Abstract
This is my response to the papers by Chris Pincock, Lisa Warenski and Jonathan Weinberg, which were presented at the Book Symposium on my Essays on A Priori Knowledge and Justification, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meetings, March 16–19, 2014.
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Notes
The argument is directed at Goldman (1999), who presses a similar concern.
References
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Casullo, A. (2003). A priori justification. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Casullo, A. (2013). Four challenges to the a priori—a posteriori distinction. Synthese,. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0341-x.
Goldman, A. (1999). A priori warrant and naturalistic epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 1–28.
Ichikawa, J. (2013). Experimental philosophy and apriority. In A. Casullo & J. Thurow (Eds.), The A Priori in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Acknowledgments
My thanks to Chris Pincock, Lisa Warenski and Jonathan Weinberg for their careful reading of my work and probing responses to it. I regret that limitations of space prevent me from addressing all the issues that they raise. Thanks also to Peter Graham for organizing and chairing the symposium.
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Casullo, A. Response to my critics: Chris Pincock, Lisa Warenski and Jonathan Weinberg. Philos Stud 173, 1705–1720 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0590-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0590-2