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Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates

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Abstract

It often happens that the entry of a third candidate into a race for legislative office is supported by a group of voters who favour, not the new candidate, but one of the two initially declared candidates. It is hoped that the third candidate will draw votes away from a particular one of the other two, changing the course of the election. This phenomenon is examined at a general level and the set of social choice rules which are invulnerable in this sense is characterized.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Scarborough College and Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada

    Donald E. Campbell

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  1. Donald E. Campbell
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Additional information

This paper was written while I was a Canada Council Research Fellow visiting at Stanford University. I am grateful to Professor W. Leinfellner for helpful comments on a first draft and I assume full responsibility for errors.

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Campbell, D.E. Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates. Theor Decis 10, 247–263 (1979). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126341

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