Abstract
In this chapter, I am going to discuss a very interesting case brought to our attention by Saul (1997, 2007) and references therein: NP-related substitution failure in simple sentences. Whereas it is well known that opacity occurs in intensional contexts and that in such contexts it is not licit to replace an NP with a co-referential one (this would be illicit, substitution failure constituting a violation of the compositionality constraint, according to Salmon 1986, 2007, Richard 2013, Jaszczolt 2005), one would not expect that substitution failure (that is an exception to Leibniz’s law) should also be exhibited by simple sentences (though they are not exhibited by all simple sentences) in the context of stories about Superman. The suggested explanation of these cases is to posit an embedding explicature, that is to say the insertion of structure (a sentential fragment such as ‘We are told that’ or ‘As the story goes’) that ipso facto creates an intensional context capable of blocking substitution. I consider various complications to this story in the light of important objections by García-Carpintero (p.c.) and, finally, I consider how this story fares when one applies constraints on explicatures along the lines of those proposed by Hall (2014) in an interesting paper.
In general, this chapter exploits interesting considerations by Norrick (2016) on the structural similarities between stories and indirect reports. Norrick believes there are important differences, but he is inclined to concede that we could study structural similarities. An important similarity, brought out by the examples discussed by Saul (2007), is that the narrative frame, once it is inserted into the interaction, can be left implicit and, during the act of narrating or referring to the story, one need not repeat the words ‘the story says’ or ‘we are told that…’ every time. Although implicit, these words are heard because they do some work at the structural level, as is shown by this attempt to resolve an otherwise intractable philosophical problem. The explicatures of simple sentences are perceived because they are integrated into the speakers’/hearers’ perception of the overall plan of discourse, as Haugh (2015) most interestingly notes:
As Haugh and Jaszczolt (2012) note, this means that any putative “communicative intention of A is embedded within his higher-order intention” (p. 101). In other words, to figure out the implicature that evidently arises here, the participants are necessarily making inferences about some kind of overall aim (…). According to this view, then, inferences about the intended implicature(s) (i.e. the speaker’s communicative intentions) arise concomitant with inferences about the overall aim of the speaker (…) (p. 96).
It follows from the considerations by Haugh that, since the explicature connected with simple sentences depends on the perception of the overall aim or plan of the conversation, it is not easily cancelled. Readers can check by themselves that the explicatures due to simple sentences cannot be cancelled, as cancelling them would involve returning to illogical discourses. (But these are merely consequences of what I said in Capone 2009a, b). Haugh’s considerations about the overall aim of the discourse are precious in explaining how the embedding explicatures I posit are calculated once and for all for the whole stretch of the discourse framed by the narrative act (or the perception of the narrative act).
I defend the view that all the semantically relevant elements are expressed at the LF level. In other words, I argue that, for the purposes of semantics, all the relevant propositional elements are the value of either a phonetically realized element or an implicit argument. The propositional elements not triggered by a phonetically realized element or an implicit argument, can be dealt with as either pragmatically imparted or as background presuppositions upon which a given speech act occurs.(Corazza 2004, 70–71).
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Notes
- 1.
That is that-clauses of verbs of propositional attitude, in general, among other things.
- 2.
- 3.
Unlike the view that context should be seen as “a selector of lexical features because it activates some of those features while leaving others in the background” (Kecskes 2014, 35), in this paper we hold the view that context also serves to insert structure at the sentential or inter-sentential level.
- 4.
Williamson (Oxford lecture) reflects on error fragility, that is to say the idea that once an error is inserted (injected) into a theory, it will systematically lead to further errors. Take, for example, the idea that Saul’s examples discussed in this chapter prove that opacity appears even in simple sentences, that is apparently non-intensional contexts. As my readers will see, this idea is taken up by Saka (2016) and extended to other examples, leading him to postulate universal opacity. (Also see another case brought up by Willamson p.c.). This is an illustration of what Williamson means by error-fragility. I have amply shown in a later section that universal opacity, as maintained by Saka, is wrong and is certainly a consequence of the idea that simple sentences can exceptionally be loci of opacity.
