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Lewisian Realism: Methodology, Epistemology, and Circularity

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Abstract

In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis’ Modal Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian realism – the modal irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection – and argue that Lewis’ response to each is unsatisfactory because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this circularity is vicious. I end by contrasting Lewis’ methodology with Forrest’s in order to illustrate a rival method that does not fall victim to the objection I lay against Lewis.

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  1. School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Woodhouse Lane, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK

    Ross P. Cameron

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  1. Ross P. Cameron
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Correspondence to Ross P. Cameron.

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Cameron, R.P. Lewisian Realism: Methodology, Epistemology, and Circularity. Synthese 156, 143–159 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-2003-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-2003-0

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