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Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems

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Abstract

Since Kenneth Arrow showed the general possibility theorem, a number of social choice theorists have provided alternative proofs of it. In a recent article, Geanakoplos (Econ Theory 26:211–215, 2005) has constructed a new proof of the theorem. The present article provides alternative proofs of various Arrovian impossibility results from the 1960s to the 1970s by utilizing Geanakoplos’s method. We prove semi-order impossibility theorems, the quasi-transitive veto theorem, the quasi-transitive dictatorship theorem, the triple acyclic veto theorem, and the impossibility theorem without the Pareto principle.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan

    Susumu Cato

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  1. Susumu Cato
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Correspondence to Susumu Cato.

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Cato, S. Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems. Soc Choice Welf 35, 267–284 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0440-2

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