- 5.
As pointed out by Timothy Williamson (p.c.) this is also a point made by Russell. See his ideas on scope ambiguity in connection with definite descriptions (this is a topic discussed by Neale (2007) in detail).
- 6.
Timothy Williamson (p.c.) says “surely we are, because the truth-values of sentences are at issue”. Ok, I agree this is a complicated question. If we accept the hidden indexicality hypothesis, then obviously Williamson may have a point here, as the logical form has to be specified syntactically and semantically. If we take the position that free enrichment only is involved, the logical form (As the story goes/as we heard) is injected into the utterance, but this part of the logical form is not considered to be mandated by lexical or syntactic structure. So, Williamson’s remark that, indeed, it is a question of logical form can be intended in a stronger or in a weaker sense. If it is intended in a weaker sense, it does not really contradict, but it merely further specifies what I said.
- 7.
To make this less cryptic, consider a case such as ‘Nice weather, isn’t it?’. Jaszczolt’s consideration on irony and similar cases (e.g. jokes) is that one does not proceed incrementally, by summing up the proposition literally expressed with the pragmatic increments. The increments, in such cases, do not amount to additions, but to subtractions, since the hearer has to work out that the speaker does not literally intend that the weather is nice, but has to consider that this is to be understood echoically and thus the real proposition he accepts, instead, is that the weather is quite bad.
- 8.
A propos of Merger Representations, Jaszczolt (2016, 80) writes the following:
“A semantic representation so understood is called in DS merger representation. This representation is assumed to have a compositional structure. Compositionality is there a methodological but also an epistemological and metaphysical assumption, based on the argument from productivity and systematicity of conversational interactional patterns. The word ‘merger’ and the Greek letter sigma (Σ) that symbolizes summation, reflect the fact that information coming from different sources merges to produce one semantic structure. DS is still very much a theory in progress but at the current stage of its development, information is being allocated to the following sources: (i) world knowledge (WK); (ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS); (iii) the situation of discourse (SD); (iv) properties of the human inferential system (IS); (v) stereotypes and presumptions about society and culture (SC)” (p. 80).
- 9.
See the important paper by Fetzer (2016) on the way we integrate information coming from the linguistic context with the one coming from the social context. It is of considerable theoretical importance that Fetzer (2016) introduces the difference between generalized and particularized practs (practs are the realizations of pragmemes in discourse). In the case of embedding explicatures, one could say that although we may learn how to derive them pragmatically in particular contexts, we can start to associate them with particular structures and, then, we no longer resort to all the steps required by the inference at the level of the particularized pract.
- 10.
For the idea of compositionality as something that is mainly achieved in discourse, see the important volume: Kamp, H. and U. Reyle, 1993. Another author who addresses the issue of compositionality in discourse, albeit more timidly, is Hall (2014), who explicitly writes about ‘composing’ unarticulated constituents into an explicature. At another place, Hall writes about compositionality at the level of discourse. Hall (2014) explicitly says that she will concentrate on unarticulated constituents as these seem to be more threatening to a principle of semantic compositionality for truth-conditional content.
- 11.
As Saul (2007) puts it, in Pitt’s view ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ are names for two alter-egos that Kal-El adopted on Earth. “Kal-El does everything either Superman or Clark does, and some things that neither of them do” (p. 32).
- 12.
- 13.
Although this might prima facie sound strange, even pragmatic intrusions can require further levels of pragmatic intrusions. It is not enough to reconstruct the constituent ‘We are told that’ as part of the explicature, but we need to reconstruct the illocutionary force of ‘we are told that’. The speech act describes someone as performing an illocutionary act, but which illocutionary act? As Davis (2016, 308) says, we cannot say that an assertion is at stake, since the speaker may just be telling us a story. “But if he is telling a story, then he did not assert, affirm, or state that it did”. It is clear that Davis’ point is relevant to our discussion, as being aware that we are confronted with a story prepares us for the fiction that there are people with extraordinary powers, like Superman, and that, in the world of this story, Superman and Clark Kent are one and the same individual, although some characters in the story are not aware of this identity.
