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The Impact of Membership in the Ethics Officer Association

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Abstract

In this study, we propose considering membership in the Ethics Officer Association (EOA) as a proxy for the firm's commitment to ethical decision making, and we analyze the influence of firm- and CEO-specific characteristics on this commitment. While we observe a positive relationship between membership and firm size, we also document a negative relationship between EOA membership and the executive's time in position and, to a more modest extent, accounting returns. Pursuing this further, we present evidence that firms with past legal issues may seek EOA membership as a signal of their intention to be compliant in the future.

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Chavez, G.A., Wiggins, R.A. & Yolas, M. The Impact of Membership in the Ethics Officer Association. Journal of Business Ethics 34, 39–56 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011968010131

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011968010131

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