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Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions

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Abstract

This article investigates the relationship among the weak Pareto principle, the strong Pareto principle, and positive responsiveness in the context of voting. First, it is shown that under a mild domain condition, if an anonymous and neutral collective choice rule (CCR) is complete and transitive, then the weak Pareto principle and the strong Pareto principle are equivalent. Next, it is shown that under another mild domain condition, if a neutral CCR is transitive, then the strong Pareto principle and positive responsiveness are equivalent. By applying these results, we obtain a new characterization of the method of majority decision.

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  1. Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan

    Susumu Cato

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  1. Susumu Cato
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Correspondence to Susumu Cato.

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Cato, S. Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions. Theory Decis 71, 503–518 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9261-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9261-8

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