Timothy Williamson (p.c.) raises the following problem:
Postulating this extra constituent gets the truth-value wrong in a vast range of cases. If it is true that S but the speaker wasn’t told that S, the original statement was true. If the speaker was told that S (in a non-factive sense of ‘told’) but it is false that S, the original statement was false. Adding ‘I was told that’ incorrectly reverses the truth-value in both cases.
Although one should certainly take this problem into account, I am not particularly worried by it, as there are languages in which factive ‘tell’ is made explicit by a combination with a particle (e.g. the clitic ‘lo’ in Italian). Thus, there may well be semantic resources to make ‘tell’ factive, which is what we need to overcome the objection by Williamson (in English we may say things such as ‘As the real story goes, …’ or ‘We have heard it that S’). The objection based on the fact that a true proposition may turn out to be false if embedded in the constituent ‘I was told that’ in the case nobody told us that p can be defeated by considering that this problem does not arise in the context of superman stories. It is a general problem, but not one that arises in this context.
- 14.
Timothy Williamson (p.c.) says “That confuses our evidence for a statement with its content”. I agree that we should avoid the identification of the evidence for a statement with its content (that is the content of the statement), but this does not prevent us from inserting into the statement an implicit constituent dealing with the evidence, in case it is understood that the provision of the evidence is part of what the speaker means (of course I am not saying that this should always occur).
- 15.
Timothy Williamson (p.c.) says that this gets the truth-value wrong if (a) she was lying or (b) she did regret it but didn’t say so. I propose to listen to Williamson, and to confine ourselves to a more limited claim. So I will not argue that this pragmatic increment will take place in general, but I will argue that it can take place occasionally if the increment conforms to the speaker’s intentions (as understood by the Hearer).
- 16.
Here we have an interesting objection from a philosophical point of view. Timothy Williamson (p.c.) says: “I don’t remember a single occasion when I heard that construction being used in a way plausibly so interpreted – the fact that the evidence for the knowledge attribution was X’s claim to know shows nothing to the purpose”. Here the perspective of linguistics may diverge from a philosophical perspective. I quite agree that one cannot – in general – argue in favor of the semantic or pragmatic equivalence between ‘X knows that P’ and ‘X says he knows that p’. Yet all I am saying is that there are contexts, in which ‘X knows that P’ is typically construed as ‘X says he know that p’. But this is not a philosophical point, this is a linguistic point. Thus, I do not expect Timothy Williamson to agree on this, because, understandably, he is worried that I am postulating a semantic/pragmatic equivalence. But I am opposed to such an equivalence as strongly as Williamson, as that would be quite pernicious. What I say is that in certain contexts, or in certain typical contexts, one may have this type of interpretations.
- 17.
Neal Norrick p.c. says:
“You say of your example (3),
(3) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman went out.
that replacing ‘Clark Kent’ with ‘Superman’ clearly produces a false statement. But I see nothing wrong with:
Superman went into the phone booth and Superman went (back) out.
Superman went into the phone booth and Superman came (back) out.
Though they mean something different than (3):
The individual who is sometimes Clark Kent (mild manned reporter, with glasses, in a business suit) and sometimes Superman (jumps tall buildings, sans glasses, in a red suit, with a cape) went into the phone booth as Clark Kent and came out as Superman”.
I agree with Norrick that these intuitions are correct. However, they do not interfere with what we have to say about the substitution failure problem. This case seems not to accord with the script of the story. Since the script is not followed, this is a context in which it is indifferent whether we use ‘Superman’ or ‘Clark Kent’.
- 18.
Timothy Williamson (p.c.) writes:
“In any case, the fact that the examples are drawn from fiction is irrelevant to the way they are normally meant to be understood. If you want a genuine real life case, there was a man who changed his name from ‘Dalton’ to ‘d’Alton’ (he thought the latter sounded more upper-class). It is tempting to say ‘Dalton was born and d’Alton died’ and not ‘d’Alton was born and Dalton died’. The key issues are the same”.
