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Some strategic properties of plurality and majority voting

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Toronto, Canada

    Donald E. Campbell

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  1. Donald E. Campbell
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This paper was prepared while the author was visiting at the Ontario Economic Council, Toronto. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the hospitality of the OEC and the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Ottawa. Neither council bears responsibility for the views expressed herein.

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Campbell, D.E. Some strategic properties of plurality and majority voting. Theor Decis 13, 93–107 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134212

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