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On Clone as Genetic Copy: Critique of a Metaphor

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Abstract

A common feature of scientific and ethical debates is that clones are generally described and understood as “copies” or, more specifically defined, as “genetic copies.” The attempt of this paper is to question this widespread definition. It first argues that the terminology of “clone as copy” can only be understood as a metaphor, and therefore, a clone is not a “genetic copy” in a strict literal sense, but in a figurative one. Second, the copy metaphor has a normative component that is problematic in the context of descriptive science and may support or indicate the ethically relevant phenomenon of objectification of animals. In order to support the argument against the common conception of a clone as a copy, the biotechnological principles of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) cloning will be examined. On this basis, it will be shown that the metaphor is valid because of similarities between the phenotype, the genotype, or the nuclear DNA sequence of the clone and its progenitor by using three prominent levels of comparison (clone as phenotypical, genotypical, and nuclear copy). Focusing on the process of SCNT, it will be shown that cloning as copying or doubling has to be redefined for scientific purposes because it is neither necessary nor does it fit to the biotechnological principles of cloning. It is more accurate to understand SCNT cloning as a process of splitting rather than of doubling or copying. In the second part, a deconstructivist analysis based on Jacques Derrida’s description in Positions (1981) will reveal the normative potential of the original–copy dichotomy. I will be showing that it includes an asymmetrical power structure between the original (progenitor) and the copy (clone) and that this structure can be reversed or at least considered unstable. Therefore, arguments that build on that metaphor must be reconsidered. Moreover, the analysis reveals that applying a terminology to humans and animals that is commonly used for things becomes the language of objectification. Two selected examples, fungibility and violability, based on Martha Nussbaum’s notion of objectification will support the thesis of objectification, display its normative consequences, and put the clone as a copy metaphor in a broader range of ethically questionable research tendencies.

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Notes

  1. If not otherwise stated, I will refer to cloning as SCNT with adult cells.

  2. Similar definitions can be found by many other authors. Cf. Klotzko ([51]: 20): “She [Dolly] was virtually an exact genetic copy of the 6-year-old sheep that provided the nucleus;” “Animal cloning is intended to produce virtually identical genetic copies of the donor animal to yield identical phenotypes” ([33]: 5). Ian Wilmut, the leader of the group that produced Dolly uses the terms “copy” and “copying” too (e.g., Wilmut qtd. in [50]: 24; see also [51]: 148).

  3. “Zeitschichten” after [52].

  4. E.g. successful SCNT experiments with frogs by John B. Gurdon [41] or achievements in in vitro fertilization.

  5. Although Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932) counts as a prime example for a technological dystopia in the literature about cloning, the word “clone” is not mentioned there (see [55]: 25). Peter N. Poon states that Huxley used the term “Bokanovsky’s Process” as an asexual reproduction technique instead of cloning, because it was already reserved in botany (see [64]: 162).

  6. Today pharmaceutical company Novartis Switzerland.

  7. The Island describes the misuse of cloning, using the cloned humans as organ farms. In The Attack of the Clones, the clones are by default faceless and nameless soldiers. Taking the psychological, sociological, and ethical challenges of human cloning into account, Orphan Black tells the story about a group of clones revealing the secret of their origin.

  8. According to Roman Marek ([55]: 33), this is rather astonishing because Dolly must have been one of the medically best investigated sheep in the world.

  9. It is important to acknowledge that animals cloned by SCNT are not to be confused with genetically modified organisms (GMOs). But Dolly was one step on the way to find a more efficient technique to generate GMOs like the transgenic sheep Polly (see [67] and [10]), and therefore, a strong link between SCNT and the production of GMOs is still given.

  10. The role of metaphors in science has already been investigated in general, e.g., Keller [48], Brown [14], Giles [39], and Pauwels [60] among a large body of scientific literature.

  11. The main reason why it is fruitful to rely on Derrida is his approach of deconstruction. But other connections between Derrida and cloning can be made. The dispute between Jürgen Habermas and Derrida will be continued in a deconstruction of Habermas’ argument against reproductive human cloning in the last paragraph. Furthermore, as a critic of all forms of equalization and standardization (see [30]: 18), Derrida seems to be the right proponent for challenging a biotechnology like SCNT cloning, which has been related with standardization, genetic identity, and mass production (see [12]) since its beginnings.

  12. Donald L. M. Baxter ([7]) discusses Joseph Butler’s distinction between identity in a loose and in a strict sense.

  13. Cloning raises questions about phenotypical, genotypical, and also personal identity. In this article, the first two will be addressed only.

  14. Some exceptions should be mentioned here. Fiester [35] focuses on consequent-based and deontological ethical concerns of animal cloning. The expert’s report by the Danish Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment ([24]) is of interest as it does not only include a sentientist welfare perspective but is also referring to the integrity of cloned farm animals (for details on the integrity concept, see [65]). Camenzind [16] considers anthropocentric and sentientist approaches as well as the non-sentientist Swiss concept of animal’s dignity, stated in the Swiss Constitution (for explanation of animal’s dignity, see [6]; [17]).

  15. Because of this neglect, I will refer to animal cloning whenever possible, especially in the last part of the paper.

  16. A sociological study on cloning of endangered animals can be found in Friese [37].

  17. A deeper discussion about the fundamental concepts of genome, genotype, and phenotype is provided by Mahner and Kary [54].

  18. Names of company like “Lazaron Biotechnologies,” “Forever Pets,” or “My friend again” that provide cloning services suggest that it is possible to reanimate a dead pet through cloning. But this lies beyond the performance of SCNT cloning because genetic identity does not imply personal identity. Further discussion about cloning pets can be found in Bok [9] and Fiester [36].

