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Radical internalism meets radical externalism or: Smithies’ epistemology transcendentalised

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Abstract

In The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2019), Declan Smithies has carried out a thorough radical internalist programme. Along the way, he compares and contrasts many different views, including a group he calls “radical externalism”. From the labels, it might seem that radical internalism and radical externalism must be very different in their core commitments. In this short note, I will single out a version of radical externalism—factivism, more specifically John McDowell’s version (McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press., McDowell, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55:877–893, 1995, McDowell, J. (2011). Perception as a capacity for knowledge. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.)—and argue that actually this version has many similarities with Smithies radical internalism. Where there are differences, they do not obviously lie at the internalist/externalist juncture. The main point of this comparison is that philosophical positions that seem very different can share much common ground, and in seeing this, one can be in a better position to understand the crucial points of disagreement.

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Notes

  1. Here are some references for the textual evidence: for internalism for consciousness, see his remarks on a brain-in-a-vat having “exactly the same phenomenal character as it does in the real-world scenario …” (p. 202). Internalism for representational content follows from this view on BIV plus “Representationalism about Perceptual Experience: Every perceptual experience has phenomenal character that is identical with the property of representing some content with presentational force” (p. 91). Internalism for evidence is derived by further adopting “The Content Principle: Every experience that represents that p with presentational force thereby provides immediate, defeasible justification to believe that p” (p. 92). And since BIV by definition does not go beyond one’s skin, the second point holds too.

  2. I briefly indicated this in my book review (2021a); here I have slightly more space to elaborate this. The nature of transcendental arguments is a huge and controversial topic; for my take in this area, see Cheng (in preparation).

  3. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer pointing out this problem.

  4. In discussing the conceptual grounding thesis, Smithies takes issues with Davies (1995), Evans (1982), and Campbell (2002). Although these philosophers all hold different views, an Oxford trend can still be seen implicitly in the background, so the affinities with McDowell is to be expected.

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  1. National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan

    Tony Cheng

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  1. Tony Cheng
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Cheng, T. Radical internalism meets radical externalism or: Smithies’ epistemology transcendentalised. AJPH 1, 10 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-022-00013-7

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