Presumably this goes against my idea that the opacity in Saul’s example derives from the insertion of a constituent saying that we heard a fictional story. But we can deal with Timothy Williamson’s intriguing case in two ways. a) we could say that although we are not confronted with a fictional, but with a real story, we still understand the substitution failure to descend from our understanding the utterances as framed in the context of a (real) story; b) we could say that this is only a case of implicit quotation and the utterance has to be understood as ‘The man called ‘Dalton’ was born and the man called ‘D’Alton’ died. This case aligns with the cases provided by Saka and discussed here in this chapter.
- 19.
But not to him or people like him who are under the impression of having been told a story that includes this statement (which however was never pronounced).
- 20.
It is of some interest that Norrick (2016, 97) believes that reported speech need not reproduce utterances that are actually spoken. He remarks that reporters can report talk they cannot have observed. (This remark is particularly suitable as a reply to García-Carpintero objection). Although Norrick’s remarks are confined to direct reports, it is not difficult to extend such considerations to indirect reports as well (we saw in a previous chapter that the distinction between direct and indirect reports is gradually being eroded).
- 21.
- 22.
To provide an easier case: if one believes P one must accept P or Q, but one cannot say that the specific belief ‘P or Q’ follows from P, given that the believer is equally justified in believing ‘P o N’, ‘P or R’, ‘P or Z’, etc. And there is no reason why on accepting P he was lead to believe ‘P or Q’ in particular.
- 23.
Timothy Williamson writes (p.c.):
“There is no such convention. How would it have arisen? The case has never occurred to ordinary speakers”.
I quite agree with Williamson that an ordinary speaker need not be aware of a negative convention saying that ‘Vampire refers to vampires’ does not entail ‘Zombie refers to zombies’ in the sense that the speaker who accepts the latter does not accept it in virtue of the former. However, in the same way in which there can be no convention concerning negative entailment, there can be no convention concerning positive entailment. Surely these cases never occur to ordinary speakers and thus they have never come to forming conventions concerning these cases. But if there are no such conventions, matters such entailment cannot be settled. Lacking semantic entailment, which is unlike logical implication, which is what Saka has uppermost in mind, there is no reason to say that a speaker who says ‘Vampire refers to vampires’ should derive in particular the thought ‘Zombie refers to zombies’. (Given that many other words have null extension, there is not a reason for replacing a word having null extension with any other particular word that has a null extension, rather than an another chosen at random. There could be so many replacements, why should one choose one and not another?). So it appears to me that Saka’s interesting example is best dealt with by invoking the difference between semantic entailment and logical implication. (Substitution is licensed by entailment but not by logical implication).
- 24.
However, a point on which Saka and myself agree is that Superman examples cannot be understood in isolation and need contextualization. This is compatible with everything else I am going to assert in this paper.
- 25.
Williamson p.c. writes an intriguing comment: is a person really coextensive with himself?
- 26.
Timothy Williamson writes (p.c.): No, it isn’t. To learn something is to come to know it. Therefore learning it requires not having known it. Ok I agree with this, I have no quarrel with this. But here we are dealing with the projection problem of presuppositions in complex sentences, and it is notorious that ‘say’ is a plug to presuppositions (see Levinson 1983) and thus, if they are projected upwards, this must be done through conversational implicatures.
- 27.
Timothy Williamson comments (p.c.) “No. In learning something, someone may forget not having known it, or simply have a strong disposition not to talk about such matters”. I agree with Williamson that this is a logical possibility, but how realistic is it? This is like saying that one who believes ‘p’ has no inclination to say ‘I believe p’ (because he may not be inclined to talk about what he believes). I agree that in some circumstances, he may have no reason to say p or have specific reasons to say ‘I do not believe that p’. But one should at least admit that if the speaker is motivated to say what he has learned, he has an inclination to say ‘I have learned that p’. (Verbs like ‘believe’ are treated like dispositional verbs by Davis 2005, as well as by many other authors).
- 28.
