Abstract
There are four approaches to analyzing the concept of a priori knowledge. The primary target of the reductive approach is the concept of a priori justification. The primary target of the nonreductive approach is the concept of a priori knowledge. There are two approaches to analyzing each primary target. A theory-neutral approach provides an analysis that does not presuppose any general theory of knowledge or justification. A theory-laden approach provides an analysis that does presuppose some general theory of knowledge or justification (call it the background theory). Those who embrace a theory-laden analysis incur a special burden: they must separate the features of their analysis that are constitutive of the a priori from those that are constitutive of the background theory. My goal is to illustrate how the failure to separate these features leads to erroneous conclusions about the nature of a priori knowledge.
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Notes
By ‘general theory of knowledge or justification’, I mean any theory that offers an account of the conditions necessary or sufficient for knowledge or justification.
Pust (2002) makes this point but notes that Kitcher’s use of the term ‘warrant’ is not consistent.
Even if Cantor believes (C1)–(C3), (D) does not follow since those beliefs need not impugn the reliability of his exercise of the process and, moreover, they do not preclude his having evidence that his exercise of the process is reliable.
One might suggest, in Kitcher’s defense, that he can avoid my objection by adding (C1) to his argument as an independent assumption. This assumption, in conjunction with (A1) and (A2), does entail (C2). Therefore, if the remainder of Kitcher’s original argument is sound, the revised argument is also sound. The revised argument, however, only shows that (WC) leaves open (rather than entails) that a priori knowledge is tradition-dependent.
See Casullo (2005).
Maddy (1997, p. 184) maintains that the Quinean picture of mathematics is incompatible with his epistemological naturalism.
Versions of this paper were presented at the first annual Midwest Epistemology Workshop, the 2008 APA Pacific Division Meetings, and the University of Iowa Graduate Student Conference. My thanks to the participants at these conferences, my APA commentators: Jonathan Adler and Lisa Warenski, and Mikael Janvid for their helpful comments.
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Casullo, A. Analyzing a priori knowledge. Philos Stud 142, 77–90 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9302-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9302-5