Abstract
The paradox of deontology, as the name suggests, is generally thought to pose a problem for deontological theory, particularly for agent-centered restrictions. I argue that it is neither a paradox nor a problem for restrictions. On the contrary, the cases that are alleged to generate the paradox presuppose restrictions, which shifts the burden to the opponent of restrictions.
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Notes
It is assumed that “(1) A1 has no way out of this dilemma, and (2) there are no morally relevant consequences beyond those described in the case” (1983, p. 84).
In the case in question, the object of restrictions is to prohibit causing harm. Some argue that it is intending to cause harm that is prohibited; see Oberdiek (2008) for a discussion of the distinction between causing harm and intending harm. For others, it is violating moral rights that is prohibited; see esp. Nozick’s discussion of moral constraints in his (1974). For the sake of consistency, I will follow Scheffler in treating the object of restrictions as prohibiting causing harm. I do not believe anything in the arguments hinge on this.
The difference between agent-neutral and agent-relative expressions is that the former can be made without reference to individual agents while the latter cannot. A good example is Thomas Nagel’s distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. “If a reason can be given a general form which does not include an essential reference to the person who has it, it is an agent-neutral reason. If on the other hand the general form of a reason does include an essential reference to the person who has it then it is an agent-relative reason” (1986, pp. 152–153).
References
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Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia. New York: Basic Books.
Oberdiek, J. (2008). Culpability and the definition of agent-centered restrictions. Law and Philosophy, 27(2), 105–122.
Scheffler, S. (1985). Agent-centred restrictions, rationality, and the virtues. Mind, 94(375), 409–419.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank David Copp for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Burtoft, S. The Paradox of Deontology and Agent-Centered Restrictions. Philosophia 48, 1801–1806 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00199-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00199-1