Skip to main content

Zhu Xi’s Appropriation of Mencius’s Thought: From a Hermeneutic to a Developmental Approach

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius

Part of the book series: Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy ((DCCP,volume 18))

  • 416 Accesses

Abstract

Traditionally, Zhu Xi’s Mencius-interpretation had enjoyed for a long time an authoritarian status. However, it is challenged by Mou Zongsan in modern scholarship. Mou revolutionarily identifies Lu Xiangshan instead as the authentic follower of Mencius. Given the significance of the famous debate between Zhu and Lu in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism in history of Chinese philosophy, it is especially of interest to explore the essential difference between these two Confucians’ Mencius-interpretations. In sum, this paper aims to show that in contrast to Lu’s subjectivistic approach, Zhu opts for a communitarian and anti-idealistic understanding of Mencius’ philosophy. Whereas Lu’s image of Mencius is volitionistic, Zhu’s picture of Mencius is rationalistic. Methodologically, Zhu’s bottom-up orientation is more concrete. In term of a reconstruction of Zhu’s epistemology, it will develop a new defence of Zhu’s Mencius-interpretation against Mou’s misunderstanding.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 109.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    Sishu Jizhu 四書集註 (Collected Annotations to the Four Books) (Beijing Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 197–377; [hereafter: Jizhu]; Sishu Huowen 四書或問 (Questions Concerning the Four Books) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2001), 415–511; [hereafter: Huowen]; Li Jingde 黎靖德 comp. Zhuzi Yulei 朱子語類 (Topics Arranged Conversations of Master Zhu) (Beijing: Zhonhua shuju, 1986), 1218–1478; [hereafter: Zhuzi Yulei].

  2. 2.

    Cf. Einstein 1954: 228. Here I mainly follow Matthew Stanley’s formulations in his book Einstein’s War (Stanley 2019: 43–44).

  3. 3.

    Zhu Wen Gong Wen Ji 朱文公文集 (Collected Writings of Zhu Xi) (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshuguan, 1980, 764; [hereafter Wenji]).

  4. 4.

    Qian 1980, Vol. 3: 397. Qian also says here that Lu Xiangshan held the opposite view, namely that Liu “only believed that mind is Li, but did not say that the whole cosmos is nothing but of one Li” (象山只主心既理,不言通宇宙是一理) (ibid.). I shall come back to Lu Xiangshan later in Section IV.

  5. 5.

    Qian writes: “Then all of them indicate that in addressing this chapter of the Mencius, Zhu failed to thematically explore Mencius’s original intention” (則朱子於孟子此章,始終未能直探孟子本意立言也) (Qian 1980, Vol. 2: 267; see also: 263; 265–266) Although the term “仁心” (the mind of benevolence) does not appear in 6A11 (it only appears once in the Mencius in 4A1), Mencius said that “Benevolence, this is human mind” (仁, 人心也) in 6A11 before he went on to talk about “seeking one’s lost mind” (求其放心).

  6. 6.

    Mou Zongsan, however, does not consider this as a “genuine” identity, for in the mature Zhu the mind of Dao 道心 is an activity, whereas Li remains ontologically inactive (see Mou 1968, Vol. 2: 464–478; Vol. 1: 588). In our view, this is certainly not “identity” in Lu Xiangshan’s sense. But it is also clear that what Zhu mainly opposed is rather the reduction of “identity” to an “immediate identity” (more on this in Sect. IV). This point is missed by Mou. Furthermore, Mou fails to see that the Li as Taiji in Zhu, cosmologically, its active. 

  7. 7.

    Historically, Zhu’s interpretation induced both positive and negative responses. (For a comprehensive coverage of them, see Huang 1997). Among criticisms, the most representative ones came from WANG Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529)(representing the School of Mind 心學) and HUANG Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610–1695) (representing the School of Force 氣學). Since these critiques are mainly developed out of the frameworks of different schools, they are “transcendent” in nature. Given the limited length of this paper, a critical re-examination of them must be reserved for another occasion.

  8. 8.

    These fragments are now mainly included in Lu Jiuyuan, Lu Jiuyuan Ji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980); [hereafter: Lu Jiuyuan ji]. Among them, the most significant are “Yu Zheng Zhaiji” 與曾宅之 (A Letter to ZENG Zhaizhi), 3–7; “Yu Li Zai er” 與李宰二 (Second Letter to Chief Official LI), 149–150; “Mengzi Shuo” 孟子說 (Mencius’s Doctrine), 265–266.

  9. 9.

    For a general exposition of different types of geometry and relativity theory, see Stanley 2019: 67ff.

  10. 10.

    Zhu Xi, Shijichuan 詩集傳 (Collected Annotations to the Book of Odes). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1958), 100.

  11. 11.

    Cf.: Chan 2004.

  12. 12.

    All quotations in English from The Mencius mainly follow either Lau 1970 or Norden and Bryan 2009. But sometimes I might use my own translations.

