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Farewell to direct source incompatibilism

  • Free Will
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Abstract

Traditional theorists about free will and moral responsibility endorse the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action that she performs only if she can do or could have done otherwise. According to source theorists, PAP is false and an agent is morally responsible for her action only if she is the source of that action. Source incompatibilists accept the source theory but also endorse INC: if determinism is true, then no one is morally responsible for any action. This paper is a critique of a kind of source incompatibilism, namely, direct source incompatibilism.

Direct source incompatibilists reject PAP on the basis of Frankfurt-style examples. Since PAP is one of two premises in the traditional argument for INC, direct source incompatibilists opt for a version of the direct argument, which argues for INC with the aid of some non-responsibility transfer principle. I demonstrate that this option is not available, for there is a tension between the following two claims.

SI-F: There are genuine Frankfurt-style examples.

SI-D: There is a sound version of the direct argument.

More specifically, (a) Frankfurt-style examples provide the impetus for at least one group of counterexamples to non-responsibility transfer principles, and (b) non-responsibility transfer principles may be used to show that crucial agents—those purported to be responsible in Frankfurt-style examples—are not morally responsible for their actions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Washington State University, PO Box 645130, 99164-5130, Pullman, WA, U.S.A.

    Joseph Keim Campbell

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  1. Joseph Keim Campbell
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Additional information

Versions of this paper were presented in 2006 at the Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, the Bled Philosophy Conference, and the Western Canadian Philosophical Association Conference.

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Campbell, J.K. Farewell to direct source incompatibilism. Acta Analytica 21, 36–49 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-0003-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-0003-4

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