Notes
See Richard Kraut, Against Absolute Goodness (Oxford: OUP, 2011), pp. 4ff.
See Kraut, op. cit., ch. 1.
See Christine Korsgaard, "On Having a Good", http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.HG.pdf [accessed 12/07/2014]. Thanks to John Hacker-Wright for bringing this to my attention.
See Kraut, op. cit., p. 7.
See John Milton, "On the Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce" in Kermode (ed.), The Major Works (Oxford: Classics, 2008); Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 1999), ch. 11.
See John McDowell, "Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle’s Ethics" in his The Engaged Intellect: Philosophical Essays (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2009), esp. p. 33.
See G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), §60, p. 153.
See Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (Oxford: OUP, 1958), p. 81.
See Korsgaard, op. cit.
See Kraut, op. cit. p. 8
See Raimond Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 93ff.
See Marina Barabas, "In Search of Goodness" in Christopher Cordner (ed.), Philosophy, Ethics, and a Common Humanity: Essays in Honour of Raimond Gaita (London: Routledge, 2011).
See Gaita op. cit., Preface.
Kraut, op. cit., p. 46.
Ibid., p. 60, emphasis mine.
Ibid., p. 89, emphasis mine.
Ibid., p. 88.
Ibid., pp. 27ff. Here I part company with Stroud’s interpretation of Kraut’s methodology; cf. Stroud, S. (2013). "‘Good For' supra ‘Good’," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87(2):459–466, esp. pp. 459–462.
Kraut, op. cit., p. 85.
Simone Weil, First and Last Notebooks (Oxford: OUP, 1970), p. 79.
Ibid., p. 213.
Thanks to John Hacker-Wright for suggesting this example.
Roger Crisp "In Defence of Absolute Goodness" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 87(2):476–482, (2013) esp. pp. 480–482.
Ibid., p. 481.
Contrast Weil, op. cit. p. 158.
See G.E.M. Anscombe, "On the Source of the Authority of the State" Ratio 20(1): 1–28; Peter Winch, "Miss Anscombe’s Moral Philosophy" in L. Alanen, S. Heinemaa and T. Wallgren (eds.), Commonality and Particularity in Ethics (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 1977).
Primo Levi, If This is a Man (New York: Abacus, 1991), p. 173.
Ibid., pp. 32ff.
Ibid., p. 86.
See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Terence Irwin (trans.), Hackett Publishing, 1999), 1115a30–b19.
See Gaita, op. cit. pp. xvii–xix
Raimond Gaita, A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 222ff.
Raimond Gaita, After Romulus (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2011), ch. 1.
Levi, op. cit., p. 125.
Ibid., p. 127.
Ibid., pp. 127–128.
See Peter Winch, "Who is My Neighbour" in his Trying to Make Sense (London: Basil Blackwell, 1987).
See Luke 17:21.
See Raimond Gaita, "Justice and Hope" in D. Modjeska (ed.), The Best Australian Essays 2006 (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2006).
See Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), esp. ‘Problem III’.
An expression which both Gaita and Kraut make use of in their characterisation of absolute value; see Gaita, 2004, op. cit., p. 189; Kraut, op. cit., p. 89.
R.F. Holland, Against Empiricism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 2.
I would like to thank Luke Brunning, Richard Kraut and in particular the editor and anonymous reviewer of the journal for their helpful comments on a previous version of this essay.
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Campbell, M. Absolute Goodness: In Defence of the Useless and Immoral. J Value Inquiry 49, 95–112 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9444-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9444-y