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Complementary relations in the theory of preference

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(1) This paper uses the following binary relations: > (is preferred to); ⩽ (is not preferred to); < (is less preferred than); ~ (is indifferent to). (2) Savage used primitive ⩾, postulated to be connected and transitive onA (the set of acts), to define the others: [x ~ y ⇔ (x ⩽ y and y ⩽ x)]; [y < x ⇔ notx ⩽ y]; [x > y ⇔ y < x]. Independently of the axioms, this definition implies that ⩽ and > are complementary relations onA: [x < y ⇔ notx > y]. (3) Pratt, Raiffa and Schlaifer used primitive ⩽, postulated to be transitive onL (the set of lotteries), to define the others with a different expression for <: [x < y ⇔ (x ⩽ y and noty ⩽ x)]. Thus, ⩽ and > are not necessarily complementary onL; since ⩽ is not postulated to be connected onL, but connected ⩽ is necessary and sufficient for such complementarity. Since the restriction of ⩽ to the subsetA ofL is connected, ⩽ and > are complementary onA. (4) Fishburn used primitive < onA to define the others with different expression for ~ and ⩽: [x ~ y ⇔ (notx < y and noty < x)]; [x ⩽ y ⇔ (x < y orx ~ y)]. His version of Savage's theory then assumed that < is asymmetric and negatively transitive onA. Thus, ⩽ and > are complementary, since asymmetric < is necessary and sufficient for such complementarity. (5) This analysis provides a new proof that the same list of elementary properties of binary relations onA applies to all three theories: ⩽ is connected, transitive, weakly connected, reflexive, and negatively transitive; while both < and > are asymmetric, negatively transitive, antisymmetric, irreflexive, and transitive; but only ~ is symmetric.

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Burros, R.H. Complementary relations in the theory of preference. Theor Decis 7, 181–190 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02334314

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