Williamson (p.c.) writes: “Didn’t she learn it when she first heard about him?”. But if we know something a priori, what we learned when we first heard about Peter Hempel is not something we learned a posteriori, but something we could know in principle by reflecting on it. (All we had to learn was his name).
- 29.
Borg (2012, 22–23) says: “I’ll use the term ‘free pragmatic enrichment’ as the label for pragmatic effects on semantic content which are driven solely by pragmatic, contextual demands concerning appropriate interpretation, that is to say, for pragmatic effects on semantic content which are not required by any lexico-syntactic element in the sentence”. Huang (2014) on free enrichment says: “We have already seen in chapters 2 and 7 that in this case, although there does not seem to be an overt indexical or covert slot in the linguistically decoded logical form of the sentence uttered, the logical form nevertheless needs to be conceptually enriched. The process of free enrichment is “free” because it is entirely pragmatically rather than linguistically based. Free enrichment is a typical optional and contextually driven ‘top-down’ process (Recanati 2004, 24–6)” (p. 313).
- 30.
Williamson (p.c.) claims that this view is not equivalent to his view on assertion (at some point I thought there was a similarity):
“No, this is NOT and never was my view. That the speaker knows is not even implicitly part of the content of the assertion. Claiming otherwise gets the truth-value of many assertions wrong, e.g. when the speaker is Gettiered or aims to be lying but in fact speaks the truth”.
- 31.
Timothy Williamson (p.c.) produces the very good objection that “the second conjunct is still as opaque as before and thus infects the conjunction with opacity. In fact, since the second conjunct entails the first conjunct, the conjunction is equivalent to the second conjunct after all, which is back to the previous proposal”. If there is a way out of this problem, this must be to avoid the use of conjunction altogether. One can use the full stop, to signal that we have two distinct assertions proffered at different times: P. I know that P. Another solution is to say that the knowledge component is provided through presupposition. I think the latter is the safest.
- 32.
Williamson (p.c.) says: “But there is no good motivation to manifest blatantly elliptical cases as in (11) and (12) to ordinary cases”. I agree we should reflect on this. If anything, Williamson’s consideration steers us in the direction of the free enrichment view.
- 33.
“Saturation is a pragmatic process whereby a given slot, position or variable in the linguistically decoded logical form is contextually filled. In other words, in this type of pragmatic enrichment, a slot, position or variable must be contextually saturated for the utterance to express a complete proposition” (Huang 2014, 312). As the reader can work out for herself, my proposal is not in line with standard proposals about saturation, as we need a two step level: the provision of a (sentential) variable; assigning value (or saturating) this sentential variable. This two step process, obviously, occurs instantaneously, and thus cannot be part of conscious or reflective inference.
- 34.
On p. 7, Hall (2014) says “With free enrichment processes in general, it is straightforward to explain why they do or do not occur. Hearers infer an implicature – also a ‘free’ pragmatic effect – if it is required for the interpretation to meet the expected level of informativeness, relevance, etc., if the contextual premises for doing so are sufficiently accessible, and if the speaker can reasonably be taken to have intended the hearer to make the inference”. Of course this is reminiscent of my considerations in Capone (2006, 2009).
- 35.
This is enough to exclude NP or VP conjuncts which would need to be derived from fully propositional premises, often through deductive inferences (see various discussions in Hall’s paper on how such arguments can be constructed e.g. p. 11). As Hall writes, “Once the interpretation settles into a valid argument, the pragmatic processes that contribute to explicature are those whose effect has been local, modifying a sub-propositional constituent of logical form, while the processes that result in implicatures are those whose effect is global, in that they are represented as following logically from fully propositional premises” (p. 19).
- 36.
A crucial objection by Hall to the over-generation charges by the indexicalists is that “these indexicals do not exclude other pragmatic effects, which means that the indexicalist is just as susceptible as the contextualist to the examples that the former levels against the idea of pragmatic enrichment, such as (7) above” (p. 8).
- 37.