References

All quotations in English from The Mencius mainly follow either Lau 1970 or Norden and Bryan 2009. But sometimes I might use my own translations.

  • Angle, Stephen. 2018. Buddhism and Zhu Xi’s Epistemology of Discernment, in John Makeham (2018), 156–192.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chan, Wing-tsit 陳榮捷. 1963. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ——— 陳榮捷. 1989. New Studies on Chu Hsi (Zhu Xi) Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chan, Wing-cheuk 陳榮灼. 2004. Zhu-Lu Huitong ji Xintu 朱陸滙通之一新途 (A New Way in Synthesizing Zhu [Xi] and Lu [Xiangshan]). Taiwan Philosophical Studies 台灣哲學硏究 4, 19–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • ——— 陳榮灼. 2013. Cheng Yichuan yu Zhuzi ji Jiben Fenqi – yi Xila Zhexue de Guandian 程伊川與朱子之基本分歧 – 一希臘哲學的視點 (On the Essential Distinctions between Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi – From the Standpoint of Greek Philosophy). National Central University Journal of Humanities 55, 75–05.

    Google Scholar 

  • ——— 陳榮灼. 2018. Zhuzi Xinqinglun de Xianxiangxue Hanyi 朱子“性情論”的現象學涵義 (Phenomenological Implications of Zhuzi’s ‘Doctrine of Nature and Feeling). In (eds.), Anthology of 21st Century Confucianism Volume Two: Globalization of Confucianism and Contemporary Civilization, eds. Yang Zuhan 楊祖漢 and Li Ruiquan 李瑞全. 二十一世紀當代儒學論文集 II: 儒學的全球在地化與當代文明. Zhongli: The Research Center of Confucianism, National Central University, 669–681.

    Google Scholar 

  • ——— 陳榮灼. 2020. Review of The Buddhist Roots of Zhu Xi’s Philosophical Thought. Dao 19 (2020): 152–157.

    Google Scholar 

  • Einstein, Albert. 1954. Ideas and Opinions. New Jersey: Crown Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gregory, Peter. 1995. (tr.) Inquiry into the Origin of Humanity. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hegel, G.W.F. 1967. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hills, Jr, Thomas. 1991. Autonomy and Self-Respect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Huang, Junjie 黃俊傑. 1997. A Treatise on the Intellectual History of Menciusian Studies, vol. II 孟學思想史論.卷二. Taipei: The Preparatory Office of the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, Immuanuel. 1956. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, Immanuel. 1964. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lau, D.C. 劉殿爵. 1970. Mencius. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Li, Jingde 黎靖德. (comp.) 1986. Zhuzi Yulei 朱子語類 (Topics Arranged Conversations of Master Zhu). Beijing: Zhonhua shuju.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lu, Jiuyuan 陸九淵. 1980. Lu Jiuyuan Ji 陸九淵集 (Complete Works of Lu Jiuyuan). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.

    Google Scholar 

  • Makeham, John, ed. 2018. The Buddhist Roots of Zhu Xi’s Philosophical Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2018a. Monism and the Problem of the Ignorance and Badness in Chinese Buddhism and Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism, in John Makeham (2018), 277–344.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mou, Zongsan 牟宗三. 1968. Xinti yu Xingti 心體與性體 (Mind as Substance and Nature as Substance), vol. 1, 2. Taipei: Zhengzhong.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Norden, Bryan W. 2009. (tr.). The Essential Mengzi: Selected Passages with Traditiona Commentary. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Qian, Mu 錢穆. 1980. Zhuzi Xin Xuean 朱子新學案 (History of Zhu Xi’s Thought). 5 Volumes. Taipei: Sanmin shuju.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, F.W.J. 2018. Statement on the True Relationship of Philosophy of Nature to the Revised Fichtean Doctrine, trans. Dale E. Snow. New York: SUNY Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stanley, Mattew. 2019. Einstein’s War. New York: Dutten.

    Google Scholar 

  • Xu, Fuquan 徐復觀. 1975. Zhong Guo Si Xiang Shi Lun Ji 中國思想史論集 (Collection of Essays in Chinese history of Ideas). Taipei: Taiwan Xue sheng shu ju.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhu, Xi 朱熹. 1958. Shijichuan 詩集傳 (Collected Annotations to the Book of Odes). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.

    Google Scholar 

  • ——— 朱熹. 1980. Zhu Wen Gong Wen Ji 朱文公文集 (Collected Writings of Zhu Xi). Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshuguan.

    Google Scholar 

  • ——— 朱熹. 1983. Sishu Jizhu 四書集註 (Collected Annotations to the Four Books). Beijing Zhonghua shuju.

    Google Scholar 

  • ——— 朱熹. 2001. Sishu Huowen 四書或問 (Questions Concerning the Four Books) Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Wing-cheuk Chan .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Chan, Wc. (2023). Zhu Xi’s Appropriation of Mencius’s Thought: From a Hermeneutic to a Developmental Approach. In: Xiao, Y., Chong, Kc. (eds) Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27620-0_9

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics