caloric intake (by about 50%) without sacrificing certain “fundamental nutrients”; similar effects have not yet been demonstrated in humans (Manzocco 2019: 92–3).
- 4.
Some of the standard objections to transhumanist enthusiasm for radical longevity have to do with overpopulation, strain on limited resources, and unequal access to new technologies (see e.g. Glannon 2002: 347; McNamee and Edwards 2006: 514–5; Noonan 2016: 40–1). The standard response to these concerns usually falls along the lines of: “a civilization with technology advanced enough to exacerbate these problems by extending lives will probably be able to solve or mitigate them (e.g. by colonizing uninhabited planets).” A more thoughtful response (see Cutas 2008; cf. Moen 2015: 680) is to argue that the living do not have some moral duty to die so that others (especially others who do not yet exist) can be accommodated. I might not be justified in doing absolutely anything to survive, but others’ rights to reproduction and at least some resources might just be eclipsed by my right to avoid death, when possible, even if it is not possible for everyone.
- 5.
Of course, for those interested in the emergence of posthumans and a universal artificial consciousness, the potential loss of personal identity might not be much of a problem (and personal identity is a fraught philosophical concept anyway, as James Hughes and others (e.g. Swan 2019: 710–3) are careful to point out), but this is a somewhat different line of inquiry from the one currently under consideration.
- 6.
Not every cryonicist is a transhumanist, or vice versa, but there is a lot of overlap in that Venn diagram. In one notable example, Max More, one of the most influential transhumanists, spent a decade as president and CEO of Alcor, the largest cryonics company. In the small non-overlapping parts of the diagram, one might find people who choose cryonic preservation simply hoping to reach an ordinary human lifespan prevented by the early onset of an extraordinary (and currently incurable) illness; such people would not necessarily be seeking any sort of transhumanist enhancement. See, for instance, the 2019 documentary, Hope Frozen, which details one family’s decision to have their three-year-old daughter’s body preserved after she succumbed to brain cancer.
- 7.
However, even if the technology becomes available, some have pointed out that there might still be social or political obstacles to the reanimation of preserved bodies. For example, future societies might not see any good reason to devote resources to reanimating and caring for the people of a bygone era that could be better spent on the people of their own (cf. Moen 2015: 678; Shaw 2009: 517). On the other hand, Thau (2020: 643–4) considers the disturbing possibility that future societies would be motivated to reanimate the preserved people of the past, but only to use or abuse them.
- 8.
Since this damage can occur in the brain, it is also a problem for the proponents of future uploading technology. It is hard enough to map accurately and understand one’s neural structures without having to contend with structural damage as well.
- 9.
Just to be clear, I do not mean to discount the various social, political, or economic practicalities I have mentioned along the way that would surely have some bearing on the likelihood of successful repair, rejuvenation, and reanimation; all of these issues are taken into consideration when coming to the conclusion that cryonic preservation is extremely unlikely to work out. (I have said less about aesthetic and psychological uncertainties related to how a reanimated individual might adapt to the future world, but I doubt these kinds of worries will essentially alter the Cryonic Wager math, especially if suicide remains a possibility under unsatisfactory conditions (cf. Thau 2020: 641, 643).) However, my focus is on the medical, physiological, and technological practicalities because those have the most direct relevance to the issue of assisted dying in the cryonics context.
- 10.
Many transhumanists/cryonicists speak of “information-theoretic death,” in which the personality-generating memories and other information encoded in one’s neural structures are irreparably lost due to damage/deterioration so severe that no technology would be able to recover it (cf. Manzocco 2019: 116–7; Minerva and Sandberg 2017: 527; Moen 2015: 677–8; Shaw 2009: 518–9). According to this understanding of death, a cryonics patient with a well-preserved brain need not be considered entirely dead, even though most people (relying on our current legal and medical definitions of death) would not consider such a person alive either. To borrow a quote from The Princess Bride’s Miracle Max, the cryonically preserved might turn out to be “only mostly dead.” For further discussion of this strange situation, see Hershenov (2003: 91–4).
- 11.
Despite this legal setback, things apparently worked out ok for Donaldson in the end (see Minerva and Sandberg 2017: 526), but his good fortune does little to diminish the force of the hypothetical situation his case represents.
- 12.
On the weaker end of the spectrum are arguments based on religious belief, or on arbitrary and contingent views about what is “natural” or “dignified.” Minerva and Sandberg do an admirable job of briefly responding to religious arguments on their own terms and showing that support for cryothanasia need not conflict with certain, mostly Judeo-Christian, religious beliefs. While I am unsure that dreams of life-extension via cryonic preservation would be as compatible with other religious traditions, especially certain versions of Buddhism (see Buben 2019), the main problem with religious arguments is that they often depend on additional, highly dubious, metaphysical and epistemological claims about the existence of divinities and knowledge of their will. Something similar could be said about the questionable assumptions made by those who attempt to define what is natural or dignified for human beings. This is a tried, if not true, strategy employed by the conservative-minded in response to new technological developments throughout history. In most cases, their concerns are gradually ignored as the new developments are normalized and deemed compatible with the ever-shifting socio-cultural understanding of what is appropriate for humans.
- 13.
For a transhumanist preserved at age 90, the goal is not to be reanimated only to go on living someday in the body of an ordinary 90-year-old.
- 14.
I highly recommend The Lonely Island’s song “YOLO” for a humorous rebuttal of the standard “don’t sweat the future; live in the present” interpretation of the expression.
- 15.
As an Alcor member, one wears a “stainless steel bracelet…which reports the phone numbers to call in case of an emergency and the protocols to follow by whoever finds the body of this person” (Manzocco 2019: 117–8).
- 16.
Although we were far from any particularly dangerous areas near the Syrian border (we were trying to find the ancient ruins of Oenoanda, which housed some extensive Epicurean inscriptions, when we got lost and then stuck), Phil was convinced that IS insurgents were lurking out there in the darkness ready to take us hostage. Fortunately, a lovely local family in a small car stumbled upon us first and helped pull us out of the muck.
- 17.
This idea is a bit like trying to cheat Pascal’s Wager by concluding the life of an unbeliever with a deathbed conversion, albeit without having to worry about facing divine wrath for attempting to pull a fast one on the Almighty.
- 18.
I am grateful to Bill Tierney for informative conversations about his own experiences in the cryonics world, and to Jukka and Michael for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
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Buben, A. (2023). Dying to Live: Transhumanism, Cryonics, and Euthanasia. In: Cholbi, M., Varelius, J. (eds) New Directions in the Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. The International Library of Bioethics, vol 103. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25315-7_17
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