And indeed there is evidence that this is what she means as she quotes Recanati (2004) saying that what is meant by a local pragmatic process is that “one modifies non-propositional subparts of the linguistic logical form and, as Recanati puts it, it is the modified meaning of these subparts that goes into the composition process” (p. 14).
- 38.
However, it should be noted that, according to Hall, set intersection is not the only instantiation of modification, as one can always modify an NP through disjunction (Frenchmen (or Belgians)).
- 39.
Hall stresses the fact that although Stanley tries to account for pragmatic intrusion through covert indexicals, whenever this is possible, he makes the concession that at least in the case of deferred reference we are confronted with a genuine case of pragmatic intrusion that is not mandated by linguistic structure.
- 40.
I remind readers that ‘free enrichment’ is usually taken by the literature to mean free of linguistic control’. Free enrichments could be seen to be pragmatic processes complementary to those mandated by covert linguistic structure in that the effects of context are linguistically optional (Hall 2014).
- 41.
In ‘Mary said that “Elisabeth” went to London’, the explicature we obtain is: Mary said that Elisabeth (whom she called ‘Elisabeth’) went to London. Here the pragmatic component of the explicature is not a local process of modification but amounts to insertion of structure. (One has to replace “Elisabeth” with: Elisabeth, whom she called ‘Elisabeth. This hardly looks like modification or a local process, as to have modification one would have to have: “Elisabeth” whom she called “Elisabeth”, but this would be an absurd kind of modification).
- 42.
Unlike many other scholars, Neale (2007, 82) does not believe that we should find deep differences between the (aphonic) indexicality approach and the free enrichment approach. He writes:
“However we proceed, the heavy lifting is done by pragmatic inference because interpreting utterances of sentences containing aphonic “indexicals” is a pragmatic, richly inferential matter, the product of integrating linguistic and non-linguistic information. The only substantive difference between the way the heavy-handed pragmatist sees the process of identifying the proposition expressed and the way someone postulating aphonic elements in syntax sees it is that the latter is just insisting that the search for and integration of contextual information in the interpretation process is triggered syntactically. To the best of my knowledge, no-one has ever attempted to produce an argument designed to show that an item in syntax is necessary for such a search to be triggered or for such integration to take place. (Such an argument would have to come from empirical psychology, of course, not from armchair speculations about the nature of language or the nature of mind)” p. 82.
- 43.
At this point, the reader might be curious about the way I propose to reconcile Williamson’s considerations about knowledge with my proposal (mainly the view that assertion requires knowledge). One can accommodate Williamson’s knowledge rule for assertion by saying that, typically, an assertion commits one to ‘P (and I know P) (if the residual problems can be resolved). But what happens when an embedding explicature occurs? Well, in this case one has the following structure: (I heard that) P (and I know P). The constituent (and I know that P) may be aborted in case, in context, the speaker is casting doubt on the veridicality of what he heard. This is ok, since ‘I heard that p’ need not count as an assertion of unqualified P, although in some cases it can be said as part of an assertion that P. An alternative view is that ‘I know that p’ is provided through presupposition. On such a view, it would be even easier to reconcile the presupposition with the insertion of the sentential fragment ‘We were told that…’.
- 44.
This goes more or less in the direction of what Wayne Davis (2016, 292) says when he argues that his ideational view of meaning can resolve Frege’s problems in a straightforward way:
“Defining meaning as idea expression rather than reference enables natural solutions to Frege’s and Russell’s problems. People do think about Santa Claus even though Santa Claus does not exist, and such thoughts have a part conventionally expressed by the name ‘Santa’. So ‘Santa’ has a meaning even though it has no referent. The thought “ammonia is poisonous” is distinct from the thought “NH3 is poisonous” even though ammonia is NH3. Since ‘ammonia’ and ‘NH3’ express different thought parts, they have different meanings, even though their extensions are identical.” (p. 292–293).
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Capone, A. (2018). Embedding explicatures in implicit indirect reports: simple sentences, and substitution failure cases. In: Capone, A., Carapezza, M., Lo Piparo, F. (eds) Further Advances in Pragmatics and Philosophy. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72173-6_6
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