  19. Orig: “durch ungeschlechtliche Vermehrung genetisch identische Kopien von Lebewesen herstellen” ([28]: 624).

  20. The term “chimaera” is also used for the results of interspecies nuclear transfer. These “heteroplasmic” clones possess the nuclear DNA from one species and the mitochondrial DNA from another. The difficulty to categorize these animals into existing classification systems is discussed by Friese ([37]: 23ff.).

  21. This view is also supported by Sarah Franklin who argues that in the case of Dolly “clone” is only used because of the lack of a more accurate term (cf. [38]: 24).

  22. With “genome,” Brem and Wolf are referring to the genetic traits in the nucleus (nDNA, see below). I prefer to speak of a nuclear copy, because “genome” is already used for the complete genetic material of an organism.

  23. Due to the fact that during the first cell division the DNA sequence may change because of spontaneous mutations, the DNA sequence is the same at least at the moment after the transfer before the cell starts to divide the first time.

  24. O. F. Cook must be seen as the actual originator of the term “clone” because of Webber’s reference to Cook.

  25. According to Webber, first spelled without ‘e’. Pollard [63] suggested to add a silent “e” to ensure the long “o” two years later.

  26. In fact, it is difficult to speak of Dolly’s mother because three female sheep were involved in cloning her: the oocyte donor, the nucleus donor, and the surrogate that delivered Dolly.

  27. E.g. as a synecdoche. Synecdoche is a figure of speech substituting a part (or a subcategory) by the whole (or main category) or vice versa.

  28. See also the statement of Terry Eagleton that not only the boarders between language of literature and science are not clearly defined, but that also all language “[…] is ineradicably metaphorical, working by tropes and figures; it is a mistake to believe that any language is literally literal. Philosophy, law, political theory work by metaphor just as poems do, and so are just as fictional” ([29]: 126).

  29. For the highlighting and hiding systematicity of metaphors, see [53]: Chapter 3.

  30. French for “general strategy of deconstruction” ([25], 41). The original terminology is used here instead of the term “method” in order to signify that according to Derrida, deconstruction is not a method in an ordinary sense. The difference is that deconstruction is not applied to a research matter from outside, following the dichotomy between (active) subject and (passive) object. According to Derrida, deconstruction is part of the matter itself, not having a particular beginning and ending. On the one hand, being aware of the limits of this article, it is on the other hand nevertheless necessary to start with an arbitrary cut and neglect this characteristic of deconstruction.

  31. Feminist critique assumes that this binary opposition not only implicates a hierarchic order but that it also is gendered. The first half is not only more valuable than the other one but is also seen as the “male” part, while the less valuable half is viewed as the “female” part (see [49]: 39f.).

  32. A third phase of neutralization may also be mentioned, although it is not necessary in the process of deconstruction. Neutralizing an opposition means to harmonize or assimilate the hierarchical positions (see [25]: 41).

  33. Insofar as Habermas’ argument corresponds with Leon Kass’ “yuck factor” argument presented in The Wisdom of Repugnance (2002). Unlike Kass, Habermas tries to ground his moral intuitions with a rational argument.

  34. See http://www.afterwalkerevans.com/ and http://www.aftersherrielevine.com/ [13].

  35. As stated above, the shift contains the step from one binary opposition (here: original–copy) to another one (object–living being). The new opposition may be the subject of a new deconstruction, which itself contains another shift and so forth.

  36. It is not obvious if he is referring to the progenitor or to the clone.

  37. In the biotechnological context, “objectification” is generally used in a very broad sense to describe the act of treating as an object what is really not an object, but an animal (or a human being). Further investigations are required to define specific ways as well as similarities and differences of objectification of humans and animals.

  38. For the purpose of this article, the issue of objectification of plants will be left aside.

  39. At this point, it is neither necessary to defend Regan’s view of animal rights nor the value theory on which it is built on. But I borrow his terminology of “experiencing subject-of-a-life” because it serves the purpose to express a clear distinction between objects and certain non-objects.

  40. The category of objectification could also be applied to humans and animals who are not subjects-of-a-life. But it is possible that some notions of objectifications must be adapted to them, e.g., the notion of autonomy (see below) must be considered differently in the cases of animals, children, or comatose people because there are forms of self-determination that cannot be found in these cases.

  41. I do not agree with all the details of Nussbaum’s description of her proposed notions and relations between them. Nevertheless, her classification serves as a rough guide for the structure of my own interpretation.

  42. Of course, it is morally questionable if I borrow a pen and overuse or break it. But the moral problem would not be grounded in violating the pen itself, but its status as the property of an owner.

  43. The link between the inherent value and the moral status, as well as the distinction between the inherent and the instrumental value, are common in animal ethics. As Regan states, his attribution of an inherent value is a postulate, a theoretical assumption that he argues for (cf. [66]: 247). I will use both expressions as a heuristic instrument but want to stress that his theory of value is neither necessary nor the only way to ground moral status for animals.

  44. Carol J. Adams’ concept of the “absent referent” describes a similar process of making an animal anonymous in the process of eating meat. That is why it is suitable to use her terminology here.

  45. It should be mentioned that the quoted statement is not followed by any explanation of the normative grounds it is built on.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Susanna Kautschitsch, Kerstin Weich and Martin Huth for their precious critical suggestions and Julia Schöllauf for her proofreading.

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  1. Messerli Research Institute, Unit of Ethics and Human-Animal Studies, University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna, Veterinaerplatz 1, 1210, Vienna, Austria

    Samuel Camenzind

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Camenzind, S. On Clone as Genetic Copy: Critique of a Metaphor. Nanoethics 9, 23–37 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-014-0218-6

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