Abstract
This paper is an investigation of metaphysical nihilism: the view that there could have been no contingent or concrete objects. I begin by showing the connections of the nihilistic theses to other philosophical doctrines. I then go on to look at the arguments for and against metaphysical nihilism in the literature and find both to be flawed. In doing so I will look at the nature of abstract objects, the nature of spacetime and mereological simples, the existence of the empty set, the dependence of universals on particulars, and other general questions of ontology.
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Manuscript submitted 6 September 2004
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Cameron, R.P. Much Ado About Nothing: A Study of Metaphysical Nihilism. Erkenntnis 64, 193–222 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-3637-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-3637-5