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New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility

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Abstract

This is the introduction to a volume of new essays in the metaphysics of moral responsibility by John Martin Fischer, Carl Ginet, Ishtiyaque Haji, Alfred R. Mele, Derk Pereboom, Paul Russell, and Peter van Inwagen. I provide some background for the essays, cover the main debates in the metaphysics of moral responsibility, and emphasize some of the authors’ contributions to this area of philosophy.

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Notes

  1. van Inwagen (1983).

  2. van Inwagen (1983, pp. 1–15 and 58–68, see especially pp. 14 and 65).

  3. van Inwagen (1983, pp. 13–14).

  4. Alternatively, he writes: “‘free will’ is a name for the property is on some occasions able to do otherwise” [van Inwagen (2008, this issue)].

  5. In (van Inwagen 2008, this issue) van Inwagen advises against the following definition: “Free will is whatever sort of freedom is required for moral responsibility”. However, in noting the presumed connection between free will and moral responsibility, I am not intending to provide a definition. One datum worth preserving in discussions about the meaning of ‘free will’ is that free will seems to be the most basic power or ability necessary for moral responsibility.

  6. Frankfurt (1969). This essay is reprinted in Fischer (ed.) (1986, pp. 143–152). Readers are also directed to the other important critical essays in this collection.

  7. Fischer uses this expression in Fischer (2008, this issue).

  8. Pereboom (2000); Fischer (1999); and Mele and Robb (1998).

  9. Ginet (1996). For related arguments, see Widerker (1995a, b); and Kane (1996).

  10. van Inwagen (2004, p. 219).

  11. van Inwagen (1978), reprinted in Fischer (ed.), (1986, pp. 241–249); and in van Inwagen (1983, pp. 219–222).

  12. See Haji (2006), and Haji and McKenna (2004). For other criticisms of Ginet-type dilemmas, see Pereboom (2000) and Fischer (1999).

  13. See Fischer (1987, 1994); and Fischer and Ravizza (1998, pp. 174–190). Fischer notes a comparative distinction in Zimmerman (1988, pp. 32–34). For an argument that anticipates the distinction, see Fischer (1982, pp. 24–40), reprinted in Fischer (1986, pp. 174–190).

  14. Pereboom (2003). The term “source incompatibilism” comes from McKenna (2001). The distinction was anticipated in Pereboom (2000, 2001), where Pereboom distinguishes between leeway and causal history incompatibilism.

  15. van Inwagen (1983, p. 2).

  16. van Inwagen (1983, p. 16). For presentations of three formal versions, see Chap. III. The first version was initially presented in van Inwagen (1975). For a related argument, see Fischer’s basic version of the argument for incompatibilism, in Fischer (1994, Chap. 5).

  17. Ginet (1966).

  18. Ginet (1980, Chap. 5).

  19. For another interesting compatibilist approach, which denies a substantive premise of the consequence argument, see Beebee and Mele (2002). For general discussions of contemporary compatibilist theories not noted here, see Haji (2002), and Russell (2002).

  20. Fischer (2008). See Scanlon (1988, 1998).

  21. See Fischer (1994).

  22. Fischer and Ravizza, (eds.) (1998, p. 82).

  23. Russell (1983, 1995, 2008a, b, c, forthcoming a).

  24. Strawson (1962, pp. 1–25); Russell (1992); and Wallace (1994). Strawson’s essay is reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza (eds.) (1993, pp. 44–66).

  25. Russell (2008c, this issue).

  26. McKenna (2008). See also Russell (forthcoming b).

  27. Pereboom (1995, 2001, Chap. 4); and Mele (2006, pp. 188–195). See also Mele (2005b); Pereboom (2005, 2007); Mele (2007, pp. 195–210; 2008, this issue).

  28. Haji (2005b).

  29. Haji (2008, this issue).

  30. See also Haji (1998, pp. 42–64; 1999, pp. 175–203); and Pereboom (2001, pp. 141–148).

  31. Mele (2008, this issue).

  32. Mele (1995, pp. 190–191; 2006, pp. 188–195).

  33. Mele (2006, Chap. 3), and Mele (2005a).

  34. Mele (1995, 2006, pp. 4–5).

  35. van Inwagen (1998, p. 370). van Inwagen extends this argument to the libertarian agency theory in van Inwagen (2000), reprinted in Kane (ed.) (2002, pp. 158–177). For other similar criticisms of libertarianism, see Mele (2006, Chap. 3), and Haji (2005a). The expression “luck argument” is mine, not van Inwagen’s.

  36. van Inwagen (1983, pp. 126–152).

  37. van Inwagen (1983, p. 148). van Inwagen also offers a related argument for restrictivism, the view that “one has precious little free will, that rarely, if ever, is anyone able to do otherwise than he in fact does” [van Inwagen (1989, p. 405)].

  38. van Inwagen (2008, this issue).

  39. Pereboom (1995, 2001).

  40. Pereboom (2001, Chaps. 2 and 3) and Pereboom (2006).

  41. Pereboom (2008, this issue).

  42. Ginet (1989, pp. 17–46), reprinted in Mele (ed.) (1997); Ginet (1980, Chap. 6); and Ginet (2002).

  43. See Ginet (1997, 2004). Mele has also published extensively in action theory. See also Mele (1992, 1997).

  44. Ginet (2008, this issue); Clarke (2003).

  45. Davidson (1963, pp. 685–700), reprinted in Mele (ed.), (1997, pp. 27–41).

  46. I thank Angelo Corlett for his friendship and for this opportunity to serve as Guest Editor for this special double issue of The Journal of Ethics. I also thank the contributors to this volume—John Fischer, Carl Ginet, Ish Haji, Al Mele, Derk Pereboom, Paul Russell, and Peter van Inwagen—for their new essays, for their earlier writings, for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this introduction, and for their encouragement and support.

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    Joseph Keim Campbell

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Campbell, J.K. New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility. J Ethics 12, 193–201 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-008-9031-1

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