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The United Nations Global Compact as a Facilitator of the Lockean Social Contract

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Abstract

The United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) has difficulties in attracting new voluntary members and inciting them to implement its ten principles. The present article analyzes this implementation deficit from the perspective of Lockean social contract theory and derives new strategies for reducing it. On this view, the UNGC presents itself as the attempt to realize a set of moral norms, typically enforced by an impartial minimal state, protecting its citizens from violations of their natural rights, negative externalities and discrimination by bribed officials. It will only succeed in facilitating the realization of those norms on a strictly voluntary basis, if it manages to overcome the underlying n-person prisoner’s dilemma. This requires the existence of a critical mass k < N of conditionally moral firms, which are willing to observe the UNGC principles and to resist the temptation to free ride on their observance by others, if it does not disadvantage them in comparison to their situation in a state of universal non-observance. Four contracting problems can impede the conclusion of this Lockean social contract. The UNGC has a slim chance of overcoming its implementation deficit on a non-coercive basis by cultivating four institutional capabilities assisting conditionally moral firms in surmounting those four problems of voluntary norm compliance.

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Fig. 1

Source: own presentation

Fig. 2

Source: Adapted from Schelling (1973, p. 388) and Drummond Nauck (2016, p. 51)

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Notes

  1. https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc (2 July 2017).

  2. https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles (2 July 2017).

  3. http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/lang--en/index.htm (2 July 2017).

  4. http://staging.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 (1 November 2017).

  5. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html (2 July 2017).

  6. https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles (2 July 2017).

  7. This analysis provides a powerful explanation for the implementation deficit of the UNGC, which, in 14 years, merely attracted 8000 companies and 4200 NGOs (Williams 2014, p. 243) out of target populations of millions of companies and thousands of NGOs respectively. Only a subset of those UNGC members has been actively involved in the local UNGC networks of their host countries (Rasche and Waddock 2014, p. 215). Moreover, the lax policy on the submission of voluntary progress reports, permitting up to 4 years of non-compliance (Berliner and Prakash 2015, p. 121), could not prevent the delisting of more than 4000 companies by the end of May 2014 (Williams 2014, p. 244).

  8. http://www.globalcompact.de/wAssets/docs/Deutsches-Netzwerk/MOU_2014_Germany-Signed.pdf (2 July 17).

Abbreviations

CBE:

Contractualist Business Ethics

ICCA:

International Center for Corporate Accountability

ILO:

International Labor Organization

UN:

United Nations

UNEP:

United Nations Environment Programme

UNGC:

United Nations Global Compact

UNODC:

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

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Correspondence to Damian Bäumlisberger.

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Damian Bäumlisberger declares that he did not receive any specific funding for this study and he has no conflict of interest. He works for a publicly funded university and his salary is not tied to any ideological, political or economic goals.

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Bäumlisberger, D. The United Nations Global Compact as a Facilitator of the Lockean Social Contract. J Bus Ethics 159, 187–200 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3721-1

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