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Coalitional Interval Games for Strategic Games in Which Players Cooperate

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Abstract

We propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. Associating with a strategic game a coalitional interval game we avoid having to take either a pessimistic or an optimistic approach to the problem. The paper makes two contributions to the literature: It provides a theoretical foundation for the study of coalitional interval games and it also provides, studies, and characterizes a natural method of associating coalitional interval games with strategic games.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departamento de Matemáticas, Facultade de Informática, Universidade da Coruña, A Coruña, 15071, Spain

    Luisa Carpente

  2. Departamento de Estatística e IO, Facultade de Matemáticas, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, Santiago de Compostela, 15782, Spain

    Balbina Casas-Méndez & Ignacio García-Jurado

  3. Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

    Anne van den Nouweland

  4. Department of Economics, 435 PLC, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, 97403-1285, USA

    Anne van den Nouweland

Authors
  1. Luisa Carpente
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  2. Balbina Casas-Méndez
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  3. Ignacio García-Jurado
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  4. Anne van den Nouweland
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Luisa Carpente.

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Carpente, L., Casas-Méndez, B., García-Jurado, I. et al. Coalitional Interval Games for Strategic Games in Which Players Cooperate. Theory Decis 65, 253–269 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9091-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9091-x

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