Journal of the History of Philosophy

Meno's Paradox Reconsidered BRIAN CALVERT THE OPENING SECTIONS of Plato's Meno are devoted to a typically Socratic discussion about the nature of virtue. Socrates represents himself as knowing nothing, but eager to learn. Meno, on the other hand, who begins by being quite confident of his ability to define virtue, is, under cross-examination, gradually reduced to a confession of ignorance and bewilderment. When Socrates invites him to join in a continuation of the enquiry, Meno attempts to terminate further discussion by saying: How will you enquire, Socrates, into that of whose nature you know nothing at all? What sort of thing, among those things which you do not know, will you put forward as the object of your search? Or even if, at best, you chance upon it, how will you know that this is the thing you did not know? (80d) Socrates responds as follows: I understand what you mean, Meno. You see what a captious argument you are introducing -that it is impossible for a man to enquire either about what he knows or about what he does not know. He cannot enquire about what he knows because he knows it, in which case there is no need to enquire. Nor can he enquire about what he does not know, for he does not know about what he is to enquire. (80d-e) There is a wide variety of opinion among philosophers and scholars about how this paradoxical argument1 should be assessed. An initial division can be made between those who do not take the argument seriously (e.g.A.E. Taylor, P. Shorey, C. Ritter2), 1 (a) What I have called "this paradoxical argument" is traditionally reckoned to include both Meno's questions and Socrates' argument. That is to say scholars have generally assumed that Socrates offers a formal reconstruction of Meno's objections, and that the two quoted passages can be considered as a unit. This assumption has been challenged recently by Jon Moline ("Meno's Paradox?", Phronesis XIV, 2, 153 if). He claims that Socrates does not restate or reformulate Meno's questions, but unfairly substitutes a rather different argument. Socrates takes what Moline calls a "personal, sarcastic query" and makes of it "a philosophically interesting general issue" (p. 160). I, personally, find Moline convincing. Nevertheless, since the case I wish to present is concerned solely with the soundness of Socrates' reply to the paradox, and particularly since I do not want to give the impression that my argument depends upon Moline's thesis, I will keep the traditional position. That is, I shall continue to speak of "Meno's argument" or "Meno's Paradox" in the remainder of what follows. (b) I also speak of Socrates and Plato, and use the two names almost interchangcably. Partly I do this because there is no unanimity in the views of scholars whose opinions I shall be discussing and referring to, and partly because my case is not affected by the problem of the historic Socrates. 2 A. E. Taylor, Plato (New York, 1936), p. 137; P. Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago, 1933), p. 157; C. Ritter, The Essence o[ Plato's Philosophy (New York, 1933), translated by Adam Alles, p. 102. [143] 144 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY regarding it as an irrelevant exercise in obstructionism, and those who do take it seriously (e.g.B. Phillips, M. Grene, J. Klein, R. Sprague3). Within the latter category a second division can be drawn. Firstly, there are those (Phillips, Grene, Klein) who regard the paradox as expressing a point of view that is logically impeccable, though philosophically objectionable. That is to say, the claim is made that there is no logical fallacy involved in Meno's argument; it can only be countered by the offering of an alternative and more palatable philosophical position. This Plato is seen as doing in the theory of recollection. On the other hand, there are those (e.g. Sprague) who do regard the argument as fallacious ; the position expressed is not to be taken as logically impeccable, and Plato in fact succeeded in exposing the fallacy embedded in the argument. A second and quite different area of disagreement has arisen over...